People v. Woodruff

• Decision Date: 13 September 1982
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 67105,67106
• Citation: 323 N.W.2d 923,414 Mich. 130
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie WOODRUFF, Defendant-Appellee. 414 Mich. 130, 323 N.W.2d 923
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 923

323 N.W.2d 923

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie WOODRUFF, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 67105, 67106.

414 Mich. 130, 323 N.W.2d 923

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 13, 1982.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., and A. George Best, II, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for the People.

Robert E. Berg, Jr., Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The question before us is whether 1957 P.A. 177 ¹ applies to any untried charge which carries a possible punishment of imprisonment against any inmate regardless of whether the offense is committed after imprisonment or whether the offense carries a mandatory consecutive sentence.

I

On August 23, 1978, following a preliminary examination, the prosecutor filed an information in Recorder's Court, Case No. 78-04944, charging defendant with possession of 6.8 grams of heroin, possession of five tablets of diazepam (Valium), and possession of five tablets of codeine. The arrest warrant had been issued on July 31, 1978.

On August 18, 1978, after a preliminary examination in Recorder's Court, Case No. 78-05176, an information had been filed charging the defendant with possession of 5.7 grams of heroin and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The warrant in that case had been issued on August 9, 1978.

Trial of both cases was set for December 5, 1978. When the defendant failed to appear, a bench warrant was issued in both cases. In fact, the defendant had been returned, as an escapee, to Jackson Prison on or about November 4, 1978. He was released on April 13, 1979. On July 13, 1979, defendant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss both cases, alleging violation of M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1), which provides that "such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days" after the prosecutor receives notice. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on July 17, 1979; the prosecutor responded only that he did not have actual notice of the incarceration. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice on July 25, 1979.

The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals concluded that the 180-day rule was applicable even though the crimes with which the defendant was charged were allegedly committed while he was a prison escapee and any sentences to be imposed upon conviction of those offenses would be consecutive to the term being served. M.C.L. Sec. 768.7a(1); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1030(1). It ordered a remand to the trial court for a determination whether the prosecutor should have known that the defendant was incarcerated. 105 Mich.App. 155, 306 N.W.2d 432 (1981).

The prosecutor has applied for leave to appeal.

II

The act in question provides:

"Sec. 1. Whenever the department of corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a penal institution of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such warrant, indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of such inmate, and request for final disposition of such warrant, indictment, information or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail." M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1).

"Sec. 2. The department of corrections shall notify each prisoner of any request forwarded under the provisions of section 1 of this act." M.C.L. Sec. 780.132; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(2).

"Sec. 3. In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice." M.C.L. Sec. 780.133; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(3).

The prosecutor argues that the 180-day rule applies only where the pending charge would allow for concurrent sentencing. This is the position first taken by a panel of the Court of Appeals in People v. Loney, 12 Mich.App. 288, 292-293, 162 N.W.2d 832 (1968):

"The purpose of the statute is clear. It was intended to give the inmate, who had pending offenses not yet tried, an opportunity to have the sentences run concurrently consistent with the principle of law disfavoring accumulations of sentences. This purpose, however, does not apply in the instance of a new offense committed after imprisonment, nor where the statute as in the case of an escape or attempted escape, sets up a mandatory consecutive sentence. The Legislature was not concerning itself with the need for dispatch in the handling of a charge brought against an inmate for offenses committed while in prison.

* * *

"For the foregoing reasons, it is the opinion of this Court that the 180-day statute does not and was not intended to apply to offenses committed while in prison and for which mandatory consecutive sentences are provided."

In People v. Moore, 96 Mich.App. 754, 761-762, 293 N.W.2d 700 (1980), a panel of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Loney interpretation:

"We find no ambiguity in the 180-day rule statute that would permit us to make exceptions in the application of its plain language. Even if it were reasonable and otherwise valid to distinguish, as Loney did, between inmates who commit criminal offenses prior to incarceration and those who commit them subsequently, the distinction is one that the Legislature, not this Court, should make. However, our decision here rests not only on the concept of separation of powers, but also upon our belief that the rationale underlying Loney is no longer completely valid.

"The Loney Court justified its result on what it believed was the intent of the Legislature in passing this statute. Loney found this intent to be that inmates of state penal institutions should serve concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. Because inmates who commit criminal offenses while incarcerated are not entitled to concurrent sentencing, see MCL 768.7a; MSA 28.1030(1), an incarcerated defendant was not prejudiced by delay of trial. However, since Loney was decided the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that the 180-day rule protects more than just a defendant's right to serve concurrent sentences.

"In People v. Hill, 402 Mich 272, 280; 262 NW2d 641 (1978), the Supreme Court found that the purpose of the 180-day rule was to 'secure to state prison inmates their constitutional right to a speedy trial'. As set forth in the United States Constitution, US Const, Am VI, and the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, Sec. 20, the right of an accused to a speedy trial does not depend upon whether the charged offense was committed prior to or during incarceration for another crime. Therefore, we hold that Loney was wrongly decided and that persons such as defendant who commit crimes while incarcerated are entitled to the protection of the 180-day rule."

Since Moore, several panels of the Court of Appeals have split on the issue. ²

III

We find the extent of the act's coverage to be unambiguously plain, and it is to be applied as written. ³ The title, which is an expression of the law's object, ⁴ declares it too to be "An act to dispose of untried warrants, indictments, informations or complaints against inmates of penal institutions of this state". ⁵ The corpus of the act sets forth the methods of disposition. Charges are either to be tried within a specified time or dismissed. The language of the statute expressly provides that it applies to "any" untried charge against "any" prisoner, "whenever" the department of corrections shall receive notice of that charge. M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1).

The statute imposes three basic conditions for the 180-day rule to affect an untried charge: (1) the charge must be against a prison inmate, (2) the offense must be one for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, and (3) notice must be received by the department and a request delivered to the appropriate prosecuting attorney. The statute does not specify that the type of sentence, concurrent, mandatory consecutive, or discretionary consecutive, determines the reach of the provision. The statute refers only to "a prison sentence".

The statute may have several salutary effects, no one of which should be mistaken for the sole purpose of the act. This Court indicated in People v. Collins, 388 Mich. 680, 689, 202 N.W.2d 769 (1972), in People v. Castelli, 370 Mich. 147, 153, 121 N.W.2d 438 (1963), and most recently in People v. Hill, ...