Reeves v. Scott
| Decision Date | 16 September 1949 |
| Parties | REEVES v. SCOTT et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kenneth R. Reeves, a nonunion musician, sued Ralph Chionini Scott and others, members of a musicians' union, to restrain defendants from interfering with plaintiff's business and for damages.
The Superior Court, Suffolk County, Morton, J., entered a decree dismissing the bill, and plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Judicial Court, Ronan, J., reversed the decree, holding that the demands of defendants on hotels to require those to whom rooms were let for private social functions to hire only union muscians were unlawful.
Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, JJ.
D. Burstein, Boston, for plaintiff.
M. T. Hall, Boston, J. T. Day, South Boston, for defendants.
This is an appeal from a final decree dismissing the bill brought by the plaintiff against certain officers of Boston Musicians' Protective Association Local No. 9, American Federation of Musicians, a voluntary association, hereinafter called the union, to restrain the members of the union from interfering with his business, and for damages.
The plaintiff has been engaged for several years in the business of conducting orchestras and furnishing them to various organizations and individuals who required music for dances, banquets, weddings or other social affairs. Prior to the summer of 1943, a principal part of the plaintiff's business was the furnishing of music at the various hotels in Boston for such social affairs as were conducted by private parties who had hired rooms for the purpose from the hotel and who engaged the plaintiff to supply the music.
The union is comprised of persons who play various musical instruments and are engaged in the vicinity of Boston in furnishing music in theatres, hotels, radio broadcasting stations and halls which are let for social functions. It is a branch of the American Federation of Musicians, hereinafter called the federation, which in turn is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The union by-laws forbid its members to play in an orchestra or band with nonunion members, or to render musical services in a building or place classed as unfair. The by-laws of the federation forbid a member to accept an engagement from a booking agent who has not been licensed by the federation.
The plaintiff was a member of the union for a few months and resigned in June, 1942, after he had been found not guilty on certain charges and while a matter was pending for further investigation by the union. The evidence shows violation of the by-laws of the union by the plaintiff. His application filed in September, 1943, for readmittance to the union has never been finally acted upon by the union, and it is apparent that, by reason of considerable feeling manifested agaisnt him by officers of the union, the application will not be granted. As the plaintiff does not now seek readmittance to the union, we need not decide that matter. See Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 17 N.E.2d 170;Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677.
The principal hotels in Boston have for many years regularly employed orchestras or bands, comprised only of members of the union, in the dining rooms, dance halls or other places in the hotels which were under the immediate supervision of the hotels and where music was furnished for the entertainment of their guests. It was the practice of these hotels to let rooms to private parties to conduct various social affairs. The hotels merely let the space and did not concern themselves in any way with the selection of those who were to perform musical services at such affairs. That matter was left entirely to those who hired the rooms.
The plaintiff and others engaged in a business similar to his were competing with members of the union in furnishing musical services especially at these private functions sponsored by those who had hired rooms at a hotel. There was an open market for this work when the present controversy between the plaintiff and the union began. The conflict was precipitated by the desire of the union to secure this work for its members. Minor skirmishes occurred. The plaintiff, who had been hired by different parties to furnish music at the Copley Plaza Hotel in May, 1943, at the Bradford Hotel in May, 1943, and at the Hotel Sheraton in December, 1947, was prevented from doing so by the interference of the union, which compelled these third persons to discharge the plaintiff and to secure an orchestra of union members. The bitterness of the struggle and the attitude of the union toward the hotels may be illustrated by one of these instances. With reference to the episode at the Bradford Hotel, for example, the judge found that an officer of the union notified the person who hired the plaintiff that there would be no music at the contemplated social affair and, just before the affair began, this official ‘with several policemen about’ appeared at the hotel with two orchestras comprised of members of the union. He told the manager of the hotel, ‘Get rid of Reeves and if you don't you'll get into trouble.’ The manager told the person sponsoring the affair to discharge the plaintiff ‘or out you'll go unless you take the union band.’ The union official then warned the hotel manager to and ‘you'll have no more music at the Bradford if you hire Reeves.’ The management of the Hampshire House was threatened with picketing if it did not cease to employ the plaintiff and other nonunion orchestras. On another occasion, a member of the union was discovered playing in an orchestra which the plaintiff was conducting at Hull, refused upon the request of the president of the union to stop playing immediately, was fined $500, and was suspended from the union. He has since continued to play in the plaintiff's orchestra. In August, 1942, the official journal of the union, which was distributed to its members, contained a notice that the plaintiff and another were no longer members and that members of the union should govern themselves accordingly. Similar notices appeared in subsequent publications.
The hotels controlled the places of employment of musicians at these private social functions and consequently were in a position to control this source of employment of those who competed with the union. Competition would be eliminated if the hotels refused to permit nonunion musicians to work at these social functions. The union, although it had no trade dispute with the hotels, passed a vote on April 1, 1943, that its members would refuse to render musical services at the hotels after July 1, 1943, ‘and request the A. F. of M. 1 to do likewise with its members' unless the management in letting rooms to others for social functions should insist that the music for such affairs be furnished only by members of the union. An association comprising all the principal hotels in Boston agreed on July 8, 1943, to comply with the vote of the union. The plaintiff has since been unable to secure employment at these hotels.
The plaintiff had the right to engage in the business of furnishing musical services to those members of the public who desired them, and such a right has always been recognized in this Commonwealth as a property right protected by the common law and guaranteed by arts. 1 and 10 of the Declaration of Rights to the Constitution of Massachusetts and by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The principle is too firmly established in this jurisdiction to require the citation of many decisions. See, for example, Godin v. Niebuhr, 236 Mass. 350, 351, 128 N.E. 406; Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 75, 76 N.E.2d 12, 2 A.L.R.2d 1190. The burden is upon one who interferes with the lawful conduct of another's business to show that the interference was justified by the exercise of an equal or superior right and was carried out by lawful means. Quinton's Market, Inc. v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 317, 21 N.E.2d 546;Keegan v. O'Donnell, 310 Mass. 346, 350, 37 N.E.2d 995;Colonial Press, Inc. v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 500-501, 74 N.E.2d 1. The members of a union have the right to compel their employer to give them all the available work of the particular kind which they are competent to perform even to the exclusion of others. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 1067, 116 Am.St.Rep. 272,7 Ann.Cas. 638;Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N.E. 717, L.R.A.1915A, 1217, Ann.Cas.1915C, 810;Tracey v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 25, 114 N.E. 959;Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790. The hotels, however, were not the common employers of union and nonunion musicians. They had always employed union musicians in all affairs conducted by the hotels, but they did...
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