R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Harris
| Decision Date | 06 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1D19-1641 |
| Citation | 346 So.3d 643 |
| Parties | R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Margaret HARRIS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Harris, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jason T. Burnette, Jones Day, Atlanta, GA; Charles F. Beall, Jr., and Larry Hill, Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
Bard D. Rockenbach, Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach; Carlos Santisteban, Jr., Carlos Santisteban, Jr., P.A., Miami; Richard J. Diaz, Richard J. Diaz, P.A., Coral Gables; Robert D. Trammell, Robert D. Trammell, P.A., Tallahassee; and Jonathan B. Harris, J.B. Harris, P.A., Coral Gable, for Appellee.
In this Engle1 progeny case, R.J. Reynolds challenges a final judgment awarding Margaret Harris, as personal representative of the Estate of Richard Harris (the Estate), six million dollars in punitive damages. R.J. Reynolds argues that the trial court erred by affirmatively instructing the jury it could consider the Engle findings when deciding whether to award punitive damages (and how much to award).
We agree the trial court erred, reverse the portion of the judgment awarding punitive damages, and remand for further proceedings limited to punitive damages.
Richard and Margaret Harris originally sued in the Eleventh Circuit in 2007. Seven years later, the parties agreed to transfer this case to Gadsden County in the Second Circuit. After Richard Harris died in 2016, the trial court allowed the Estate to file a fifth amended complaint asserting a wrongful death claim and adding a claim for punitive damages.2 The case finally went to trial in 2019 and consisted of two phases. Phase I addressed liability, class membership, comparative fault, compensatory damages, and entitlement to punitive damages. Phase II addressed the amount of punitive damages.
In Phase I, the trial court instructed the jury that the Engle findings were "binding"—they could "not be denied or questioned, and they must carry the same weight as they would if you had determined them yourselves." The trial court then listed the Engle findings,3 noting that they "do not, by themselves, establish that R.J. Reynolds is liable to the plaintiff."
Later in the Phase I instructions, the trial court made several points about how the jury was to determine whether punitive damages were warranted. The trial court explained that entitlement to punitive damages is determined by clear and convincing evidence: "Clear and convincing evidence differs from the greater weight of the evidence in that it is more compelling and persuasive."
The trial court then instructed the jury about the Engle findings for purposes of punitive damages: Earlier, R.J. Reynolds objected to this portion of the jury instructions. Instead, it sought an instruction that the jury "may not consider the Engle findings when determining whether punitive damages against R.J. Reynolds are warranted." The trial court rejected this requested instruction.
At the end of Phase I, the jury found for the Estate on all claims, apportioned thirty percent fault to Richard Harris, and awarded four million dollars in compensatory damages. The jury also found that punitive damages were warranted.
The trial went on to Phase II, where the court repeated its instruction to jurors that R.J. Reynolds again objected to this portion of the instructions and maintained the position that the jury should not consider the Engle findings in connection with punitive damages.
The jury awarded six million dollars in punitive damages. R.J. Reynolds moved for a directed verdict, or for a new trial or remittitur, in part because the trial court permitted the jury to consider the Engle findings in determining punitive damages entitlement and amount. The trial court denied the motion and entered the final judgment.
Accurate jury instructions are crucial to the fair operation of our civil jury trial system. To that end, a trial court abuses its discretion and commits reversible error if it provides an erroneous instruction that "reasonably may have misled the jury." Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp. , 177 So. 3d 489, 517 (Fla. 2015). Likewise, a court can err by failing to give a proposed instruction that contains an accurate statement of the law, is supported by the facts of the case, and is necessary for the jury to properly resolve the issues of the case. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Prentice , 290 So. 3d 963, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), approved by Prentice v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , No. SC20-291, 338 So.3d 831 (Fla. March 17, 2022). When that occurs, we must reverse if the proposed instruction is not covered by other instructions given to the jury and the failure to instruct is prejudicial. Id.
R.J. Reynolds argues the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury that it could consider the Engle findings when determining whether punitive damages were warranted. As authority for its proposed instruction to the contrary, R.J. Reynolds relied on the Florida Supreme Court's statement that "the res judicata effect of the Phase I findings addressed in Engle has no application to claims for punitive damages sought by Engle progeny plaintiffs." Soffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 187 So. 3d 1219, 1227 (Fla. 2016). The company also provided the trial court with citations to trial transcripts from thirty other Engle progeny cases in which the juries had been instructed using the same or substantially similar instruction as that requested by R.J. Reynolds. These dozens of trials occurred throughout the state in fourteen circuits (including the trial court's Second Circuit).
The trial court rejected R.J. Reynolds’ requested instruction and instead instructed the jury that In doing so, the trial court erred.
The trial court's instructions to the jury were problematic for two reasons. First, by affirmatively instructing the jury it could consider the Engle findings for purposes of punitive damages, the trial court ignored the Florida Supreme Court's explanation in Soffer that the Engle findings have "no application" to claims of punitive damages. Id. In Soffer , the court held that "the individual members of the Engle class action are not prevented from seeking punitive damages on all claims properly raised in their subsequent individual actions." Id. at 1221.
In explaining its reasoning, the court delved into the interplay between the Engle findings and punitive damage claims. The court explained that the Engle findings had no application to future punitive damage claims. Id. at 1227. Engle sent individual plaintiffs back to square one on punitive damages. Id. at 1228 (). The instructions here did not provide the "clean slate" intended under Soffer .
R.J. Reynolds thus requested an accurate statement of the law. The other instructions failed to cover this point, and R.J. Reynolds was prejudiced as a result.
Second, not only did the trial court reject an accurate instruction, but it also gave a misleading one. The instructions disregard a basic principle of preclusion: a finding in one proceeding should not be afforded preclusive effect if there are "[d]ifferences in the burden of proof or persuasion between the initial proceeding and the subsequent proceeding." Cook v. State , 921 So. 2d 631, 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ; cf. State v. Dubose , 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477, 480 (1943) .
The instructions here folded in findings made by an earlier jury under a lesser evidentiary standard. The Estate bore the burden to prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. § 768.725, Fla. Stat. (). Yet the Engle findings were made by an earlier jury under the greater-weight-of-the-evidence standard.
The blending of these two evidentiary standards might have reasonably misled the jury as it was deliberating punitive entitlement. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Jewett , 106 So. 3d 465, 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial