Rice v. Fulton Cnty.

• Docket Number: A23A1646
• Decision Date: 18 January 2024
• Parties: ADAM RICE et al. v. FULTON COUNTY et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

1

ADAM RICE et al. v. FULTON COUNTY et al.

No. A23A1646

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fourth Division

January 18, 2024

DILLARD, P. J., RICKMAN and PIPKIN, JJ.

PIPKIN, Judge.

Appellants a group of Fulton County tax payers, filed a proposed class action lawsuit against Fulton County and many of its municipalities^[1] (collectively "Appellees") alleging that Appellees had utilized an illegal method for assessing property taxes on homes sold in 2015. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for class certification holding that the proposed class failed to meet the commonality and predominance requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2) and (b) (3). Appellants allege that this was error; we agree, and we reverse.

1. Factual and procedural history

This is the second iteration of this case to come before this Court for appellate review. As we explained in our prior decision see Rice v. Fulton County, 358 Ga.App. 1 (852 S.E.2d 860) (2020) (Rice I), Appellants filed this action seeking a refund of ad valorem property taxes under OCGA § 48-5-380 from Appellees based on alleged illegal property tax assessments. Id. at 1. In Rice I, this Court reversed the trial court's grant of Appellees' motion to dismiss Appellants' second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. After the case was returned to the trial court, Appellants amended their complaint two more times and moved the trial court for class certification under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) and (b) (3).

In its motion for class certification, Appellants alleged that, in 2016 and 2017, the Fulton County Board of Assessors ("FCBA") used an illegal method for assessing property taxes on homes sold in 2015.^[2] Appellants contended that the FCBA illegally overrode the fair market value assessments generated by FCBA's Computer Assisted Mass. Appraisal ("CAMA") system and replaced those assessments with the higher purchase price that the taxpayer paid for the property the year before. Appellants alleged that properties that did not sell in 2015 did not have their CAMA values overridden. Appellants contended that this scheme, called "sales chasing"^[3] was used by the FCBA in order to intentionally target certain properties and assess higher taxes, which, Appellants argued, "resulted in taxes that were not uniform or fairly and justly equalized," violating Article 7, § 1, Para. 3 of^[4] the Georgia Constitution and OCGA § 48-5-306 (a)^[5].

2. Trial Court's Ruling The trial court determined that Appellants could not meet the commonality or predominance prongs for class certification under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2) and (b) (3). Specifically, the trial court determined that: Appellants "have not articulated a viable legal or classwide factual theory for how they will prove lack of uniformity of assessments and equalization of values without getting into individualized analysis of comparable properties and values"; all that Appellants can show on a classwide basis "is that a computer program exists that generated a different (lower) value than the purchase price that was actually used as the property's assessment"; the use of different methods to calculate the appraisals would "not suffice to prove lack of uniformity of assessments or equalization of values"; and that, in this case, "the existence or lack of uniformity can only be evaluated by reference to the properties' values, which is an individualized factual issue."

Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that "liability for a tax refund based on lack of uniformity of assessments or equalization is an individualized issue, not a common question susceptible of being answered by classwide common proof." The trial court denied class certification and Appellants appealed.

3. Analysis "Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing their right to class certification, and we review the trial court's decision in certifying or refusing to certify a class action for an abuse of discretion." (Citation omitted.) Doe v. Vest Monroe, LLC, 368 Ga.App. 572, 572 (1) (890 S.E.2d 439) (2023). Generally speaking, while an abuse of discretion standard "is deferential, it is not toothless. An abuse of discretion occurs where a ruling is unsupported by any evidence of record or where that ruling misstates or misapplies the relevant law." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Eagle Jets, LLC v. Atlanta Jet, Inc., 347 Ga.App. 567, 576 (2) (c) (820 S.E.2d 197) (2018).

"In determining the propriety of a class action, the first issue to be resolved is not whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or may ultimately prevail on the merits but whether the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 have been met." (Punctuation and citation omitted.) SunTrust Bank v. Bickerstaff, 349 Ga.App. 794, 800 (2) (824 S.E.2d 717) (2019). Thus, in order to certify a class, a trial court must find that the putative class satisfies the four prongs of OCGA § 9-11-23 (a), which are: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequate representation. After meeting these factors, a plaintiff must then "satisfy at least one of the three requirements of OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) in order to show that class certification is appropriate." (Footnote omitted). Bowden v. Med. Center Inc., 309 Ga. 188, 193-194 (1) (b) (845 S.E.2d 555) (2020). Relevant here is OCGA § 9-11-23 (b) (3), also called the "predominance and superiority" prong, which requires "[t]he court find[] that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. "To satisfy these requirements, it [is] not enough for the plaintiffs simply to [allege] that they were satisfied. Rather, the plaintiffs [have] to come forward with evidence to prove their satisfaction of the statutory requirements." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner, 295 Ga. 524, 526 (1) (762 S.E.2d 419) (2014). With these principles in mind, we address Appellants' enumerations.

(a) Commonality

Appellants allege that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that they failed to meet the commonality requirement, finding that the putative class presented a legal theory that would require individual analysis. We agree that this was error.^[6]

It is well settled that commonality is "a relatively low bar" of proof and "even a single common question will do." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Doe, 368 Ga.App. at 576 (2) (a). Still, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that "[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class." OCGA § 9-11-23 (a) (2). "The common contention must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." (Citations and punctuation omitted) Bowden, 309 Ga. at 194-195 (1) (c). Indeed,"[w]hat matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (II) (A) (131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374) (2011). Generally, this "requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bowden, 309 Ga. at 194 (1) (c).

Here, the trial court found that Appellants failed to establish commonality because Appellants' only claim of common proof is "that a computer program exists that generated a different (lower) value than the purchase price that was actually used as the property's assessment." But the record shows that Appellants identified a different and broader common question that may be answered on a classwide basis -whether the method used by Appellees to calculate the Appellants' property taxes was legal. See OCGA § 48-5-380 (providing that each county and municipality shall refund taxes "[w]hich are determined to have been erroneously or illegally assessed and collected from the taxpayers under the laws of this state or under the resolutions or ordinances of any county or municipality"). The answer to this question will not vary with each class member because it is binary - either the method used by Appellees to calculate the putative class members' property taxes was legal or it was not. "Thus, a classwide proceeding in this case has the capacity to generate common answers that will drive the resolution of this litigation and renders a class action superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Bickerstaff, 349 Ga.App. at 802. See also Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (II) (A).

Still Appellees argue that we should affirm the decision of the trial court because Georgia law allows county boards of tax assessors to use different methods to arrive at the fair market value of any given property. See, e.g., Sherman v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 288 Ga. 88, 91 (701 S.E.2d 472) (2010). This case law is inapposite, however, because Appellants do not contend that they are entitled to a specific valuation method. Instead, they contend that the alleged sales chasing method used by Appellees was so arbitrary that it was not an appraisal method at all. See, e.g., OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (defining "fair market value" and listing eight criteria that a tax assessor "shall" apply when determining fair market value); Ga. Comp. R. &Regs. 560-11-10-.09 (4) (a-c) (detailing the three methods for appraising real property - the direct sales comparison approach, the cost approach, and the income...