Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 15-444 (RC)

• Decision Date: 23 October 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 15-444 (RC)
• Parties: Mark E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

341 F.Supp.3d 97

Mark E. ROBINSON, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 15-444 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed October 23, 2018

Kenneth E. McPherson, Kenneth E. McPherson, Chtd., Riverdale, MD, for Plaintiff.

Philip Alexander Medley, Christina Okereke, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, BACK PAY, AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Mark Robinson, a sergeant in the District of Columbia's (the "District") Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), sued the District under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. ("DCHRA"), alleging that he was denied the opportunity to work in a particular MPD unit because of race discrimination and retaliation. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Robinson, awarding him $750 in compensatory damages. Having received a favorable jury verdict, Mr. Robinson seeks from the Court injunctive relief, an award of back pay, and attorneys' fees. Upon consideration of the parties' filings, the Court concludes that Mr. Robinson is entitled to all three forms of relief, though not to the extent he requests. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Mr. Robinson's motions.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

Mr. Robinson's lawsuit was prompted by his desire to work in the Automated Traffic Enforcement Unit ("ATEU")—an MPD division created to organize traffic camera photographs, analyze evidence of traffic violations, and issue citations—and his inability to secure that work. See generally Affidavit of Mark E. Robinson ("Robinson Affidavit I"), ECF No. 24-1. Mr. Robinson began working full time in the ATEU in 2008, and he became sufficiently proficient in the unit's functions that he was tasked with training and certifying MPD officers to work in the ATEU Overtime Program, which allowed those officers to supplement their normal workload with ATEU overtime work. See id. ¶¶ 11–16.

In late-2011, Mr. Robinson was transferred from the ATEU to MPD's Special Events Branch ("SEB"), ostensibly because MPD was "civilianizing" the ATEU.² Id. ¶ 18. After Mr. Robinson's transfer to the SEB, while MPD officers could no longer work full time in the ATEU, the ATEU Overtime Program continued. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. During his time in the SEB, Mr. Robinson sought reassignment to the ATEU and the opportunity to participate in the ATEU Overtime Program. Id. ¶¶ 18–23. His requests were denied by his supervisor, Lisa Sutter. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24, 34.

Mr. Robinson brought this action in 2015, alleging that he was transferred out of the ATEU, denied reassignment to the ATEU, and denied the opportunity to participate in the ATEU Overtime Program between February 2014 and May 2015, all because of his race or in retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1-3. After several rounds of briefing, the case proceeded to trial on Mr. Robinson's claim that he was denied ATEU overtime opportunities because of discrimination or retaliation. See Robinson v. District of Columbia ("Robinson I") , 139 F.Supp.3d 448, 451 (D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing Mr. Robinson's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) ); Robinson II , 275 F.Supp.3d at 104–05 (dismissing Mr. Robinson's claims of retaliation and discrimination arising from his reassignment from the ATEU to the SEB). The Court dismissed Mr. Robinson's retaliation claim at the end of his case, leaving only Mr. Robinson's discrimination claim for the jury's deliberation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) ; Minute Order, Mar. 13, 2018. On this claim, the jury found that Mr. Robinson's SEB supervisor in 2014 and 2015, Ms. Sutter, discriminated against him by denying him ATEU overtime opportunities, and the jury accordingly awarded Mr. Robinson $750 in damages. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 56.

Shortly after the trial, Mr. Robinson filed a motion asking the Court to (1) enjoin the District from excluding Mr. Robinson from ATEU overtime opportunities which are not filled by officers actively working within the ATEU; (2) enjoin the District from retaliating against Mr. Robinson; and (3) enjoin the District from discriminating against Mr. Robinson on the basis of his race or color. Mot. Injunctive Relief ("Inj. Mot.") at 3, ECF No. 64. Mr. Robinson also filed motions for back pay, Mot. Award Back Pay ("Pay Mot."), ECF No. 70, and attorneys' fees, Mot. Attys' Fees Costs ("Fee Mot."), ECF No. 63-1.³

Those motions are now ripe for the Court's consideration. The Court concludes that while Mr. Robinson is entitled to all three types of relief, he is not entitled to all injunctive relief sought, nor is he entitled to the full amounts of back pay and attorneys' fees sought. Accordingly, as explained below, the Court grants Mr. Robinson's motions in part.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Equitable Relief

"[O]ne of the central purposes of Title VII is ‘to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.’ " Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) ). Accordingly, Title VII expressly provides for a wide range of remedies:

If the court finds that the [defendant] has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

In considering what remedy is appropriate, a court "must strive to grant ‘the most complete relief possible.’ " Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 764, 96 S.Ct. 1251 ). In other words, the court's goal is to restore the prevailing plaintiffs, as nearly as possible, to the circumstances they "would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418–19, 95 S.Ct. 2362 ). The court has "considerable discretion" to fashion such a remedy. Lander, 888 F.2d at 156 ; see also Hayes v. Shalala, 933 F.Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1996).⁴

B. Attorneys' Fees

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) requires a party seeking attorneys' fees and "related nontaxable expenses" to file a motion with the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). The motion must "specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award." Id. 54(d)(2)(B). It must also state the amount or provide a fair estimate of the award sought. Id. ; see also Craig v. District of Columbia , 197 F.Supp.3d 268, 274 (D.D.C. 2016).

Under Title VII, the Court is authorized, in its discretion, to award "the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Generally, "[a] reasonable fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys." West v. Potter , 717 F.3d 1030, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ). In awarding appropriate attorneys' fees, a court must conduct a two-step inquiry. Craig , 197 F.Supp.3d at 274–75 (citing Does I, II, III v. District of Columbia , 448 F.Supp.2d 137, 140 (D.D.C. 2006) ).

First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party. Id. Plaintiffs are considered prevailing parties, entitled to attorneys' fees, "if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Harvey v. Mohammed , 951 F.Supp.2d 47, 53 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ). A litigant need not succeed at every step of the litigation in order to be a prevailing party under Title VII; indeed, "a litigant who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney's fees even for the unsuccessful stage." Craig , 197 F.Supp.3d at 275 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr. in the U.S. , 189 F.Supp.3d 48, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2016) ).

Second, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's fee request is reasonable. Does I, II, III , 448 F.Supp.2d at 140. In calculating a reasonable fee award, a district court must determine: (1) the reasonable hourly rate (or "lodestar") for the services rendered by the plaintiff's attorney, (2) the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and (3) whether the plaintiff has offered specific evidence demonstrating that this is one of the rare cases where a lodestar enhancement or multiplier is appropriate. See Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ; Heller v. District of Columbia , 832 F.Supp.2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2011). "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. With respect to the number of hours expended, the court must exclude hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Craig , 197 F.Supp.3d at 275 (quoting Does I, II, III , 448 F.Supp.2d at 140 ). Along the same lines, if a plaintiff "achieved only partial or limited success," the court may...