Robinson v. Ignacio Sch. Dist., 11JT

• Decision Date: 10 April 2014
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 13CA1090
• Citation: 328 P.3d 297
• Parties: Christie ROBINSON, individually and as parent and next friend of C.R., a minor child, Plaintiff–Appellee and Cross–Appellant, v. IGNACIO SCHOOL DISTRICT, 11JT, Defendant–Appellant and Cross–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

328 P.3d 297

Christie ROBINSON, individually and as parent and next friend of C.R., a minor child, Plaintiff–Appellee and Cross–Appellant,

v.IGNACIO SCHOOL DISTRICT, 11JT, Defendant–Appellant and Cross–Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 13CA1090

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Announced April 10, 2014

La Plata County District Court No. 13CV20, Honorable Suzanne F. Carlson, Judge

Phillip W. Snyder, P.C., Phillip W. Snyder, Durango, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee and Cross–Appellant

Semple, Farrington & Everall, P.C., M. Brent Case, Mary B. Gray, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant and Cross–Appellee

Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Christie Robinson, individually and as parent and next of friend of her son, C.R., sued defendant, Ignacio School District, 11JT, for injuries C.R. sustained on a school bus. The district moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24–10–101 to –120, C.R.S.2013. The court partially denied the motion. Thus, the district appeals the portion of the court's judgment that denied its motion to dismiss. Robinson cross-appeals the portion of the judgment that dismissed her individual claim for lack of notice pursuant to the CGIA. We reverse that part of the court's judgment denying the district's immunity under the CGIA, and therefore, do not address the portion of its judgment denying Robinson's individual claim.

I. Background

¶ 2 The Ignacio School District transports students of all ages, from elementary to high school, on the same bus. Because of prior bullying by older students, the district implemented a seating assignment directive that required younger students to sit at the front of the bus and the older ones at the back of the bus.

¶ 3 However, in February 2011, two older students, including the bus driver's son, left their assigned seats in the back of the bus and moved towards the front near C.R., Robinson's seven-year-old son. When the bus driver saw her son and his friend move towards the front, she braked and ordered her son to sit down. However, they disobeyed her and sat by C.R. They then grabbed his neck and began to jerk his head back and forth, causing a severe cervical strain and a concussion.

¶ 4 As a result, Robinson, individually and as parent and next friend of her son, filed suit against the district for negligence and as respondeat superior for the bus driver's alleged wanton and willful conduct in failing to control the students. In response, the district moved to dismiss Robinson's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

¶ 5 The trial court partially granted the district's motion. It dismissed Robinson's individual claim and respondeat superior claim for the bus driver's alleged willful and wanton negligence. However, it allowed Robinson's negligence claim to stand because the court found that the district had waived its immunity under the CGIA since Robinson's injuries resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle by a public employee under section 24–10–106(1), C.R.S.2013.

¶ 6 The district filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 24–10–108, C.R.S.2013.

II. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

¶ 7 The district contends that the trial court erred in applying the “operation of a motor vehicle” waiver of government immunity to a claim for injuries resulting from a school bus driver's alleged failure to supervise students on a school bus. It asserts that negligent supervision does not implicate operation of a motor vehicle. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 8 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo.2010). When reviewing issues of statutory construction, we must ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's intent. Id. To discern legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, giving words and phrases effect according to their plain and ordinary meanings. People v. Hopkins, 2013 COA 74, ¶¶ 10–11, 328 P.3d 253. “ ‘The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’ ” Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 179 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo.App.2007) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). “If ... the relevant statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written, without resorting to other methods of ascertaining legislative intent.” Fleury v. IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corp., 2014 COA 13, ¶ 35, ––– P.3d ––––. In construing a statute's ordinary meaning, we read the “statutory scheme” as a whole “to give ‘consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts of the statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2010)).

B. Analysis

¶ 9 The CGIA protects public entities from liability in all “claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort.” § 24–10–106(1); see Foster v. Bd. of Governors of the Colo. State Univ. Sys., 2014 COA 18, ¶ 11, ––– P.3d ––––. However, public entities waive their sovereign immunity under certain exceptions. § 24–10–106(1); see also Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo.2000).

