Richards v. Cox

• Decision Date: 11 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. 20180033,20180033
• Citation: 450 P.3d 1074
• Parties: Dr. A. LeGrand RICHARDS, Appellees, v. Spencer COX, Utah Lieutenant Governor, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

450 P.3d 1074

Dr. A. LeGrand RICHARDS,¹ Appellees,

v.Spencer COX, Utah Lieutenant Governor, Appellant.

No. 20180033

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed September 11, 2019

On Direct Appeal

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The 2016 legislature enacted Senate Bill 78 (SB 78), which imposed election laws for the office of State Board of Education member. See S.B. 78, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016). The question before us is not whether SB 78 is good public policy: that’s a question for the citizens of Utah, speaking through their duly elected representatives. No, the question before us is whether SB 78 violates the Utah Constitution.² It does not.

¶2 SB 78 specifically requires "[a] person interested in becoming a candidate for the State Board of Education [to] file a declaration of candidacy" in compliance with the Utah Code sections relating to general elections,³ and explicitly made "[t]he office of State Board of Education ... a partisan office." UTAH CODE § 20A-14-104.1.⁴ Appellees argue that article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution, which states that "[n]o religious or partisan test or qualification shall be required as a condition of employment, admission, or attendance in the state’s education systems," prohibits the legislature from establishing partisan elections as the means by which State Board of Education members (Board members) are elected. Appellant State of Utah counters that Board members are not employed in the state’s education systems and are therefore not covered by article X, section 8. The State further contends that, even if Board members are employed in the state’s education systems for the purposes of article X, section 8, the prohibition against "religious or partisan test[s] or qualifications[s]" does not apply to or establish a ban on general partisan elections for Board positions.

¶3 Because we agree with the State that Board members are not employed in the state’s education systems, and are therefore not covered by article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution, we need not reach the second question as to whether a general partisan election runs afoul of article X, section 8 ’s ban on partisan or religious tests or qualifications.⁵ Accordingly, we reverse the district court and hold SB 78 to be constitutional and commensurately allow its implementation.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o religious or partisan test or qualification shall be required as a condition of employment, admission, or attendance in the state’s education systems." In 2016, the legislature passed SB 78, which amends the Utah Election Code, makes the office of State Board of Education a partisan office, and requires Board members to be elected through the general partisan election process. See UTAH CODE §§ 20A-14-101.1 to -104.1. Appellees brought suit asking the district court to issue an injunction enjoining the implementation of SB 78 on the grounds that it violates article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution.

¶5 The district court agreed with appellees, concluding that "[t]here is perhaps no more partisan a test than a contested, partisan election" and that, "according to its plain meaning, Board members hold ‘employment’ in a legal sense in the State’s education system and therefore fall within the purview of [ article X, section 8 ]." The district court therefore issued an order declaring SB 78 unconstitutional under article X, section 8 and enjoined the implementation of SB 78. The State appealed.

¶6 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 We review constitutional interpretation issues for correctness, granting no deference to the district court. Schroeder v. Utah Att’y Gen.’s Office , 2015 UT 77, ¶ 16, 358 P.3d 1075. "A district court’s interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we ... review for correctness." Harvey v. Cedar Hills City , 2010 UT 12, ¶ 10, 227 P.3d 256.

ANALYSIS

¶8 Both parties agree that the legislature has the authority to prescribe election laws for the office of State Board of Education. UTAH CONST. art. X, § 3.⁶ The parties disagree, however, about whether the election laws prescribed by SB 78 run afoul of article X, section 8 of the Utah Constitution.

¶9 Appellees claim that article X, section 8 ’s language barring "religious or partisan test[s] or qualification[s]" as a "condition of employment ... in the state’s education systems" forbids partisan election of Board members. They contend that this prohibition is one of the underlying intentions of article X, section 8, as supported by the constitutional history associated with article X, section 8 and the plain language of its text.

