Phillips v. Garcia
Decision Date | 09 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA–CV 14–0239.,1 CA–CV 14–0239. |
Citation | 237 Ariz. 407,351 P.3d 1105,714 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 13 |
Parties | Robert PHILLIPS, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Craig E. GARCIA, Defendant/Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Stein and Stein, P.C. By Henry M. Stein, Law Office of Dennis A. Sever, PLLC By Dennis A. Sever, Mesa, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant.
Slack–Méndez Law Firm By Charles J. Slack–Méndez, Tempe, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee.
OPINION
¶ 1 In this opinion we address an aspect of the procedure established by the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure for entry of an award and judgment after a superior court arbitration. Defendant Craig E. Garcia appeals the superior court's denial of his motion to dismiss the arbitrator's award. We conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction, but in our discretion we exercise special action jurisdiction and grant relief by ordering dismissal of the action without prejudice.
¶ 3 Nothing further was filed with the court until November 2013, approximately 10 months later, when Phillips filed a petition requesting that the court order Garcia to appear as a judgment debtor pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 12–1632. The petition further provided that “[a] Judgment has been entered against this Judgment Debtor and docketed.” (Emphasis added).
¶ 4 Garcia moved to dismiss the arbitration award because no application for entry of judgment was timely filed within 120 days after the arbitrator's decision, in accordance with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 76(d). After numerous pleadings by the parties, the court denied Garcia's motion in a signed order filed February 26, 2014. Garcia filed his notice of appeal on March 7, 2014.
¶ 5 Garcia asserts this court has jurisdiction over this appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12–2101(A)(2), -(A)(3), and -(A)(4).1 This court, however, lacks appellate jurisdiction because a challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss is a non-appealable interlocutory order. See Engle Bros., Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Ariz.App. 406, 407, 533 P.2d 714, 715 (App.1975) ; see also N. Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 525, 622 P.2d 469, 472 (1980). No final, appealable judgment has been entered.
¶ 6 Although this court lacks appellate jurisdiction, we may exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction under appropriate circumstances, even when the parties have not requested such relief. See A.R.S. § 12–120.21(A)(4) ( ); Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 35, 36 P.3d 749, 759 (App.2001) ( ); Arvizu v. Fernandez, 183 Ariz. 224, 227, 902 P.2d 830, 833 (App.1995) ( ). Special action jurisdiction is proper when a party has no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal,” Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a) or “in cases involving a matter of first impression, statewide significance, or pure questions of law,” see Roman Catholic Diocese v. Superior Court , 204 Ariz. 225, 227, ¶ 2, 62 P.3d 970, 972 (App.2003) (internal quotation omitted).
¶ 7 The issue Garcia raises on appeal is primarily a question of law—requiring this court to interpret court rules and a statute. See Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 303, 802 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1990) ( ). Additionally, the parties have briefed the issue and we have a complete record. We are presented a legal issue of first impression, and judicial economy will be served by a substantive ruling now. Therefore, in our discretion we accept special action jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court erred by not dismissing the case. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).
¶ 8 Garcia argues the trial court erred when it declined to dismiss the arbitration award in accordance with Rule 76(d), which provides:
If no application for entry of judgment has been filed within 120 days from the date of the filing of the notice of decision, and no appeal is pending, the case shall be dismissed.
According to Garcia, no true judgment was entered, no appeal filed, and the 120 day period allowed by Rule 76(d) has expired; therefore, the action must be dismissed. Phillips contends that the Judgment is a valid judgment under Rule 76(a) and A.R.S. § 12–133(E), and Garcia did not appeal that judgment. We first address whether a true judgment was entered.
¶ 9 This court reviews de novo the interpretation of rules and statutes. M–11 Ltd. P'ship v. Gommard, 235 Ariz. 166, 168, ¶ 6, 330 P.3d 356, 358 (App.2014). We look to the plain meaning of the language as the most reliable indicator of the construction and meaning. See State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007) ; New Sun Bus. Park, LLC v. Yuma Cnty., 221 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 12, 209 P.3d 179, 182 (App.2009). When the language of a statute or rule is “clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction.” See Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991).
¶ 10 Rule 76(a) provides:
(Emphasis added.) This rule grants the arbitrator the power to render a decision, and the parties may then propose the form of award for the arbitrator to sign. After the parties have been given an opportunity to voice any objections, the arbitrator's duty is to then “pass upon the objections and file one signed original award or other final disposition ” with the clerk of the court. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 76(a) (emphasis added). Rule 76(b) directs that when no award is filed with the court, the notice of decision becomes the award of the arbitrator.
¶ 11 This court has explained that the rules of arbitration “clearly contemplate two separate filings” by the arbitrator: the “notice of decision” and “the award.” See Bittner v. Superior Court (Galati), 182 Ariz. 434, 436, 897 P.2d 736, 738 (App.1995).2 The arbitrator here filed a notice of decision on January 3, 2013. Phillips's counsel submitted the Judgment to the arbitrator, and it was signed and filed on January 29. The Judgment, despite its name, must be correctly understood to be the “award or other disposition” under Rule 76(a), because it was signed by the arbitrator rather than a superior court judge or commissioner. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(a) ( )(emphasis added).
¶ 12 Phillips also argues that, based on the “or other final disposition” language in the rule, the mislabeling of the award should not matter. In Bittner, the mislabeling of an award was analyzed in the context of whether an appeal from an arbitrator's award was untimely. Bittner, 182 Ariz. at 435, 897 P.2d at 737. An arbitrator first filed an “Arbitration Award” with the court but the...
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