Phoenix City Prosecutor's Office v. Ybarra

• Decision Date: 21 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-SA 07-0029.,1 CA-SA 07-0029.
• Parties: PHOENIX CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Gloria YBARRA, Judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court, Respondent Judge, Joshua Price Landers, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

160 P.3d 695

215 Ariz. 374

PHOENIX CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Gloria YBARRA, Judge of the Phoenix Municipal Court, Respondent Judge Joshua Price Landers, Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 07-0029.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department E.

June 21, 2007.

Kerry G. Wangberg, Phoenix City Prosecutor By Gary L. Shupe, Assistant City Prosecutor, Phoenix, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Law Office of Jonathan L. Warshaw By Jonathan L. Warshaw, Gilbert, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

TIMMER, Judge.

¶ 1 We accept jurisdiction in this special action to decide whether the State must consent to a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial on a charge of misdemeanor driving under the influence ("DUI") in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 28-1381 (Supp.2006). For the reasons that follow, we hold the State's consent is not required.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The State charged real-party-in-interest Joshua Price Landers with driving while impaired to the slightest degree in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(1) and driving with a blood alcohol concentration above .08 in violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(2), both misdemeanor offenses, A.R.S. § 28-1381(C). He requested a jury trial pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1381(F), which the Phoenix Municipal Court granted. After trial in that court, a jury acquitted Landers of the first DUI charge but found him guilty of the second. Landers subsequently filed a motion for new trial on the second charge, which the court granted.

¶ 3 Prior to his second trial, Landers filed a "Waiver of his Right to Jury Trial." The State opposed the waiver and asked the court to grant the State's independent request for a jury trial. The court rejected the State's opposition to Landers' waiver and denied the State's request for a jury trial. Significantly, the court concluded that A.R.S. § 28-1381(F) only provides the defendant with a statutory right to a jury trial, and that "nothing in the statute requires the consent or approval of the state."

¶ 4 The State subsequently filed a petition for special action relief in the superior court challenging the municipal court's ruling. The superior court declined jurisdiction, and the State initiated the pending special action.

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 We accept jurisdiction in this special action because it presents a legal question of first impression and of statewide importance, and because the State has no equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1, 3; Jackson v. Schneider ex rel. County of Maricopa, 207 Ariz. 325, 327, ¶ 5, 86 P.3d 381, 383 (App. 2004); see also A.R.S. §§ 13-4032 (2001) (listing issues State may appeal in criminal cases) & 22-375 (2002) (stating only appeal from municipal court judgment is to superior court). Additionally, the State has provided evidence of conflicting municipal court rulings on this issue, so a decision from this court would provide needed guidance. Cervantes v. Cates ex rel. County of Maricopa, 206 Ariz. 178, 181, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d 449, 452 (App.2003).

¶ 6 We review the superior court's decision declining jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. Stoudamire v. Simon, 213 Ariz. 296, 297, ¶ 3, 141 P.3d 776, 777 (App.2006). Whether the State was entitled to a jury trial in the face of Landers' waiver is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. "An error of law may constitute an abuse of discretion." Id.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 The State argues the municipal court erred by refusing to conduct a jury trial because (1) the State has an independent right to a jury trial pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1381(F), which it timely exercised, and, alternatively, (2) the State is required to consent to a defendant's waiver of a jury trial pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3983 (2001) and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 18.1(b), and the State did not do so here. We address each contention in turn.

I. Does the State have an independent right to a jury trial in misdemeanor DUI cases?

¶ 8 The State argues it has a statutory right¹ to a jury trial in misdemeanor DUI cases, and thus the municipal court erred by denying the State's timely demand for a jury trial after Landers waived his right. See A.R.S. § 22-320(A) (2002) (stating jury demand by state or defendant must be made at least five days before trial or deemed waived). Specifically, the State cites A.R.S. § 28-1381(F), which provides: "At the arraignment, the court shall inform the defendant that the defendant may request a trial by jury and that the request, if made, shall be granted." See also A.R.S. § 28-1382(C) (Supp.2006) (setting forth same language in context of extreme DUI offense). This court has held that §§ 28-1381(F) and -1382(C) provide substantive jury-trial rights for misdemeanor DUI offenses. Manic v. Dawes, 213 Ariz. 252, 254, ¶ 9, 141 P.3d 732, 734 (App.2006); State ex rel. Wangberg v. Smith, 211 Ariz. 101, 104, ¶ 11, 118 P.3d 49, 52 (App.2005).

