Pleasant v. Motors Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 111,111
• Parties: James M. PLEASANT, Administrator of the Estate of E. L. Pleasant v. MOTORS INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 164

185 S.E.2d 164

280 N.C. 100

James M. PLEASANT, Administrator of the Estate of E. L. Pleasant v. MOTORS INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 111.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1971.

Bryan, Jones, Johnson, Hunter & Greene, by K. Edward Greene, Dunn, for plaintiff appellant.

Teague, Johnson, Patterson, Dilthey & Clay, by Grady S. Patterson, Jr., and Paul L. Cranfill, Raleigh, for defendant appellee.

BRANCH, Justice.

Appellant contends that the intentional destruction of the automobile by the son of the named insured in the policy was not a 'direct and accidental loss' as required by the terms of the policy.

This Court defined the word 'accident' in connection with a suit seeking recovery under an accidental death policy which provided for 'direct and accidental loss' in the case of Clay v. State Insurance Co., 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289, as follows:

'. . . (I)n case of accident insurance, as expressed in the general terms of this policy, the word 'accident' should receive its ordinary and popular definition as an unusual and unexpected occurrence--one that takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person affected--and that in a given case the question is to be determined by reference to the facts as they may affect the holder of the policy, or rather the person insured. 'An event which, under the circumstances, is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens.' Bomvier, 1883, as cited in Lovelace v. Travelers' Protective Association, 126 Mo. 104, 28 S.W. 877, and the cases, hold further that the intentional killing of the insured by a third person does not of itself, and without more, withdraw the claim from the protection of the policy . . ..'

In Fallins v. Durham Life Insurance Co., 247 N.C. 72, 100 S.E.2d 214, the court considered an accidental death policy, and stated:

'An injury is 'effected by accidental means' if in the line of proximate causation the act, event, or condition from the standpoint of the insured person is unintended, unexpected, unusual, or unknown.

The unintended acts of the insured are deemed accidental. Injuries caused to the insured by the acts of another person, without the consent of the insured, are held due to accidental means unless the injurious acts are provoked and should have been expected by the insured. . . .'

These cases effectively point out that whatever is unexpected or unforeseen is determined from the standpoint of the named insured in the policy.

The use of the word 'accidental' to limit the losses in automobile insurance policies is subject to more than one reasonable meaning. It is well settled that when such words become ambiguous as applied to the various causes of loss set forth in the policy, the ambiguity will be construed against the insurer.

'The words used in the policy having been selected by the insurance company, any ambiguity or uncertainty as to their meaning must be resolved in favor of the policyholder, or the beneficiary, and against the company.' Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518.

We therefore conclude that an automobile insurance policy providing for payment for accidental loss or damage to the automobile includes loss caused by the intentional act of another when in the line of causation the act, from the standpoint of the policyholder or named insured, is unintended, unexpected, unusual, or unknown. Of course the insurance company may, by use of specific words, exclude losses covered by intentional acts of another.

Here the policy contained no specific provision excluding recovery for loss caused by the intentional act of another. Nor does the record show that the named insured had knowledge of, or complicity of any kind in, the intentional burning of the insured automobile.

Defendant argues that the tortious destruction of the automobile by Bobby Pleasant should be imputed to his father, the named insured, so as to preclude recovery.

In support of this argument defendant cites Sparrow v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 243 N.C. 60, 89 S.E.2d 800, which holds that an employer could not recover on an insurance policy for the loss of an automobile which was tortiously converted to his use by an employee. Defendant also cites cases from other jurisdictions, including Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 178 Wis. 349, 189 N.W. 1028, where the Wisconsin Court denied recovery by an innocent partner on an insurance policy when the property covered by the policy was wilfully burned by his co-partner. These cases are distinguishable from instant case since all of the cases cited by defendant are based on relationships which allow tortious conduct to be imputed. This Court does not place tort liability on a parent simply because of the parent-child relationship.

The North Carolina rule in this respect is stated in the case of Smith v. Simpson, 260 N.C. 601, 133 S.E.2d 474, as follows:

'The mere fact of the relationship does not render a parent liable for the torts of his child. Liability of the parent must be predicated upon evidence that the child was in some way acting in a representative capacity such as would make the master responsible for the servant's tort, or on the ground that the parent procured, commanded, advised, instigated or encouraged the commission of the tort by his child, or that the parent was independently negligent, as in permitting the child to have access to some dangerous instrumentality. " (Quoting from 3 Strong: N.C.Index, Parent and Child, § 7.)

The Virginia case of Aetna Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 170 Va. 312, 196 S.E. 641, is a case...