Raulerson v. State
| Citation | 699 So.2d 339 |
| Decision Date | 26 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-710,97-710 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2267 James RAULERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Kenneth Witts, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
James Raulerson (defendant) appeals his judgment and sentence for felony driving while license suspended, claiming that section 322.34(1) of the Florida Statutes (1995) unconstitutionally permits the trial court to determine whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony. We affirm.
The defendant was charged with the offense of driving while his license was suspended in violation of section 322.34 of the Florida Statutes (1995). The state prosecuted the offense as a felony, relying upon the fact that the defendant had three prior convictions for the same offense. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asserting that section 322.34(1) was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant thereafter entered a plea of nolo contendere after specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his dismissal motion. The trial court then adjudicated the defendant guilty of the felony offense of driving while license suspended and imposed sentence.
Section 322.34(1) of the Florida Statutes (1995) provides that a driver, upon a third or subsequent conviction for driving with a suspended license, is guilty of committing a third-degree felony:
322.34 Driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified.-
(1) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264, and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:
(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
The defendant argues that whether an accused has been "convicted" under the statute depends upon whether or not the trial court exercised its discretion to withhold an adjudication of guilt. In this regard, the defendant maintains that if the trial court withholds a defendant's adjudication of guilt following either a guilty verdict or plea on the charge of violating section 322.34(1), then that charge would not constitute a prior "conviction" for purposes of enhancement under the statute. He further asserts that since the trial court is vested with discretion pertaining to the decision whether to withhold an adjudication of guilt, the statute must be struck down as unconstitutional because the delegation of such legislative power to the trial court violates Article 2, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. We disagree.
In determining whether a statute is constitutional we must resolve all doubts in favor of the statute's constitutionality. State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994). In doing so, we must give the statute a fair construction that is consistent with the constitution and legislative intent. Id. at 1076. Applying these rules of construction to the instant case, the defendant's argument fails.
The dispositive issue here is whether a defendant's violation of section 322.34(1) constitutes a conviction when the sentencing court decides to withhold an adjudication of guilt instead of entering a judgment against the defendant. If the answer is yes, then the defendant's argument fails because all prior violations of the statute would count in determining whether the violation is a felony.
By embracing the concept of withholding adjudication, Florida courts have created some confusion because there is uncertainty as to the meaning and ramifications of such a disposition. However, our supreme court has made it clear that one may be "convicted" without being adjudicated guilty:
[T]he term "conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court. It is important to distinguish a "judgment of conviction" which is defective unless it contains an adjudication of guilt.
State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-244 (Fla.1971).
The above definition is consistent with rule 3.701(d)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
"Conviction" means a determination of guilt resulting from plea or trial, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or whether imposition of sentence was suspended.
In Smith v. Bartlett, 570 So.2d 360 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991), Judge Harris aptly noted that, after Gazda, the term "conviction" was similarly defined and applied in other contexts. See Jones v. State, 502 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)(adjudication withheld is a conviction for double jeopardy purposes); Johnson v. State, 449 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 458 So.2d 274 (Fla.1984) ().
A common sense reading of the instant statute indicates that the legislature intended the term "conviction" to mean a determination of a defendant's guilt by way of plea or verdict. There appears to be no requirement that there be an adjudication. The obvious legislative intent of section 322.34 is to increase the penalty for repeat violations of the statute. The legislative goal is accomplished by application of the Gazda definition of conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is constitutional.
AFFIRMED.
I write to more directly address the contention of the appellant. This seems appropriate since this has become a "hot issue" of the day.
Raulerson relies on Wooten v. State, 332 So.2d 15 (Fla.1976), another case involving a criminal offense which provides for progressively more severe sentences for subsequent like offenses. Wooten requires that formal adjudications are essential in order to authorize the imposition of the progressive sentences. The Wooten court held:
The requirement that offenders who have been proven guilty be so adjudged is part and parcel of the legislative scheme to discourage drunken driving by authorizing progressively harsher sentences for multiple offenders. In order for a repeat offender to be subject to enhanced punishment for subsequent offenses under Fla. Stat. § 316.028(4) (1974 Supp.), there must have been at least one previous conviction under Fla. Stat. § 316.028(3) (1974 Supp.) Section 316.028 does not authorize stiffer punishment in the absence of a prior adjudication of guilt; previous entry of a judgment of conviction is the necessary precondition.
Although the requirement for a...
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...under Florida law is immaterial. 12 In this respect, we recognize the issue is unsettled under Florida law. (See Raulerson v. State (Fla.App.1997) 699 So.2d 339, 340, review granted Mar. 5, 1998 (table, 709 So.2d 537); State v. Keirn Fla.App. 4th Dist.1998) 720 So.2d 1085, review granted Ju......
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..."conviction" under section 322.34(1)(c), because it is a disposition outside of section 318.14(10). We note that in Raulerson v. State, 699 So.2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the fifth district has addressed the identical issue as that posed in this case and arrived at a similar result. Raulers......
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