Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State

• Citation: 714 A.2d 584
• Decision Date: 23 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-558-A,AFL-CIO,96-558-A
• Parties: 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942 RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL 94, AFSCME,v. STATE of Rhode Island. ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 584

714 A.2d 584

158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942

RHODE ISLAND COUNCIL 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 96-558-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 23, 1998.

Gerard P. Colbeigh, for plaintiff.

William E. Smith, Providence, for defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice.

This case comes before the Court on appeal by the Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (union), from a judgment of the Superior Court vacating an arbitration award in its favor. The trial justice vacated the award on the ground that the arbitrator's construction of the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the state and the union was irrational. According to the arbitrator's award, the state's statutory use of prison labor to accomplish work normally carried out by union members is a violation of the parties' CBA. In conjunction therewith the arbitrator concluded that prison inmates incarcerated at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) who are engaged in bargaining-unit labor at the direction of the Department of Corrections (DOC) are employees of the state within the meaning of the labor contract. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court vacating the arbitration award. The undisputed facts surrounding this appeal are as follows.

The union and the state were parties to a CBA from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1995. The union is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for all state employees within Rhode Island Council 94 with regard to wages, hours, and working conditions. Under the terms of the CBA the state is restricted in its right to assign work performed within an established bargaining unit to any employee outside that unit or to a subcontractor. Specifically, article 33 of the CBA, entitled "Sub-Contracting Procedure," provides in pertinent part:

"33.1 The State shall continue to provide work for employees in the bargaining units, and shall avoid, insofar as is practicable, the sub-contracting of work performed by employees in the bargaining unit on the date of this agreement, provided however:

"33.2 The State agrees that upon considering sub-contracting of any work presently performed by an employee which would have an adverse affect upon job security, wage rate, or classification status of any employee in the bargaining unit, it shall:

1) Notify the Union's Executive Director in writing of its intention six months in advance of sub-contracting, and

2) Whenever the State seeks and obtains bids from prospective sub-contractors, it shall, at least sixty days before binding itself to any sub-contracting agreement, notify the Executive Director of the Union that it has received the bids and shall grant the Union a reasonable opportunity to meet with the Director of Administration or other appropriate State Officials to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of sub-contracting and to develop a mutually acceptable plan for protecting the interests of any employees who will be affected."

Article 38.1, entitled "Non-Performance of Bargaining Unit Work," provides:

"Work normally performed within an established bargaining unit shall not be performed by any employee outside said bargaining unit, except in an emergency situation."

On March 10, 1993, the union filed a class-action grievance, contending that the state had violated these provisions by assigning job tasks "normally performed within an established bargaining unit" to prison inmates incarcerated at the ACI. It specifically contested the assignment to prisoners of janitorial work, general maintenance, groundskeeping, snow removal, custodial work, repair-shop work, and other tasks conducted at a number of state job sites. Accordingly the union sought to enjoin the prison assignments and reinstate union members to their former positions with back pay. It also sought to recover past dues that had been lost as a result of displaced union members.

A state hearing officer, in response, denied the union's grievance on the basis that "[p]risoners are not employees [within the meaning of the labor contract] and their use is not subcontracting." He concluded that the state's employment of prisoners is not a violation of the parties' CBA. Because the parties were unable to come to an agreement on the matter, the following inquiry was submitted to final and binding arbitration:

"Did the State violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement in the manner in which it allowed prisoners to work at State facilities as alleged in the grievance dated March 10, 1993? If so, what shall be the remedy?"

In support of the grievance union witnesses testified extensively regarding the use of prison inmates at various state job sites. Testimony indicated that from 1988 to 1993 inmates were replacing union employees in the performance of bargaining-unit work at the following state locations: the Cranston Street Armory, the Coventry National Guard Base, the Quonset Armory, the Aime Forand Building, Camp Fogarty, Colt State Park, and the state food-processing plant. Inmates were employed by the state to perform janitorial and watchman duties, grounds maintenance, laundry and kitchen work. According to one witness, by 1988 the Rhode Island National Guard was using more than fifty prisoners to maintain its facilities, and by 1993 three janitorial positions in that agency had been abolished.

Witnesses for the state, on the other hand, testified that the union knew of its longstanding practice of employing inmates to perform unskilled labor at various state facilities and that this practice was even encouraged by some local union presidents. The state also asserted that no state employee had been adversely affected by the practice, although some had been transferred to other state departments or agencies. In addition the state contended that under G.L.1956 § 42-56-21 ¹ it had the right and obligation to rehabilitate incarcerated prisoners by employing them in forced labor as well as the option of having them engage in more expansive and voluntary work or education-release programs. The state argued that in these circumstances inmates are not employees of the state within the meaning of the labor contract.

Following a hearing on the matter, the arbitrator sustained the union's grievance, reasoning that the CBA specifically forbids the assignment of work performed within the represented bargaining unit to any employee outside that unit. Prison inmates, the arbitrator concluded, that are supervised by the DOC and directed by it to perform bargaining-unit work are state employees outside the represented bargaining unit. Thus their use by the state, she ruled, is violative of the CBA. Accordingly the arbitrator ordered the state to reinstate displaced and laid-off union members to their former positions and to reimburse them for lost wages and benefits. She denied, however, the union's request for compensation of back dues, finding that the state's actions were prompted by budgetary concerns and not by contempt for the union or its members.

The union thereafter filed a motion with the Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award while the state requested an order vacating the award and staying its implementation pending appeal. On July 31, 1996, the Superior Court granted the state's motion and vacated the arbitration award, ruling that the arbitrator's construction of the CBA was irrational. The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the State on September 25, 1996. From this judgment the union filed a timely appeal to this Court.

I Standard of Review

As a preliminary matter we acknowledge that judicial authority to review or to vacate an arbitration award is limited. "[A]bsent a manifest disregard of a contractual provision or a completely irrational result," the courts have no authority to vacate an arbitration award. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections, 707 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I.1998) (quoting Town of Coventry v. Turco, 574 A.2d 143, 146 (R.I.1990)); Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 912, 391 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1978); Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332 355-56, 346 A.2d 124, 137-38 (1975). A court therefore may not reconsider the merits of an award despite allegations that it rests upon errors of fact or on a misinterpretation of the contract. United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370, 98 L.Ed.2d 286, 298 (1987). The courts' insulation of arbitration awards has been justified on the ground that broad judicial review in this area undermines the strong governmental policy encouraging the private settlement of labor grievances through the relatively inexpensive and expedient means of arbitration. Id.; Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 844 (1st Cir.1997); Rhode Island Council 94 v. State, 456 A.2d 771, 773 n. 2 (R.I.1983); Belanger, 115 R.I. at 355-56, 346 A.2d at 138. As Justice White stated on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court:

"Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. * * * If the courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances by private mechanisms would be greatly undermined." Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 37-38, 108 S.Ct. at 370-71, 98 L.Ed.2d at 299.

Notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, a court may vacate an arbitration award that manifestly disregards a contractual provision or yields an irrational result. See, e.g., Rhode Island Laborers' District Council v. State, 592 A.2d 144, 146 (R.I.1991); Turco, 574 A.2d at 147; City of...