Ricci v. R.I. Commerce Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-140-Appeal.,WC 20-502
• Citation: 276 A.3d 903
• Parties: Helen RICCI v. RHODE ISLAND COMMERCE CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

276 A.3d 903

Helen RICCI

v.RHODE ISLAND COMMERCE CORPORATION et al.

No. 2021-140-Appeal.

WC 20-502

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 21, 2022

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq., for Plaintiff.

Joseph D. Whelan, Esq., for Defendants.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

Justice Robinson, for the Court.

The defendants, the Rhode Island Commerce Corporation, the Rhode Island Airport Corporation, the Rhode Island Airport Police Department, Dennis Greco, and Iftikhar Ahmad (collectively defendants), appeal from a May 10, 2021 order of the Superior Court granting declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff, Helen Ricci. On appeal, the defendants contend that the hearing justice erred in finding that Ms. Ricci was a "law enforcement officer" as defined by G.L. 1956 § 42-28.6-1(1), a section of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), and that she was therefore entitled to the protections afforded by that statute.¹ This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully examining the record and the parties’ arguments (both written and oral), we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court in part, we vacate that order in part, and we remand the case to the Superior Court with instructions that it order compliance with the provisions of § 42-28.6-4 and restoration of Ms. Ricci's salary and benefits to the status quo ante .

IFacts and Travel

AThe Initial Phases of the Litigation

On December 16, 2019, Ms. Ricci was hired by the Rhode Island Airport Corporation (RIAC) as the Deputy Chief of the Rhode Island Airport Police Department (RIAPD), and she was sworn in on March 2, 2020. On July 7, 2020, the Chief of the RIAPD, Leo Messier, retired; the RIAC did not thereafter employ another person in that position until mid-November of 2020. It is undisputed that at no time during her tenure with the RIAPD was Ms. Ricci ever promoted to the position of Chief. On November 10, 2020, Ms. Ricci was terminated as a member of the RIAPD and as an employee of the RIAC. Thereafter, on November 13, 2020, Ms. Ricci filed a written request for a hearing in accordance with the provisions of the LEOBOR statute.

On December 1, 2020, Ms. Ricci filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court, in which she sought a judgment declaring: (1) "that she is entitled to the rights and benefits set forth under LEOBOR;" and (2) that the RIAPD's failure to timely respond to her request for a hearing and provide a "Hearing Committee selection * * * constitutes a dismissal of all charges" against her. Ms. Ricci also sought mandatory injunctive relief whereby she would be reinstated to her position as the Deputy Chief of the RIAPD, with all the back pay and benefits that she would have received had she not been terminated.

In response to Ms. Ricci's verified complaint, on December 14, 2020, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,² in which they asserted that Ms. Ricci was the "highest ranking sworn officer" of the RIAPD and that, under their reading of the LEOBOR statute, she was excluded from the LEOBOR's definition of "law enforcement officer" and was not entitled to the protections afforded by that statute.³

A hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment was held on January 5, 2021, during which defendants reiterated their arguments relative to Ms. Ricci's not being entitled to protection under LEOBOR. Ms. Ricci, for her part, contended that, pursuant to the express language of LEOBOR, the highest ranking sworn officers of the RIAPD were the director and deputy director of the RIAC. She contended that, for that reason, she was not the highest ranking sworn officer, but rather was simply a law enforcement officer as referenced in § 42-28.6-1(1) and so was entitled to the protections of LEOBOR.

The hearing justice issued a written decision on February 8, 2021, denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that material issues of fact remained in dispute "as to what powers Ms. Ricci had during the period between the retirement of Chief Messier and her termination, as well as who occupied the positions of director and deputy director of the RIAC * * *."

A hearing with respect to Ms. Ricci's request for declaratory and injunctive relief was held on March 26, 2021.⁴ Ms. Ricci argued that the language of § 42-28.6-1(1) was "quite clear," in that it expressly excluded only the position of Chief and also what she referred to as "the highest ranking officer," who, in the context of this case, she contended would be the director and deputy director of the RIAC. Accordingly, Ms. Ricci argued that, because she held neither the position of Chief nor was she the director or deputy director of the RIAC, it necessarily followed that she was simply a "law enforcement officer" under the statute and so was entitled to the protections afforded by LEOBOR.

