Prescott v. Independent Life and Acc. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 08 February 1995 |
Docket Number | No. CV-94-A-383-N.,CV-94-A-383-N. |
Citation | 878 F. Supp. 1545 |
Parties | Ford W. PRESCOTT, Plaintiff, v. INDEPENDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
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Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, AL, Joseph (Jay) Brady Lewis, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.
Bruce Johnson Downey, III, Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, P.A., Montgomery, AL, Ruth W. Woodling, Christine E. Howard, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, GA, for Independent Life and Acc. Ins. Co.
Alvin T. Prestwood, Linda Smith Webb, James M. Sizemore, Jr., Volz, Prestwood, Hanan & Sizemore, Montgomery, AL, for T.L. Meeks.
This cause is before the court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment filed on November 14, 1994.
The plaintiff, Ford Prescott ("Prescott") brought this suit on March 31, 1994 alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., commonly known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Specifically, plaintiff alleges a cause of action for quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Plaintiff named as defendants both the company he formerly worked for, Independent Life Insurance Co. ("Independent Life"), as well as his supervisor at the company, T.L. Meeks ("Meeks"). Plaintiff also alleged a pendant state law claim against his supervisor for assault and battery and invasion of privacy.
The defendants claim that the plaintiff was terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. They also argue that, should the court rule against their Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff's recovery should be limited by the after-acquired evidence rule.
For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Defendant Independent Life's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be DENIED. Defendant Meeks' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Title VII claims against him is due to be GRANTED. Defendant Meeks' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the state law claims against him is due to be DENIED.
Many of the facts of this case are in dispute. Therefore, except where noted, the court will rely on the facts as laid out by the plaintiff in his submissions, including his affidavit.1
Plaintiff was hired by the defendant insurance company in 1980. He began as an insurance agent, but eventually worked his way up to the position of Staff Sales Manager in the Montgomery office. In 1992, defendant Meeks became the District Manager for Independent Life in Montgomery. As such, Meeks was Prescott's direct supervisor.
According to the plaintiff, beginning in November of 1992 and continuing until plaintiff's termination in May, 1993, the defendant Meeks subjected him to numerous unwanted sexual advances. These advances allegedly took the form of unwanted touchings, implicit threats to plaintiff's status at the company, as well as implicit promises of advancement. Plaintiff also alleges an elaborate plan concocted by Meeks to win the plaintiff over. Allegedly, when the plaintiff refused to give into the defendant's demands, defendant determined to get rid of the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Meeks contrived a false record against the plaintiff as part of this scheme to eliminate him.
As stated above, defendants dispute the facts alleged by the plaintiff. According to them, Prescott was a disruptive employee. They allege that plaintiff was a gossip, who criticized his supervisor's management style and decisions and openly speculated as to aspects of Meeks' personal life, including his sexual orientation. Defendants contend that it was Prescott's insubordination that resulted in his termination on May 12, 1993.
According to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is only appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings and evidentiary submissions which show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993), rehearing denied, 16 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.1994). If the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial rests on the non-movant, the party seeking summary judgment can meet this standard either by demonstrating that the non-movant's evidence is not sufficient to establish an essential element of his or her claim, or by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of an essential element to the claims, and on which they bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. To satisfy this burden, the non-movant cannot rest on the pleadings, but must by affidavit or other appropriate means, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether there exists genuine, material issues of fact to be tried. If there are not, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Dominick v. Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir.1987). "Genuine disputes are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant." Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919 (citations omitted). It is the substantive law that identifies those facts which are material on motions for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See also DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir.1989), rehearing denied, 896 F.2d 560 (11th Cir.1990).
All the evidence and the inferences from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990). See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant bears "the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no dispute as to any material fact in the case." Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). When the court considers a motion for summary judgment, it must avoid weighing conflicting evidence, making credibility determinations and deciding material factual issues. Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919. In the particular case of an employment discrimination claim, which often requires ascribing motive or intent to a party, the court notes that decisions in this circuit have expressed some hesitation in granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir.1994). With these rules and principles of law in mind, the court will determine whether summary judgment is appropriate or whether there exist genuine issues of material fact necessitating a trial.
The elements that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to make out a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title VII depends on the type of harassment alleged, quid pro quo or hostile environment. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). In this case, the plaintiff has specifically alleged only quid pro quo sexual harassment. Under this theory, the plaintiff seeks to establish that a supervisor required sexual favors in return for job benefits, including not being terminated. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, 867 F.2d 1311, XXXX-XXXX (11th Cir.1989), rehearing denied, 874 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.1989).
The elements that a plaintiff must show to make out a claim under quid pro quo sexual harassment are the following: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group;2 (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) the harassment altered the terms and conditions of employment. See Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assoc., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir.1994). Unlike a suit for hostile work environment, a plaintiff proceeding under a theory of quid pro quo harassment need not prove knowledge on the part of the employer. See Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909-910 (11th Cir.1982); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir.1987). As stated by the court in Steele, Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316.3
However, Independent Life has brought to the court's attention a recent decision from a district court in another circuit that held that homosexual sexual harassment was not actionable under Title VII. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 871 F.Supp. 822 (D.Md.1994). The court will briefly address this contention.
In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged quid pro quo sexual harassment. As stated above, under that form of harassment, the plaintiff claims that a supervisor required sexual favors for advancement, or for continued employment. The court believes that the gender of the person who requests such favors is not relevant. Under quid pro quo sexual harassment, all that is required is a supervisor who conditions the terms of employment on the employee's giving in to the supervisor's sexual demands. In fact, homosexual quid pro quo sexual harassment has been recognized for some time. See, Joyner v. AAA Cooper Trans., 597 F.Supp. 537, 542 (M.D....
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