People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 14 June 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 13987
• Citation: 203 Cal.Rptr. 562,157 Cal.App.3d 145
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Norman Samuel WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant. D000096.

Page 562

203 Cal.Rptr. 562

157 Cal.App.3d 145

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Norman Samuel WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

D000096.

Cr. 13987.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

June 14, 1984.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Christine Zilius, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Marshall and Linda A. Cabatic, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

After entering a "slow plea" based on the preliminary hearing transcript, Norman Samuel Williams appeals from the judgment convicting him of murder (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)), ¹ rape (§ 261, subd. (2)) and first degree burglary (§ 459, former § 460, subd. 1). Williams also appeals the court's special circumstance findings based on the rape and burglary. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(iii), (a)(17)(vii).) The court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the murder accompanied by special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)), and to concurrent upper terms of eight and six years, respectively, for the rape and burglary. (§§ 264, 461, subd. 1.) We modify the judgment of conviction by reducing Williams' murder conviction from first to second degree and by striking the special circumstance findings. As modified, we affirm the judgment. We also remand the matter for resentencing on second degree murder and direct the court upon resentencing to stay the sentence previously imposed for rape.

Facts

Williams raped and murdered 11-year-old Deanna R. during the early morning hours of July 2, 1980 while burglarizing the apartment in which she lived.

Discussion

I

Williams challenges all of his convictions, arguing they were based on involuntary confessions he made to the police. He also says the court should have made express oral findings regarding voluntariness so as to allow meaningful appellate review of the voluntariness ruling. (See Johnson v. State (Alaska App.1981) 631 P.2d 508, 513.) In Johnson, the court carefully noted, "we do not mandate written opinions or extensive, formalistic elaborations on the part of the trial court. A brief statement of the trial court's findings concerning contested facts essential to its decision is all that is required." (Id., at p. 513, fn. 16.)

California law on this point is that "[t]he judge's [voluntariness] determination must be reflected in the record with unmistakable clarity although he need not make formal written findings." (People v. Rowe (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1029, 99 Cal.Rptr. 816, citing Sims v. Georgia (1967) 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593.)

We fail to see any substantive or practical differences between the Alaska and California standards. Here, the court complied with both. After counsel's arguments regarding the only contested facts essential to its voluntariness determination, the court stated: "[N]ever once have I heard any evidence that anybody held out a carrot. I don't think there was any, you know, 'we'll get you for murder two--' or anything like that. But there is nothing like that in this case. So I'm convinced that the District Attorney has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he followed the applicable law in eliciting [Williams'] confession." Thus the court found Williams' confession was not induced through implied threats or promises and, on that basis, ruled Williams' confession was voluntarily made. The court's voluntariness determination is reflected in the record with sufficient clarity to allow our review of its ruling. (People v. Rowe, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 1029, 99 Cal.Rptr. 816.)

Turning to the merits, it is our function to "examine the uncontradicted facts surrounding the making of the statements to determine independently whether the prosecution met its burden and proved that the statements were voluntarily given without previous inducement, intimidation or threat. [Citations.] With respect to the conflicting testimony, [we] must 'accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record.' [Citation.] The burden of proof which must be sustained by the prosecution on questions of voluntariness is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[ ² [Citation.]" (People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 835, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93; accord, People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 608-609, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672.) " 'In determining whether the defendant's confession is the product of a rational intellect and a free will, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession must be taken into account.' [Citations.]" (People v. Haydel (1974) 12 Cal.3d 190, 198, 115 Cal.Rptr. 394, 524 P.2d 866.)

Police investigator Brad Frank questioned Williams on three separate occasions following Deanna's death. The first interview occurred late in the day on July 2, followed by the second and third interviews on July 6 and 7. Williams initiated the July 2 and 6 contacts through his former probation officer, Dan Hutton. Frank initiated the July 7 contact. Williams received and waived his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) on all three occasions.

The July 2 interview occurred at Hutton's office. Hutton was present for the first part of the interview and Williams' mother was present throughout. Williams denied he raped and murdered Deanna and burglarized her apartment.

The July 6 interview occurred at the police station. Hutton was present for most of the interview and Williams' mother and a friend of hers were present throughout. Williams again denied involvement in the crimes.

The July 7 interview also took place at the police station and represented the turning point in the case. Frank and police chief Charles Martin questioned Williams for about an hour in the presence of both of his parents. Williams began by again denying any involvement in the crimes. Martin then described his and Frank's theory of Williams' culpability. Williams then confessed his guilt. Williams' mother, emotionally upset, left the room as Williams began to confess. She returned sometime later. Williams' father remained in the room for the entire confession. Martin then asked Williams' parents to leave the room and Frank obtained two statements from Williams, an oral tape-recorded statement reiterating his confession and a short written statement. Martin assisted Frank in obtaining the written statement. In his statements Williams admitted raping Deanna and burglarizing her apartment, but he denied killing her or intending to hurt her.

Williams challenges both the confession he made in his parents' presence and the two statements he gave Frank and Martin. As to the former, Williams argues Frank and Martin induced him to confess through implied threats and promises. As to the latter, Williams argues his statements should have been excluded as the products of a coerced confession and because Frank and Martin collaborated with him in composing them.

The testimony is contradictory regarding any threats or promises that might have induced Williams' confession. Williams' mother testified Martin prefaced his and Frank's theory of the events by saying "that--he described the things that--about the death penalty, and that when people cooperate with the police, that it's easier for them, and that sometimes they could talk to the officer or the judge or the D.A. and help him." Hutton added he thought he remembered Williams asking Frank about possible penalties during the July 2 interview, and Frank responding that a conviction could result in commitment either to the Youth Authority or to the Department of Corrections. Frank flatly contradicted both Hutton's and Mrs. Williams' testimony. According to Frank, the first reference to the Youth Authority came when Williams raised the subject after concluding his confession. Similarly, the first reference to the death penalty came during the latter part of Williams' confession, after he had admitted his commission of the crimes, when Martin questioned him about possible accomplices. Faced with this conflicting testimony, we must accept Frank's narration because it is most favorable to the People and is supported by the record. (People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 835, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93; People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 609, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672.) Consequently, any references to the Youth Authority and the death penalty did not induce Williams' confession because they came after he admitted his guilt of the crimes. (People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 238, 251-252, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1615-1616, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.)

Likewise, Martin's introductory comment that he would tell the district attorney whether he thought Williams was telling the truth or was lying also did not induce Williams' confession. Martin's comment was little more than a variation on the Miranda warning that anything a defendant says can and will be used against him in court. As a practical matter, the prosecutor must be told of a defendant's statements in order to use them against him in court. Moreover, it is appropriate for the police to evaluate as well as transmit such statements. Martin promised Williams an even-handed evaluation. (Compare People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 633-634, 15 Cal.Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845.) We see nothing improper in Martin's comment.

Based on the above, we necessarily conclude Williams' statements were not the products of a coerced confession. For his collaboration argument Williams relies on Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242. Blackburn reversed a robbery conviction based on an involuntary confession. (Id., at p. 211, 80 S.Ct. at p. 282.) As the Supreme Court explained:

"In the case at bar, the evidence indisputably establishes the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and...