Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 May 1965
• Docket Number: 6058,Nos. 4644,s. 4644
• Citation: 175 So.2d 564
• Parties: RINKER MATERIALS CORPORATION, of West Palm Beach, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HOLLOWAY MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, and Frank L . Williamson, Appellees (two cases).
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 564

175 So.2d 564

RINKER MATERIALS CORPORATION, of West Palm Beach, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HOLLOWAY MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, and Frank L . Williamson, Appellees (two cases).

Nos. 4644, 6058.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 21, 1965.

Rehearing Denied June 10, 1965.

Monroe E. McDonald, of Sanders, McEwan, Schwarz & Mims, Orlando, for appellant.

Leon Handley, of Gurney, Gurney & Handley, Orlando, for appellees.

ALLEN, Acting Chief Judge.

We have consolidated for oral argument a petition to enforce the mandate of this court (Case No. 4644) and an interlocutory appeal (Case No. 6058), both cases being styled the same.

This action originated in the lower court as a suit to restrain violation of a covenant not to compete. Relief was denied by the lower court. On appeal, this court, on September 11, 1964, reversed and remanded with instructions to enjoin the Holloway Materials Corporation and its president, Frank L. Williamson, from breaching their covenant not to compete within a certain area for the balance of a contract-specified ten year period. See Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 875, cert. denied Fla., 173 So.2d 145.

In accordance with our mandate, the chancellor, on November 4, 1964, entered the permanent injunction. On December 3, 1964, Holloway was found to have violated the injunction and was fined $2,500 for its contempt of court. In addition, Mr. Williamson was fined $250 for his personal contempt of court.

Before the month was out, Rinker again found it necessary to petition for a rule to show cause. The rule was entered, and on January 13, 1965, Holloway and Williamson, individually, were again found to have violated the injunction. The chancellor was of the view that the imposition of another penalty was not necessary, and, therefore, merely ordered the defendants to cease and desist. He further decreed (although not raised by any party to the controversy) that the injunction, as a matter of public policy, would not prevent the selling by Holloway of its products to contractors working on contracts let by any governmental agency, even though in the proscribed area.

The question raised by both the petition for enforcement of the mandate and the interlocutory appeal is: Whether, after issuance of an injunction pursuant to the mandate of an appellate court, the chancellor, on his own motion, may very the terms of the injunction. The answer to this question is clearly, No!

What is involved here is a complete lack of jurisdiction to act. The principle governing has been well stated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255, 16 S.Ct. 291, 293, 40 L.Ed. 414, 416.

'When a case has been once decided by this court on appeal, and remanded to the circuit court, whatever was before this court, and disposed of by its decree, is considered as finally settled. The circuit court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.'

The Florida Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Mortgage Inv. Foundation Inc. v. Knott, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 265, 266, when confronted with an order of a trial court granting a motion to file a bill of review, after a Supreme Court mandate directing entry of a decree compelling specific performance, had this to say:

'The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the questioned order. The rendition of the opinion and judgment and the issuance of the mandate of this Court directing the entry of a decree of specific performance removed any discretion which the trial court had in the matter and left him vested only with the power to enter such decree in accordance with the requirements of the mandate. Our judgment superseded and nullified the previous judgment of the circuit court and the only power remaining in that court over the proceedings was to carry out and place into effect the order and judgment of this Court. * * *'

Accord, Berger v. Leposky, Fla.1958, 103 So.2d 628; King v. L & L Investors, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 671; Petition of Vermeulen, Fla.App.1960, 122 So.2d 318.

Furthermore, it is well settled that once the appellate court's judgment has been rendered, permitted before presentation court must be obtained before presentation of new matter affecting the judgment will be permitted. See e. g., Berger v. Leposky, supra; and State ex rel. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District v. Anderson, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 140.

We therefore hold that the lower court had not jurisdiction to engraft on the mandate of this court its exemption of government contracts from the operation of the injunction, and that portion of the order is hereby quashed.

Appellant urges this court to oust the lower court from jurisdiction to carry out the mandate of this court, because of the failure of the lower court to enforce our prior decision. We have, however, every confidence in the integrity of the judge below and are convinced that he will enforce our mandate.

As noted previously, the chancellor found the appellees...