Polignone v. Bulldog Chems., LLC
| Decision Date | 30 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-16-00633-CV,01-16-00633-CV |
| Parties | DONATO POLIGNONE AND NEAL D. ROY, Appellants v. BULLDOG CHEMICALS, LLC, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 152nd District Court Harris County, Texas
Appellants, Donato Polignone and Neal D. Roy, (collectively, "appellants") challenge the trial court's no-answer default judgment1 in favor of appellee, BulldogChemicals, LLC ("Bulldog Chemicals"), in its suit against them for breach of contract and quantum meruit. In two issues, appellants contend that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and rendering judgment against them in their individual capacities.
We affirm.
In its original petition, Bulldog Chemicals alleged that it entered into an agreement with appellants "for [the] purchase of goods, wares, merchandise, materials and/or services." In exchange for Bulldog Chemicals's agreement to "furnish[]" and "deliver[]" to appellants certain goods, appellants "agreed to pay" Bulldog Chemicals $21,750. However, after Bulldog Chemicals "shipped the goods" to appellants, they refused to pay the "amount owed." Bulldog Chemicals further asserted that appellants breached the parties' agreement and owe it $21,750, "exclusive of interest." Moreover, appellants "benefited from the use of the goods" and "are indebted in quantum meruit [to Bulldog Chemicals] in the principal sum of $21,750[]." And Bulldog Chemicals requested attorney's fees.
On February 3, 2016, Polignone was personally served with citation and a copy of the original petition. On March 2, 2016, Roy was personally served with citation and a copy of the original petition. After the returns of citations had beenon file with the clerk of the court for more than ten days2 and appellants had failed to appear and answer, Bulldog Chemicals moved, on April 28, 2016, for a default judgment. On May 11, 2016, the trial court entered a default judgment against appellants, finding that they had been "duly and legally served with process" on February 3, 2016 and March 2, 2016, they "ha[d] wholly failed to appear or answer," they "ha[d] wholly made default," and "the citation[s] with the officer[s'] return[s] thereon ha[d] been on file with th[e] [trial] [c]ourt for ten (10) days exclusive of the date of filing and [the date of judgment]." The trial court then held that appellants are liable to Bulldog Chemicals, and it ordered them to pay $21,750 in damages, $5,921.04 in attorney's fees,3 pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs.
On June 9, 2016, appellants filed an unverified4 plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Bulldog Chemicals's suit because Bulldog Chemicals did not have standing to bring claims against appellants in their individual capacities. They asserted that the agreement to purchase certain goods "existed exclusively" between Bulldog Chemicals and NuGenTec Oilfield Chemicals, LLC ("NuGenTec").5 The trial court did not rule on appellants' plea.
That same day, appellants also filed an unverified motion for new trial, arguing that the original petition "d[id] not support [a] default judgment" against them because they "never interacted with [Bulldog Chemicals] as individuals" and "[a]ll of their interactions with Bulldog [Chemicals] were based on their capacit[ies] as agents of" NuGenTec; "there were defects in service" because Bulldog Chemicals "did not send a notice of intent to take a default judgment to the Texas Attorney General by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least ten days before filing the motion for default judgment"; and appellants' "failure to answer was not intentional, but was accidental," they "ha[d] a meritorious defense," and "a new trial w[ould] not delay or prejudice" Bulldog Chemicals.
Bulldog Chemicals responded to appellants' motion for new trial, asserting that "the default judgment [was] fully supported by [its] original petition"; appellants "were personally served with [its original] petition and citation and service w[as] proper"; and appellants "failed to satisfy the [requirements of] Craddock [v. Sunshine Bus Lines Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939)]."
After a hearing, the trial court denied appellants' motion for new trial.
In their second issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in rendering judgment against them in their individual capacities because Bulldog Chemicals "lack[s] standing" to bring suit against them as individuals.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case, and standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Standing is never presumed, cannot be waived, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 443-46. We review standing under the same standard by which we review subject-matter jurisdiction generally. Id. at 446. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226, 228 (Tex. 2004).
The test for standing requires that there be a real controversy between the parties that will actually be determined by the judicial declaration sought. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996). Without a breach of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff, no cause of action can accrue to its benefit. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex. 1976). A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority. Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661. And it has standing if: (1) it has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which it complains; (2) has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be adjudicated; (3) has an individual stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused it some injury in fact, either economical, recreational, environmental, or otherwise; or (5) it is an appropriateparty to assert the public's interest in the matter as well as its own interest. Lake Medina Conservation Soc'y, Inc./Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Ctys. WCID No. 1 v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n, 980 S.W.2d 511, 515-16 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied); Billy B., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
A plaintiff has the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrate a court's jurisdiction to hear a cause. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. In our review of standing, we construe the allegations in the pleadings as true and construe them in favor of the pleader. Id.; Juarez v. Tex. Ass'n of Sporting Officials El Paso Chapter, 172 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.). We look to the facts alleged in the petition, but may consider other evidence in the record if necessary to resolve the question of standing. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000); In re Shifflet, 462 S.W.3d 528, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding). The standing inquiry "requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted." Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 153, 156 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (courts "must assess standing plaintiff by plaintiff, claim by claim"). A challenge to standing cannot be used to require the party to prove its entire case but should belimited to facts that might be characterized as primarily jurisdictional. See Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554; In re Shifflet, 462 S.W.3d at 537.
Bulldog Chemicals, in its original petition, alleged that it entered into an agreement with appellants to "furnish[]" and "deliver[]" to them certain goods in exchange for appellants' agreement "to pay" Bulldog Chemicals $21,750. After Bulldog Chemicals "shipped the goods" to appellants, they refused to pay the "amount owed" to Bulldog Chemicals. According to Bulldog Chemicals, appellants breached the parties' agreement and caused Bulldog Chemicals damages in the amount of $21,750, "exclusive of interest." Bulldog Chemicals further alleged that appellants "benefited from the use of the goods" and "are indebted in quantum meruit [to Bulldog Chemicals] in the principal sum of $21,750[]."
We note that the record also contains an affidavit from Dustin O'Neal, the president of Bulldog Chemicals, in which he testifies:
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