For their part, defendants argued that, although the director of the RIAC had "arresting authority," his authority was "limited to things related to aviation and airport security," unlike the authority of the officers of the RIAPD, whose authority has "no such bounds" and "no such limitations." The defendants further contended that there were no regulations, statutes, bylaws, or documents which stated that the director shall be what they referred to as "the highest ranking officer in the * * * department." They also argued that LEOBOR was intended "to protect line officers" while excluding "those who truly manage them." The defendants argued that since, in their view, Ms. Ricci truly managed line officers, she fell into the category of those excluded from LEOBOR coverage.

BThe Decision of the Hearing Justice

The hearing justice issued a written decision on May 6, 2021. She stated that "the plain language of the [LEOBOR] statute supports a reading, in the context of the RIAPD, that designates only the chief and the director and deputy director of the RIAC as explicitly excluded from coverage under the LEOBOR." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The hearing justice then ruled that, because the position of Chief was unoccupied at the time of Ms. Ricci's termination, "the highest ranking person with arresting authority at the [RIAC] would be considered the ‘highest ranking sworn officer’—in this case, the director of RIAC." Accordingly, the hearing justice ruled that Ms. Ricci was not the highest ranking sworn officer at the time of her termination, but rather was a "law enforcement officer" as defined by LEOBOR and, therefore, was entitled to the protections accorded by that statute. On that basis, the hearing justice proceeded to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Ms. Ricci. She ordered that Ms. Ricci be reinstated to her position as Deputy Chief of the RIAPD with back pay and benefits. An order granting declaratory and injunctive relief,⁵ consistent with the hearing justice's decision, was entered on May 10, 2021, and defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal on May 14, 2021.⁶

IIStandard of Review

It is well settled that this Court reviews questions of statutory construction in a de novo manner. In re Kapsinow , 220 A.3d 1231, 1233 (R.I. 2019) ; DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Co. , 26 A.3d 585, 616 (R.I. 2011). And "[w]hen construing statutes, this Court's role is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes." Such v. State , 950 A.2d 1150, 1155-56 (R.I. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ryan v. City of Providence , 11 A.3d 68, 71 (R.I. 2011) (stating that, when this Court determines legislative intent, "[t]hat intent is discovered from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute") (internal quotation marks omitted); Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission , 121 R.I. 232, 237, 397 A.2d 884, 887 (1979) ("It is a primary canon of statutory construction that statutory intent is to be found in the words of a statute, if they are free from ambiguity and express a reasonable meaning."); see also Kulawas v. Rhode Island Hospital , 994 A.2d 649, 652 (R.I. 2010) ("When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is our responsibility to give the words of the enactment their plain and ordinary meaning.").

It should also be borne in mind that it is a "fundamental maxim of statutory construction that statutory language should not be viewed in isolation." In re Brown , 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 2006). It is our responsibility to consider "the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, it is important to be mindful of the principle that remedial statutes are to be liberally interpreted. See, e.g. , In re Tavares , 885 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 2005) ("[W]hen construing a statute that is remedial in nature, * * * we will construe the statute liberally to effectuate its purposes.").

IIIAnalysis

The complete statutory definition of a "law enforcement officer" for LEOBOR purposes is set forth in footnote 3, supra . Nonetheless, for present purposes, it would be useful to repeat here the most pertinent words of that statutory provision:

" ‘Law enforcement officer ’ * * * shall not include the chief of police and/or the highest ranking sworn officer of any of the departments including the director and deputy director of the airport corporation of Rhode Island." Section 42-28.6-1(1).

On appeal, defendants contend (as they did in the Superior Court; see Part I.A, supra ) that the hearing justice erroneously construed § 42-28.6-1(1) when she ruled...