¶ 9 Although § 28-1381(F) does not mention the State's right to a jury trial, the State nevertheless contends this provision provides a corresponding right to the State. First, the State points out that § 28-1381(F) does not expressly exempt the State from exercising the jury-trial right. Consequently, the State contends the legislature intended to grant a jury-trial right to both the defendant and the State for such offenses. The State asserts that this court supported this view of § 28-1381(F) in Manic and Smith by speaking of a right for misdemeanor DUI "offenses" rather than limiting the right to defendants.

¶ 10 To discern the meaning of a statute, we look first to its language, Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 176 Ariz. 190, 193, 859 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1993), and we will ascribe plain meaning to its terms unless they are ambiguous. Rineer v. Leonardo ex rel. County of Pima, 194 Ariz. 45, 46, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 767, 768 (1999). Section 28-1381(F) expressly says "the defendant may request a trial by jury," which the court must grant. (Emphasis added.) A plain reading of this statute compels the conclusion that only the defendant is entitled to a jury trial and only if the defendant asks for it. Thus, if no request is made by the defendant, the case will not be tried before a jury. Although the statute does not specifically exclude the State from exercising a jury-trial right, the legislature implicitly did so by providing the right to the defendant only. Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design & Constr., Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600-01, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (App.1992) (citing Hoyle v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 224, 227, 778 P.2d 259, 262 (App. 1989)) ("What a statute necessarily implies is as much a part of the statute as what it makes explicit."); see also Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 432, 531 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1975) ("If the Legislature intended to grant a jury trial in every case, it would have no doubt said so in plain, explicit language."); Smith, 211 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 11, 118 P.3d at 52 (to same effect).

¶ 11 Additionally, although both Manic and Smith stated that a right to a jury trial exists for misdemeanor DUI offenses, they did so in the context of the propriety of defendants' assertion of such rights over the State's objections. Manic, 213 Ariz. at 253, ¶ 1, 141 P.3d at 733; Smith, 211 Ariz. at 102, ¶ 1, 118 P.3d at 50. Whether the State possessed a corresponding right was not before the court in either case, and we therefore decline to construe its word choice as commenting on the issue.

¶ 12 The State next argues we should construe § 28-1381(F) as granting a jury-trial right to the State because state and federal courts have long held that a state can obtain a jury trial in the face of a waiver of the constitutionally guaranteed right by a defendant even though the state is not mentioned in those constitutional guarantees. See e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-38, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965); State v. Durham, 111 Ariz. 19, 20, 523 P.2d 47, 48 (1974).² According to the State, therefore, "[i]f the Legislature had intended to do something as innovative as creating a jury trial right solely for defendants in a criminal matter ... it would have done so in clearer language than that used in A.R.S. § 28-1381(F)."

¶ 13 We reject the State's contention. First, as explained previously, the plain language of § 28-1381(F) compels a construction of that provision as only granting a defendant a right to a jury trial in misdemeanor DUI cases. Thus, we do not utilize secondary principles of construction to glean legislative intent. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d 876, 880 (App. 2004) (noting court need not resort to secondary rules of construction when language is clear); J.L.F. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 208 Ariz. 159, 162, ¶ 15, 91 P.3d 1002, 1005 (App.2004) (acknowledging that if statutory language is unclear "we consider the statute's context, subject matter, historical context, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose") (citations omitted).

¶ 14 Second, the reasons for allowing the State to obtain a jury trial in the face of a defendant's waiver of a constitutional right to a jury do not apply to a waiver of a statutorily created jury-trial right. In Singer v. United States, defendant Singer argued "that a defendant in a federal criminal case has not only an unconditional constitutional right, guaranteed by Art. III, § 2, and the Sixth Amendment, to a trial by jury, but also a correlative right to have his case decided by a judge alone if he considers such a trial to be to his advantage." 380 U.S. at 25-26, 85 S.Ct. 783. Thus, Singer claimed that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Federal Rule") 23, which required the United States to consent to any waiver of the jury-trial right, was unconstitutional. Id. at 26, 85 S.Ct. 783.

¶ 15 The Court rejected Singer's claim, concluding that a defendant has no...