Richardson v. Commodore, Inc.
Decision Date | 09 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 97-1829.,97-1829. |
Citation | 599 N.W.2d 693 |
Parties | Russell RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. The COMMODORE, INC. d/b/a The Commodore Tap, Ralph W. Hauerwas and Betty L. Hauerwas, Appellees. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Hugh G. Albrecht and Anne Updegraff of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Roger A. Lathrop and Peter J. Thill of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellees. Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, SNELL, TERNUS, and HARRIS,1 JJ.
Appellant, Russell Richardson, was injured at a bar owned and operated by the defendants/appellees when a portion of the ceiling fell on him. His suit against the defendants was dismissed on their motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. On further review, we find sufficient evidence to create a jury question on Richardson's premises liability claim. Therefore, we vacate the court of appeals decision and reverse the judgment of the district court, remanding for further proceedings.
We view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Richardson. See Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1997)
. The record shows that, at the time of Richardson's injury, The Commodore Tap was a bar operated by the appellee, The Commodore, Inc. Appellees Ralph and Betty Hauerwas owned the corporation as well as the building in which the bar was located.
The accident giving rise to this action occurred on September 12, 1994. While shooting pool at the bar on that date, Richardson was suddenly struck by falling plaster. Richardson thereafter brought this action against the defendants to recover damages for his physical injuries. Richardson's claim was based on a theory of premises liability. He alleged that he was a business invitee and the collapse of the ceiling and his resulting injuries were caused by the defendants' negligence in failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.
The record shows that the building that housed The Commodore Tap was built in 1913. Ralph and Betty Hauerwas acquired the building in 1982, and subsequently moved their tavern business into it. The tavern was on the first floor of this two-story building. Prior to opening for business, the Hauerwases contracted with Wayne Blumer to repair portions of the plaster ceiling of the first floor where the wood lath had been exposed by the removal of some partition walls. Blumer did not notice any signs of damage to or other problems with the plaster ceiling at the time of his repairs.
In 1985, the Hauerwases installed a drop ceiling on the first floor of the building to improve the efficiency of heating and cooling the premises. They did not notice any problems with the plaster ceiling at that time. Between 1985 and the date of the accident in 1994, the Hauerwases did not inspect the plaster ceiling, were unaware of any problems in that ceiling, and made no repairs to it.
It is undisputed that Richardson was struck by a portion of the original (1913) plaster ceiling when the plaster separated from the lath and fell through the drop ceiling. Blumer repaired the plaster ceiling after its collapse in 1994. He estimated that a piece of ceiling measuring two feet by five feet fell. This piece was not close to the areas he had repaired in 1982. Blumer testified that the ceiling collapsed due to its age and the effect, over time, of vibration from heavy traffic on the adjoining street. He thought this particular area of the ceiling may have fallen off because it was thicker than the rest of the plaster ceiling. While making the repairs in 1994, Blumer inspected the remainder of the plaster ceiling by looking through the drop ceiling where the tiles had been pushed off by falling plaster, and using a spotlight to view whether the plaster was sagging in any other areas.
As noted above, Richardson's suit is based on a theory of premises liability. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding there was no evidence they knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of the plaster ceiling. Richardson's appeal was transferred to the court of appeals. That court affirmed, and we granted Richardson's application for further review.
The principles governing the appeal of summary judgment decisions are well established:
We review a summary judgment ruling for error. The district court correctly enters summary judgment when the record shows "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). Thus, on review, we examine the record before the district court to decide whether any material fact is in dispute, and if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law. In considering the record, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.
General Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted). In viewing the facts most favorably to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, we give the opposing party the benefit of every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. See Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518, 519-20 (Iowa 1998)
.
The general rule applicable to the liability of possessors of land for injuries caused by conditions on the land is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, at 215-16 (1965); accord Mundy v. Warren, 268 N.W.2d 213, 217 (Iowa 1978)
(. ) The parties do not dispute Richardson's status as an invitee nor the defendants' status as possessors of the land. The dispute in this case centers on the requirement that the defendants know of the dangerous condition or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the condition.2
Although Richardson does not contend that the defendants had actual knowledge of the condition of the plaster ceiling, he argues that this knowledge should be imputed to them because the defendants created the dangerous condition by installing the drop ceiling. Alternatively, he claims that if the defendants had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the plaster ceiling, they would have discovered the condition of the ceiling. We discuss these issues separately.3
124 N.W.2d at 559. There was no dispute that the defendant had applied the finish to the floor. Id. at 1209, 124 N.W.2d at 563. We stated that when "the condition has been created by the owner[,] ... he will not be heard to deny he had notice of it." Id. at 1215, 124 N.W.2d at 567.
This rule does not, however, help the plaintiff here. There is no evidence that the defendants created the condition in the plaster ceiling that caused it to fall. The defendants merely installed a drop ceiling over the plaster ceiling, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the drop ceiling contributed in any way to the collapse of the plaster ceiling. Therefore, knowledge of the dangerous condition in the plaster ceiling cannot be imputed to the defendants.
A. Duty to inspect. The defendants' duty of reasonable care as possessors of the premises extends to an inspection of the premises to discover any dangerous conditions or latent defects, "`followed by such repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary for [the invitee's] protection under the circumstances.'" Wieseler v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 540 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Iowa 1995) ( ); accord Baumler v. Hemesath, 534 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Iowa 1995)
( ); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. b, at 216 (), cmt. d, at 217 (). The action necessary to satisfy this duty of reasonable care depends upon "the nature of the land and the purposes for which it is used." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. e, at 217. "[T]he duty of one who operates a place of entertainment or amusement is higher than that of the owner of private property generally." Grall v. Meyer, 173 N.W.2d 61, 63 (Iowa 1969).
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