Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 08 May 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 15-444 (RC)
• Parties: MARK E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

MARK E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 15-444 (RC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

May 8, 2019

Re Document Nos.: 81, 85, 86

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW; DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

I. INTRODUCTION

After a three day trial, a jury found that Defendant the District of Columbia discriminated against Plaintiff Mark Robinson on the basis of race when it deprived him of certain overtime opportunities within the District's Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"). This discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). The jury awarded Mr. Robinson $750 in compensatory damages. After a round of post-trial briefing, this Court awarded Mr. Robinson injunctive relief, back pay, and attorneys' fees.

The District has filed two post-judgment motions. First, the District moves for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Robinson suffered an adverse employment action required for Title VII liability. Second, the District moves to alter the Court's order granting Mr. Robinson injunctive relief, back pay, and attorneys' fees, arguing that the relief is "manifestly unjust" in light of the governing law and the evidence presented in this case. The Court concludes that the jury could reasonably find that Mr. Robinson suffered an adverse employment action. The Court also concludes that its post-trial relief is supported by the record and is necessary to fulfill Title VII's mandate. The Court thus denies the District's motions, and grants Mr. Robinson additional attorneys' fees.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court's prior memorandum opinions in this case contain detailed background summaries. See Robinson v. District of Columbia, 341 F. Supp. 3d 97, 103-05 (D.D.C. 2018); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 275 F. Supp. 3d 95, 99-101 (D.D.C. 2017). The Court will briefly recount the relevant background here. Mr. Robinson is a sworn MPD officer. See Trial Tr. 77:23-78:1, Mar. 12, 2018, ECF No. 83 (test. of Mark Robinson). He spent several years in MPD's Automated Traffic Enforcement Unit ("ATEU"), a division created to organize traffic camera photographs, analyze evidence of traffic violations, and issue tickets. See id. 50:10-22 (test. of Sharion Garner), 81:3-12 (test. of Mark Robinson). Assignment to the ATEU was apparently lucrative; Mr. Robinson earned significant overtime pay while in the division. See id. 102:4-19 (test. of Mark Robinson).

In late 2011, Mr. Robinson was transferred from the ATEU to MPD's Special Events Branch ("SEB"), ostensibly because MPD was "civilianizing" the ATEU.¹ See Trial Tr. 8:2-13 (Mar. 13, 2018) (test. of Mark Robinson). At this point, although Mr. Robinson was no longer working full time in the ATEU, he could still earn overtime hours through the ATEU Overtime Program. See id. 89:13-91:7 (test. of Lisa Sutter). Between February 2014 and May 2015, Mr. Robinson attempted to participate in the Program. See id. 15:17-16:7 (test. of Mark Robinson). The Program manager, Lisa Sutter, denied his requests. See id. 38:12-25.

Believing these denials to be discriminatory, and receiving no recourse through administrative channels, Mr. Robinson brought this case in 2015. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-3, at 5. He alleged that the District violated Title VII when it transferred him out of the ATEU, denied his request for reassignment to the ATEU, and denied him access to the ATEU Overtime Program between February 2014 and May 2015, all because of his race or in retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination. See generally id. After several rounds of briefing, the case proceeded to trial on Mr. Robinson's claim that he was blocked from the ATEU Overtime Program because of discrimination or retaliation. See Robinson, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 104-05. The Court dismissed Mr. Robinson's retaliation claim at the end of his case, leaving only Mr. Robinson's discrimination claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2); Min. Entry (Mar. 13, 2018). On that claim, the jury found that the District discriminated against Mr. Robinson by denying him ATEU overtime opportunities, and it awarded him $750 in damages. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 56.

The jury's verdict has precipitated contentious post-trial litigation. First, Mr. Robinson filed motions for back pay, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, which the Court granted in part. See Robinson, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 124. Now, the District has struck back. It has filed motions for judgment as a matter of law, and to alter or amend the post-trial relief. Mr. Robinson opposes these motions and seeks additional attorneys' fees. All three motions are ripe for the Court's consideration. It will address them in order.

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

First, the Court considers the District's motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)(3), for judgment as a matter of law. See Def.'s Mot. J. Matter of Law, ECF No. 85. Mr. Robinson contests this motion on the merits, but also raises a procedural challenge. A briefsummary of Rule 50 procedure is thus in order. Rule 50(a) allows a party in a jury trial to move for judgment as a matter of law after "a party has been fully heard on an issue" and "before the case is submitted to the jury." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). If the Court finds that "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis" to find for the nonmoving party on that issue, then the Court may grant the motion for judgment as a matter of law on any "claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue." Id. If the Court does not grant the motion, however, the Court "is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).

After the jury renders its verdict, Rule 50(b) allows the moving party, "[n]o later than 28 days after the entry of judgment," to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. "Because the Rule 50(b) motion is only a renewal of the preverdict motion, it can be granted only on grounds advanced in the preverdict motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 Advisory Committee Note to 2006 Amendment; accord Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) ("A motion under Rule 50(b) is not allowed unless the movant sought relief on similar grounds under Rule 50(a) before the case was submitted to the jury.").

In ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, the Court "do[es] not . . . lightly disturb a jury verdict." Radtke v. Lifecare Mgmt. Partners, 795 F.3d 159, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see also Breeden v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 646 F.3d 43, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[J]udgment as a matter of law is 'highly disfavored' because it 'intrudes upon the rightful province of the jury'" (quoting Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). The Court must resolve all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See Breeden, 646 F.3d at 53. The Court cannot substituteits view for the jury's view, assess witnesses' credibility, or weigh the evidence. See Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And "[e]ven if the Court finds the evidence that led to the jury verdict unpersuasive, or that it would have reached a different result if it were sitting as the fact-finder, that is not a basis for overturning the jury's verdict and granting judgment as a matter of law." Pitt v. District of Columbia, 558 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing 9 Moore's Federal Practice § 50.60[1] at 50-87 (3d ed. 2002)). The jury's verdict will stand if the evidence in support is "'significantly probative' and 'more than merely colorable.'" Scott, 101 F.3d at 753 (quoting Ferguson v. F.R. Winkler GMBH & Co. KG, 79 F.3d 1221, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). In other words, "[j]udgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not have reached a verdict in plaintiff's favor." Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 165 (quoting McGill v. Muñoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

Here, the jury found that the District discriminated against Mr. Robinson by denying him the opportunity to participate in the ATEU Overtime Program. Under Title VII, "the two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability." Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)). The District does not challenge the jury's finding on the second element; that Mr. Robinson was deprived of access to the ATEU Overtime Program because of his race. Rather, the District focuses on the first element. It argues that no reasonable jury could have found that Mr. Robinson suffered an adverse employment action. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Matter of Law ("Def.'s Rule 50 Mem.") at 1, ECF No. 85.

"An adverse employment action is 'a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.'" Jones v. Castro, 168 F. Supp. 3d 169, 174 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). "For employment actions that do not obviously result in a significant change in employment status . . . an employee must go the further step of demonstrating how the decision nonetheless caused . . . an objectively tangible harm." Id. (quoting Douglas, 559 F.3d at 553). In such a case, the court must determine ...