Price v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 01-12-01164-CV
| Decision Date | 10 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-12-01164-CV,01-12-01164-CV |
| Parties | BEAU DAVID PRICE, Appellant v. TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE COMMISSION, ALAN STEEN, JOEL MORENO, ROD VENNER, AND ANDY PENA, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Beau David Price sued his former employer, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission ("TABC") and several officials, Alan Steen, Joel Moreno, Rod Venner, and Andy Pena (collectively "Appellees"), alleging that his terminationviolated his constitutional rights of equal protection, free speech, and due course of law. The trial court granted Appellees' plea to the jurisdiction, and Price appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting the plea because sovereign immunity does not apply in suits alleging constitutional violations. We conclude that Price failed to plead a valid constitutional claim, and, accordingly, we affirm.
Price was employed as an agent by TABC from October 3, 2007, until August 3, 2009, when he was terminated for violating the commission's off-duty employment policy and for insubordination. In late 2008, Price's then-girlfriend, Natalie Minton, reported to TABC that Price had assaulted her, and Price was placed on administrative leave while TABC investigated the allegation. Minton recanted later that year and Price returned to work on January 20, 2009.
In March 2009, Minton reported that Price had violated TABC policies by taking steroids1 and having worked an off-duty job while he was on administrative leave following Minton's first complaint. In response, Price's then-supervisor, Sergeant Scott Zella, ordered an investigation, which Captain Rick Cruz decided would be handled by Sergeant Steven Cagle.
Price contends that, on March 18, 2009, Cruz sent an email to Andy Pena, Captain of the Office of Professional Responsibility of TABC, and copied Cagle,who was several weeks from completing this second investigation, stating, "The inquiry Sgt. Cagle is looking into (Beau Price working off duty while on admin. leave) will be found to be true." Price also alleges that Cagle admitted under oath to an Administrative Law Judge that he had been advised of Price's guilt, despite lacking evidence that Price had violated TABC policy. Price also claims that "Cruz treated Price differently than he treated Hispanic TABC officers charged with extra job policy violations." In support of his allegation, Price asserts that "Lieutenant Harry Schreffler [was not disciplined when he] had, with impunity, falsified a government document and notarized Price's signature falsely." Moreover, he asserts that "Schreffler was suspended in 2010 for improperly working an extra job . . . yet was reinstated and not terminated."
Price further alleges that Cruz ordered him not to make a Garrity declaration,2 but Price refused to withdraw the declaration. Price alleges that:
Price told Cruz that he needed to confer with his attorney, who advised Price that it was improper for Cruz to instruct him to withdraw the Garrity preface and not to do so. Price told Cruz that on advice of counsel he would not withdraw the Garrity.
Price contends that because he refused to withdraw the Garrity declaration, "he was subjected to retaliation and discharged by Cruz's recommendation."
Price also alleges that Assistant Chief Venner ignored Price's appeal of his termination. TABC later submitted a report to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education, pursuant to Texas Occupations Code § 1701.452, or F-5 report, apprising the commission of Price's termination. This form originally stated that Price's termination qualified as a General Discharge, but the Administrative Law Judge later ordered that this be changed to an Honorable Discharge after the State Office of Administrative Hearings conducted a hearing on September 22, 2010.
On June 21, 2011, Price filed his original petition, claiming discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA") and violations of the Texas Constitution, Article I, sections 3, 8, and 19. Appellees filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea but gave Price leave to amend his state constitutional claims. Price amended his petition and Appellees filed a Second Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction. This amended plea argued that Steen is the only defendant whom Price could sue in his official capacity and even so, Price's constitutional claims against Steen fail as a matter of law. The trial court granted Appellees' Second Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction.
A plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity from suit is a challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. SeeKirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2009); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). "A plea questioning the trial court's jurisdiction raises a question of law that we review de novo." State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's jurisdictional pleadings, we must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader's intent. Id.; Smith v. Galveston Cnty., 326 S.W.3d 695, 697-98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). The party asserting the plea must show that, "even if all the allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings are taken as true, there is an incurable jurisdictional defect apparent from the face of the pleadings, rendering it impossible for the plaintiff's petition to confer jurisdiction on the trial court." Anderson v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO, 338 S.W.3d 709, 712-13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). If the pleading contains facts that do not affirmatively demonstrate, but also do not affirmatively negate, jurisdiction, "it is an issue of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the pleadings." Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d. at 226-27). "If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted withoutallowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend its petition." Smith, 326 S.W.3d at 698 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we "'consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,' even where those facts may implicate the merits of the cause of action." Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d at 622 (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d. at 227). When reviewing the evidence, we must take as true all evidence in favor of the nonmovant, "indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Id. (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). If the evidence creates a fact issue as to the jurisdictional issue, then the fact-finder will decide that issue. Id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28). "However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d. at 228).
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, parties may not sue the sovereign without its consent. See Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. 2006). Sovereign immunity has two components: (1) immunity from suit, which deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit to which the State has not consented, and (2) immunity from liability, which protects the State fromjudgments against it even when it has consented to suit. See City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2011). Because immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26; City of Houston v. Gunn, 389 S.W.3d 401, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
Public officials sued in their official capacities are protected by the same sovereign or governmental immunity as the governmental unit they represent. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 843-44 (Tex. 2007). But, Texas law generally does not shield state officials from suits for equitable relief for a violation of constitutional rights. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.6 (Tex. 2009) ().
Nevertheless, claims for equitable relief for constitutional violations "cannot be brought against the state, which retains immunity, but must be brought against the state actors in their official capacity." Id. at 373. If a plaintiff properly sues the appropriate state official for equitable relief, we must examine whether the plaintiff's petition sufficiently pleaded his claims to defeat the government's plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
While a plea to the jurisdiction "does not authorize an inquiry so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required to put on their casesimply to establish jurisdiction[,]" the plaintiff must do more than merely name a cause of action against the state official and assert the existence of a constitutional violation. Id. at 223; see generally Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011) (); Dir. of Dept. of Agric. & Env't v. Printing Indus. Ass'n of Tex., 600 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. 1980) (...
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