Rejouis v. Greenwich Taxi, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2000
• Docket Number: (AC 18706)
• Citation: 750 A.2d 501,57 Conn. App. 778
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: ROSELANDE REJOUIS, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF JEAN CLAUDE BOITEUX) v. GREENWICH TAXI, INC., ET AL.

57 Conn. App. 778

750 A.2d 501

ROSELANDE REJOUIS, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE OF JEAN CLAUDE BOITEUX) v. GREENWICH TAXI, INC., ET AL.

(AC 18706)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 16, 1999.

Officially released May 23, 2000.

Schaller, Hennessy and Dupont, JS.

Laurel Fedor, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Mark F. Katz, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Opinion

SCHALLER, J.

The plaintiff, Roselande Rejouis, administratrix of the estate of the decedent, Jean Claude Boiteux, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered following the granting of the motion to set aside the verdict filed by the defendants Greenwich Taxi, Inc., Stamford Taxi, Inc., and Tibbetts Enterprises, Inc.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly set aside the verdict on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the damages awarded by the jury and the jury's verdict for the plaintiff was influenced by sympathy. We agree.²

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In September, 1988, the decedent was an independent contractor working as a taxicab driver for the defendants under a contract called the "Taxicab Lease Agreement." The parties executed another document called the "Independent Driver/Contractor Work Injury Compensation Plan" (compensation plan).³ In addition to the lease payments, the decedent made regular payments into the compensation plan.

On March 7, 1989, the decedent went to work driving his taxicab. The decedent was found murdered outside his taxicab in Stamford on the morning of March 8, 1989. At trial, Malka Shah of the office of the chief medical examiner testified that when the decedent was examined at approximately 9:30 a.m. on March 8, 1989, he had been dead for eight to ten hours. At the time of death, the decedent was thirty-four years of age.

In her amended complaint,⁴ the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants breached their contract with the decedent. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the decedent's death was work related and, therefore, the defendants were obligated to pay the decedent's estate pursuant to the compensation plan. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict on count one, the breach of contract claim, with respect to which the court reserved decision. After hearing the evidence, the jury found that the decedent's death was work related. The jury also found the defendants liable for damages and awarded the plaintiff $50,000 plus prejudgment interest. In response, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict⁵ and a motion for remittitur.⁶ Although the trial court, determined that the decedent's death was work related, it granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the damages awarded by the jury and because the jury's verdict for the plaintiff was influenced by sympathy. This appeal followed.

At the outset, we note that "[t]he setting aside of a verdict can occur for two general reasons. First, a trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied. Maroun v. Tarro, 35 Conn. App. 391, 396, 646 A.2d 251, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 926, 648 A.2d 1641 (1994). Second, a verdict may be set aside if its result justifies a suspicion that a juror or jurors were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality." Novak v. Scalesse, 43 Conn. App. 94, 97-98, 681 A.2d 968, cert. granted on other grounds, 239 Conn. 925, 682 A.2d 1004 (1996) (appeal withdrawn, May 13, 1997). We will first discuss whether the trial court properly determined that the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or could not apply a legal principle because of a lack of evidence.

"The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is against the law or the evidence. O'Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 208, 439 A.2d 292 (1981). The supervision which a judge has over the verdict is an essential part of the jury system.... [The trial court] should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality. Burr v. Harty, 75 Conn. 127, 129, 52 A. 724 (1902). The court has a duty to set aside the verdict where the jury's action is so unreasonable as to suggest that it was the product of such improper influences. State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 457, 423 A.2d 118 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S. Ct. 667, 62 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1980), aff'd, 188 Conn. 626, 453 A.2d 418 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928, 103 S. Ct. 2088, 77 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1983); Roma v. Thames River Specialties Co., 90 Conn. 18, 19-20, 96 A. 169 (1915)....

"The decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion that, in the absence of clear abuse, we shall not disturb. O'Brien v. Seyer, supra, . Our review of the trial court's action on a motion to set aside the verdict involves a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion, according great weight to the action of the trial court and indulging every reasonable presumption in favor of its correctness; Labatt v. Grunewald, 182 Conn. 236, 240-41, 438 A.2d 85 (1980); Levitz v. Jewish Home for the Aged, Inc., 156 Conn. 193, 198, 239 A.2d 490 (1968); since the trial judge has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence. Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 447, 39 A. 797 (1898). Moreover, the trial judge can gauge the tenor of the trial, as we, on the written record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any, that could improperly have influenced the jury. Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 139, 540 A.2d 666 (1988); Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 26, 301 A.2d 249 (1972). The focus of our inquiry is the action of the trial court in setting aside the verdict. Campbell v. Gould, 194 Conn. 35, 39, 478 A.2d 596 (1984).

"Litigants, however, have a constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury. Mather v. Griffin Hospital, supra, [207 Conn.] 138; Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 350, 441 A.2d 604 (1982); Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 180 Conn. 415, 417, 429 A.2d 915 (1980). The right to a jury trial is fundamental in our judicial system, and this court has said that the right is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court. Camp v. Booth, 160 Conn. 10, 13, 273 A.2d 714 (1970). Since, in setting aside the verdict, the trial court has deprived the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered of his constitutional right to have factual issues resolved by the jury, we must examine the evidential basis of the verdict itself to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Jacobs v. Goodspeed, supra [417]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palomba v. Gray, 208 Conn. 21, 23-25, 543 A.2d 1331 (1988).

In the present case, the plaintiff claims that there was sufficient evidence to support the damages awarded by the jury and, therefore, the trial court improperly set aside the verdict. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the written terms of the contract accompanied by the evidence and testimony presented at trial, provided the jury with an adequate basis to award damages. We agree.

"A court should be especially hesitant to set aside a jury's award of damages." Zarrelli v. Barnum Festival Society, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 322, 326, 505 A.2d 25, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d 516 (1986). "That damages may be difficult to assess is, in itself, insufficient reason for refusing them once the right to damages has been established. See Ball v. T. J. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn. 549, 551, 143 A. 855 (1928)." Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 420, 446 A.2d 799 (1982). "There are no unbending rules as to the evidence by which [damages for breach of contract] are to be determined.... The general rule in breach of contract cases is that the award of damages is designed to place the injured party, so far as can be done by money, in the same position as that which he would have been in had the contract been performed.... In making its assessment of damages for breach of [any] contract the trier must determine the existence and extent of any deficiency and then calculate its loss to the injured party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) L. F. Pace & Sons, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 9 Conn. App. 30, 41, 514 A.2d 766, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 811, 516 A.2d 886 (1986). "Assessment of damages is peculiarly within the province of the jury and their determination should be set aside only when the verdict is plainly excessive and exorbitant. Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 586, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984). Wood v. Bridgeport, 216 Conn. 604, 611, 583 A.2d 124 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brennan v. Burger King Corp., 46 Conn. App. 76, 79, 698 A.2d 364 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 204, 707 A.2d 30 (1998). "The plaintiff has the burden of proving the extent of the damages suffered. Johnson v. Flammia, [169 Conn. 491, 501, 363 A.2d 1048 (1975)]. Although...