¶ 10 Whether a public entity waives immunity under the CGIA is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction that a trial court must resolve in accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). See Young v. Jefferson Cnty. Sheriff, 2012 COA 185, ¶ 7, 292 P.3d 1189; Curtis, 179 P.3d at 83. Under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction and demonstrating that governmental immunity has been waived. Curtis, 179 P.3d at 83. “Because the CGIA is in derogation of Colorado's common law, the grant of immunity is to be strictly construed against the public entity, and the waiver provisions are to be deferentially construed in favor of victims.” Young, ¶ 8.

¶ 11 As pertinent here, a public entity waives its sovereign immunity in an action for injuries resulting from “[t]he operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public entity, by a public employee while in the course of employment ....” § 24–10–106(1)(a).

¶ 12 The school district argues that this waiver provision requires a physical manifestation of operation of a motor vehicle. Robinson disagrees. We agree with the school district.

¶ 13 While the statute does not define the term “operation,” the supreme court has instructed courts to broadly interpret waiver provisions. See Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1086 (courts should broadly interpret immunity waivers to favor victims); see also State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 506 (Colo.2000) (same); Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636, 643 (Colo.1998) (same); Young, ¶ 12 (recognizing Corsentino requires courts to broadly interpret CGIA provisions that waive immunity). Thus, consistent with these decisions, recent appellate cases have broadly construed the term “operation.” Young, ¶ 12.

¶ 14 Specifically, divisions of this court have defined “operation” as “actions of the operator related to [the] physical control of the functions of the motor vehicle.” Harris v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782, 784 (Colo.App.2000) (citing Stockwell v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 946 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo.App.1997)); Young, ¶ 12. For example, in Harris, 15 P.3d at 785, a division of this court relied on Stockwell, 946 P.2d at 544, to conclude that a bus driver's responsibility to physically remove dangers so that passengers could safely board and disembark a bus implicates the “operation of a motor vehicle.” See Stockwell, 946 P.2d at 544 (defining “operation” as stopping a vehicle to allow passengers to board or disembark a bus); see also Harris, 15 P.3d at 784 (relying on Stockwell ).

¶ 15 Despite Harris'reliance on Stockwell, the parties in this case dispute the relevance of Stockwell. Robinson contends that because the supreme court in Corsentino abrogated Stockwell's strict construction of governmental immunity waiver provisions, its definition of operation of a motor vehicle is no longer correct. We disagree.

¶ 16 A closer reading of Corsentino reveals that the supreme court disapproved of Stockwell's strict interpretation of waiver provisions, but did not overrule its definition of operation of a motor vehicle. See Young, ¶ 19. Therefore, we conclude that the Stockwell division's interpretation of the term “operation of a motor vehicle” is still applicable. See Harris, 15 P.3d at 783 (relying on Stockwell's definition of operation of a motor vehicle while broadly construing the term “operation”).

¶ 17Stockwell is particularly relevant because its facts are similar to those in this case. As pertinent here, the plaintiff filed a suit against the Regional Transportation District (RTD) because the bus driver failed to prevent fellow passengers from attacking the plaintiff. 946 P.2d at 543. The division concluded that “the provision of security is not essential to the public employee's ‘operation’ of a motor vehicle” because a bus driver's responsibility to supervise its passengers did not implicate the physical control of the bus. Id. at 544. Therefore, the division concluded that RTD did not waive its immunity. Id.

¶ 18 Consistent with Harris, the division in Young recently concluded that a driver's responsibility to ensure that his restrained passengers were safely loaded into a van constituted the “operation of a motor vehicle.” Young, ¶¶ 20–21 (stating that securing of handcuffed juveniles was a function of the van driver because the juveniles had no ability to secure the seatbelts themselves).

¶ 19 Although the Young division distinguished Stockwell, it did not undermine or disagree with its substantive conclusion. Unlike in Stockwell, where the bus driver's supervisory obligation did not require a physical action, in Young, the van driver's responsibility to secure handcuffed juveniles entailed a...