¶10 Appellees further contend that Board members are and have been, at least since 1986, understood to be employed in the state’s education systems. And as employees, they are subject to and protected by article X, section 8, which bars "religious or partisan test[s] or qualification[s]" as conditions of their employment. Appellees read "partisan test or qualification" to encompass and include partisan elections. The district court agreed with appellees’ reading of the Utah Constitution and found SB 78 to be unconstitutional and stayed its implementation.

¶11 This appeal therefore presents us with two questions. First, we are asked to determine whether Board members enjoy "employment ... in the state’s education systems." UTAH CONST. art. X, § 8. Second, we are asked to determine whether a partisan election is a "partisan test or qualification." Id. Because we answer the first question in the negative, we need not reach the second question.

¶12 The district court concluded that article X, section 8 clearly applies to Board members. We disagree. To begin with, in 1986, the relevant timeframe, the citizens of Utah would not have understood the term "employment" to include elected Board members. In addition, although we have the final say as to questions of constitutional law, we "apply a presumption of validity [to a challenged statute] so long as there is a reasonable basis upon which both provisions of the statute and the mandate of the constitution may be reconciled." Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co ., 819 P.2d 343, 347 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

And here, appellees have not overcome the presumption. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s decision.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION FRAMEWORK

¶13 In interpreting the Utah Constitution, we seek to ascertain and give power to the meaning of the text as it was understood by the people who validly enacted it as constitutional law. See Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89, ¶ 95, 416 P.3d 663 ("We agree with the dissent that originalist inquiry must focus on ascertaining the ‘original public meaning’ of the constitutional text."). In this regard, we "ask what principles a fluent speaker of the framers’ English would have understood a particular constitutional provision to embody." Id. ¶ 96. This does not entail merely translating historical terms into "roughly equivalent contemporary English." Id. ¶ 98. It involves using all available tools—Black’s Law Dictionary , corpus linguistics, and our examination of the "shared linguistic, political, and legal presuppositions and understandings of the ratification era." Id. ; see also Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake , 2006 UT 40, ¶ 10, 140 P.3d 1235 ("[W]e recognize that constitutional language ... is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed them." (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶14 Here, we acknowledge that the text of article X, section 8 presents some surface opacity. But, as we detail below, our examination of the text and historical understanding of the terms included supports the State’s interpretation. We therefore hold that the district court erred in finding that Board members held "employment ... in the state’s education systems."

II. THE MEANING OF ARTICLE X, SECTION 8

A. Understanding and Defining "Employment"

¶15 The relevant language of article X, section 8 asks us to explore what it means to be in a condition of "employment ... in the state’s education systems." Because the meaning of the word "employment" seems at first to be a straightforward definitional question, we begin our inquiry there.

¶16 Both parties’ briefs are replete with definitions of employment. Appellees would prefer to define employment to mean "to make use of" or "to use or engage the services of." They invite us on a tour of Shakespearian usages of the term to demonstrate the frequency of this definition’s use.⁷ In this sense, Board members would be employed in the state’s education systems because the systems make use of and engage the services of Board members. We have no doubt that the word employment includes and encompasses this utility-based definition and can be used to connote the simple usage of a person or thing.⁸ However, despite the creativity of Shakespeare—and this one, limited type of usage—the word employment lends itself to multitudinous other applications.

¶17 The State supplies us with some of these additional understandings and argues that employment means the "state of being employed," "normally on a day-to-day basis," which signifies "both the act of doing a thing and being under contract or orders to do it." This implies an understanding of the term rooted in one’s experience as an employee and brings with it images of places of work, salaried compensation, jobs, and bosses.

¶18 Although no one dictionary definition can be completely authoritative,⁹ we are satisfied that these multiple definitions have fleshed out the bare dictionary meaning of the term. However, dictionary definitions are not sufficiently dispositive in this case. "When we speak of ordinary meaning, we are asking an...