Rife v. Woolfolk, 15134

• Decision Date: 22 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 15134,15134
• Citation: 169 W.Va. 660,289 S.E.2d 220
• Parties: Bentley RIFE v. Roberta WOOLFOLK. and Roberta WOOLFOLK v. Bentley RIFE.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 220

289 S.E.2d 220

169 W.Va. 660

Bentley RIFE v. Roberta WOOLFOLK. and Roberta WOOLFOLK v. Bentley RIFE.

No. 15134.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

March 22, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "Before the principles of res judicata can be involved, there must have been an adjudication on the merits of a case." Syl. pt. 6, Johnson v. Huntington Moving and Storage, Inc., W.Va., 239 S.E.2d 128, (1977).

2. "When the causes of action are different, the former decision is conclusive only as to questions, rights, and facts actually decided therein, and nothing more." Syl. pt. 2, Hudson v. Iguano Land and Mining Co., 71 W.Va. 402, 76 S.E. 797 (1912).

3. "A sale of real estate by a trustee will not be set aside upon the ground of inadequacy of price unless such inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience of the chancellor. Such a sale will not be disturbed where the price realized is approximately three-fourths of the estimated value of the property." Syl. pt. 9, Pence v. Jamison, 80 W.Va. 761, 94 S.E. 383 (1917).

4. "[I]t is not the reasons assigned upon which the [lower] court decided a question that is to be reviewed, but the action of the court itself; and the question always in the appellate court is, whether the judgment to be reviewed is correct." Syl. pt. 3, Shrewsbury v. Miller, 10 W.Va. 115 (1877), in part; Syl. pt. 2, Environmental Products Co., Inc. v. Duncan, W.Va., 285 S.E.2d 889 (1981).

John C. Purbaugh, Charleston, for appellant.

Baer, Napier & Colburn, James Allan Colburn, Helen M. Morris, Huntington, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This action challenges a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Cabell County which voided a trustees' deed issued to Roberta Woolfolk. Woolfolk contends that the circuit court's judgment setting aside the sale was without basis in law or fact, and that it was barred by either collateral estoppel or the doctrine of res judicata. We disagree with both claims, and affirm.

The property which is the subject of this appeal is security for a deed of trust between Roberta Woolfolk, the trust creditor, and Bentley Rife, the mortgagor. At some point in 1979, Rife became delinquent on his payments to Woolfolk. In February of 1980, notice of the right to cure the default in payments was mailed to Rife, setting March 28, 1980, as the sale date. On March 28, Rife filed an injunction action seeking to enjoin the sale of the property. He alleged the absence of adequate personal notice of the sale, and asserted his right of equitable redemption. A temporary injunction was granted on March 28, prohibiting the sale of the property for thirty days, and the matter was continued until April 18. On April 18 the sale was again continued, to allow Rife an opportunity to obtain financing. The injunction prohibiting the sale of the property was continued in effect until May 2, 1980.

On May 2, the property was sold by the trustees for $8,000, that being the remaining amount of the indebtedness, plus interest, to an agent of Roberta Woolfolk. The sale was attended by Rife and his attorney.

The only evidence of the value of the property presented to the circuit court was the estimate of an appraiser for the Huntington Federal Savings and Loan, who estimated the value to be $62,000.

Rife filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale, and, on May 23, a hearing was held on this motion. No evidence was presented; only argument of counsel was heard. Rife asked that the sale be set aside due to inadequate notice and for the inadequacy of the purchase price. From the record it appears that the motion being considered was made in the context of a petition requesting, as its sole prayer for relief, that the sale be stayed for a certain period of time. The trial judge denied the motion to set aside the sale.

On July 1, Rife filed a complaint requesting, inter alia, that the trustees' deed issued pursuant to the sale be declared void, and that he be allowed to exercise his right of equitable redemption and reclaim the property. As grounds for voiding the deed, Rife alleged, as in his motion, that notice of the sale was inadequate and that the purchase price was inadequate. The hearing held July 21, 1980, on this complaint included the taking of documentary evidence and testimony.

Pursuant to the July 21 hearing, the circuit court entered an order on July 28, 1980, voiding the trustees' deed and permitting equitable redemption by Rife. The reasons for this ruling were not set forth extensively in the order, which merely recounted Rife's "good faith effort" to obtain the required money before May 2, 1980, and ordered Rife to pay Woolfolk $12,000 as full and final satisfaction of the debt owed, including interest, court costs, and attorney fees.

Woolfolk's position on appeal is that the judgment of the circuit court made pursuant to the July 21 hearing was barred by res judicata, or that Rife was collaterally estopped from asserting certain issues, by the order overruling his earlier motion to set aside the foreclosure sale. Woolfolk also...