Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., Nos. 4644

CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)
Writing for the CourtALLEN
Citation175 So.2d 564
PartiesRINKER MATERIALS CORPORATION, of West Palm Beach, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. HOLLOWAY MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, and Frank L . Williamson, Appellees (two cases).
Decision Date21 May 1965
Docket Number6058,Nos. 4644

Page 564

175 So.2d 564
RINKER MATERIALS CORPORATION, of West Palm Beach, a Florida corporation, Appellant,
v.
HOLLOWAY MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, and Frank L . Williamson, Appellees (two cases).
Nos. 4644, 6058.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 21, 1965.
Rehearing Denied June 10, 1965.

Page 565

Monroe E. McDonald, of Sanders, McEwan, Schwarz & Mims, Orlando, for appellant.

Leon Handley, of Gurney, Gurney & Handley, Orlando, for appellees.

ALLEN, Acting Chief Judge.

We have consolidated for oral argument a petition to enforce the mandate of this court (Case No. 4644) and an interlocutory appeal (Case No. 6058), both cases being styled the same.

This action originated in the lower court as a suit to restrain violation of a covenant not to compete. Relief was denied by the lower court. On appeal, this court, on September 11, 1964, reversed and remanded with instructions to enjoin the Holloway Materials Corporation and its president, Frank L. Williamson, from breaching their covenant not to compete within a certain area for the balance of a contract-specified ten year period. See Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 875, cert. denied Fla., 173 So.2d 145.

In accordance with our mandate, the chancellor, on November 4, 1964, entered the permanent injunction. On December 3, 1964, Holloway was found to have violated the injunction and was fined $2,500 for its contempt of court. In addition, Mr. Williamson was fined $250 for his personal contempt of court.

Before the month was out, Rinker again found it necessary to petition for a rule to show cause. The rule was entered, and on January 13, 1965, Holloway and Williamson, individually, were again found to have violated the injunction. The chancellor was of the view that the imposition of another penalty was not necessary, and, therefore, merely ordered the defendants to cease and desist. He further decreed (although not raised by any party to the controversy) that the injunction, as a matter of public policy, would not prevent the selling by Holloway of its products to contractors working on contracts let by any governmental agency, even though in the proscribed area.

The question raised by both the petition for enforcement of the mandate and the interlocutory appeal is: Whether, after issuance of an injunction pursuant to the mandate of an appellate court, the chancellor, on his own motion, may very the terms of the injunction. The answer to this question is clearly, No!

What is involved here is a complete lack of jurisdiction to act. The principle governing has been well stated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255, 16 S.Ct. 291, 293, 40 L.Ed. 414, 416.

'When a case has been once decided by this court on appeal, and remanded to the circuit court, whatever was before this court, and disposed of by its decree, is considered as finally settled. The circuit court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.'

Page 566

The Florida Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Mortgage Inv. Foundation Inc. v. Knott, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 265, 266, when confronted with an order of a trial court granting a motion to file a bill of review, after a Supreme Court mandate directing entry of a decree compelling specific performance, had this to say:

'The trial court had no jurisdiction to...

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20 practice notes
  • Patten v. State, No. 86-2928
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 7, 1988
    ...new matters may be considered on remand with prior permission of the appellate court. Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 175 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Yet, it is beyond dispute that we do not render advisory opinions. State v. Vogel, 415 So.2d 821, 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982......
  • Lesperance v. Lesperance, No. 71--329
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 1971
    ...Control Dist. v. Anderson, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 140; Rinker Materials Corporation v. Holloway Materials Corporation, Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 564; Fairfax Broadcasting Co. v. Florida Airmotive, Inc., Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 854; State ex rel. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Nathan, Fla.App.......
  • Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., No. 45003
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • July 17, 1975
    ...carried out and placed into effect the order and judgment of this Court. Rinker Materials Corporation v. Holloway Materials Corporation, 175 So.2d 564 (Fla.App.2d, A trial court is without authority to alter or evade the mandate of an appellate court absent permission to do so. Cone v. Cone......
  • Wood v. Manatee Bay Corp., No. 79-2072
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • August 6, 1980
    ...New matter affecting the judgment could not be presented without our permission. Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 175 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965), cert. denied 180 So.2d 657 (Fla.1965). A supplemental judgment could be entered only if it were consistent with not only the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
20 cases
  • Patten v. State, No. 86-2928
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 7, 1988
    ...new matters may be considered on remand with prior permission of the appellate court. Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 175 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Yet, it is beyond dispute that we do not render advisory opinions. State v. Vogel, 415 So.2d 821, 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982......
  • Lesperance v. Lesperance, No. 71--329
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 1971
    ...Control Dist. v. Anderson, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 140; Rinker Materials Corporation v. Holloway Materials Corporation, Fla.App.1965, 175 So.2d 564; Fairfax Broadcasting Co. v. Florida Airmotive, Inc., Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 854; State ex rel. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Nathan, Fla.App.......
  • Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., No. 45003
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • July 17, 1975
    ...carried out and placed into effect the order and judgment of this Court. Rinker Materials Corporation v. Holloway Materials Corporation, 175 So.2d 564 (Fla.App.2d, A trial court is without authority to alter or evade the mandate of an appellate court absent permission to do so. Cone v. Cone......
  • Wood v. Manatee Bay Corp., No. 79-2072
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • August 6, 1980
    ...New matter affecting the judgment could not be presented without our permission. Rinker Materials Corp. v. Holloway Materials Corp., 175 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965), cert. denied 180 So.2d 657 (Fla.1965). A supplemental judgment could be entered only if it were consistent with not only the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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