Robinson v. Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Manufacturing Company

• Decision Date: 16 April 1917
• Docket Number: 311
• Parties: ROBINSON v. INDIANA & ARKANSAS LUMBER & MANUFACTURING COMPANY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

194 S.W. 870

128 Ark. 550

ROBINSON v. INDIANA & ARKANSAS LUMBER & MANUFACTURING COMPANY

No. 311

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 16, 1917

Appeal from Crittenden Chancery Court; C. D. Frierson, Chancellor reversed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

R. C Brown, of Memphis, for appellant.

1. These lands were not subject to taxation for State and county purposes after they were purchased by the levee district, a governmental agency. 105 Ark. 261. The lands are nontaxable. 93 Ark. 490, 495; 95 Id. 65; 105 Ark. 261; 59 Id. 513; 103 Id. 127, 138-9; 107 Id. 189, 198; 90 Id. 236, 239; 79 Id. 550; Ib. 565; 36 Id. 155, 23 L. R. A 200; 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026; 110 Ark. 416; Acts 1899, p 48; Acts 1903, p. 58; 77 Ark. 519 is not applicable. 41 Ark 45 has been overruled. 77 Ark. 177; 88 Id. 533. See, also, 93 Ark. 490.

2. The statute of limitations does not run. Nor is the State estopped. 39 Ark. 580; 42 Id. 118; 93 Id. 496; 95 Id. 65; 77 Id. 324; 105 Id. 261; 107 Id. 189, 198; 90 Id. 236; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746, 748; 47 Id. 907; 21 L. R. A. 63; 16 Id. 145; 56 Ark. 339.

3. The exemption acts are constitutional. 19 Ark. 360, 372; 21 Id. 4058; 49 L. R. A. 604, 609; 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907; 12 Id. 1163; 10 L. R. A. 377; 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842; 103 S.W. 354; 27 So. 348; 110 La. 585; 4 Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5 ed.), 2436; 34 L. R. A. 146; 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143; 116 Tenn. 260.

4. Appellee has not paid taxes for seven years. 94 Ark. 122; 99 Id. 447; 114 Id. 376; 107 Id. 492; 89 Id. 296. The act of 1899 does not apply.

5. There has been no laches. 105 Ark. 268; 45 Id. 81; 68 Tenn. 129; 92 Ark. 497; 107 Id. 251; 105 Id. 663, etc.; 99 Id. 500; 103 Id. 251, 259, 260.

6. There is no element of estoppel. 93 Ark. 490; 105 Id. 268. The chancellor erred in his finding of facts and in holding that the lands were taxable. 78 Wash. 236; 139 P. 194; 145 Id. 458; 183 S.W. 1032; L. R. A. 1916-E 94, 97.

Daggett & Daggett, for appellee.

1. The title is barred by the act March 18, 1899. The lands were subject to taxation. 77 Ark. 519; 62 Id. 481; 57 Id. 445; 95 Id. 64. The attempted exemption is void. 55 Ark. 148; 69 Id. 284; 59 Id. 513; 58 Id. 151; 41 Id. 45; 93 Id. 490; 30 Id. 693; 40 Id. 34; 46 Id. 312; 120 U.S. 97; 62 Ark. 481; 57 Id. 445.

2. Appellant is barred by the seven years' tax act.

3. The district is estopped, and guilty of laches. 112 Ark. 467; 81 Id. 244; Acts 1901, p. 160, § 1, etc.; 90 Ark. 430; 95 Id. 6; 99 Id. 455. The decree is correct.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

J. L. Robinson instituted this action in the chancery court against the Indiana & Arkansas Lumber & Manufacturing Company to quiet the title to certain wild and unoccupied lands in Crittenden County, Arkansas. The lumber company defended on the ground that it had acquired title by the payment of taxes for seven years under the act of March 18, 1899, and that the plaintiff had been guilty of laches in bringing his suit.

The material facts are as follows: The lands in controversy were originally owned by Robert C. Brinkley, He died in 1878, and by the terms of his will the lands became the property of his children. The board of directors of the St. Francis Levee District instituted an action in the chancery court under our statute to enforce the collection of delinquent levee taxes for the year 1898. The whole of the northeast quarter of section 6, township 4 north, range 7 east, containing 409 acres in Crittenden County, Arkansas, was sold under the decree, and the levee district became the purchaser at its own sale. On September 11, 1899, the levee district conveyed to the defendant along with 20,000 acres of other lands, lots 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the northeast quarter of said section 6, for the sum of $ 1.00 per acre. On the 17th day of February, 1916, the devisees under the will of R. C. Brinkley executed a quitclaim deed to the defendant for these lots as well as the lots herein sued for. On the 6th day of October, 1915, the levee district executed a deed to plaintiff to lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the northeast quarter of said section 6, containing 249.19 acres, and on the 22d day of December, 1915, plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant to quiet his title to said lots. The lots in controversy have greatly increased in value since they were purchased by the levee district at its sale for levee taxes. It was shown by the defendant that a purchaser at a tax sale for the taxes of 1887, which is conceded to be void, executed to it a warranty deed to said lots. It was also shown by the defendant that it had paid the taxes on said lands for seven years under the act of March 18, 1899, and that the lands have always been wild and unoccupied and have never been in the actual possession of any one.

The court held that the plaintiff was barred of relief by reason of the payment of taxes by the defendant for more than seven years under color of title and a decree was entered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for want of equity. The plaintiff has appealed.

OPINION

HART, J., (after stating the facts).

The correctness of the decision of the chancellor depends upon whether or not the lands in controversy in this case were subject to taxation for county and State taxes after they were purchased by the levee district at its own sale for levee taxes. Article 16, section 5, of the Constitution of 1874, provides, that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value, provided that the following property shall be exempt from taxation; public property used exclusively for public purposes; churches used as such; cemeteries used exclusively as such; school buildings and apparatus; libraries and grounds used exclusively for school purposes, and buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for public charity.

Section 6 provides that all laws exempting property from taxation other than is provided in this Constitution shall be void.

It is insisted by both parties that this question has already been decided in their favor by a previous decision in this court. Counsel for the defendant rely upon the case of Bonner v. The Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist., 77 Ark. 519, 92 S.W. 1124. There the court said that the lands in controversy continued subject to taxation after they were acquired by the St. Francis Levee District. The levee district had purchased the lands in that case on the 24th day of January, 1898, for unpaid levee taxes and on the second Monday in June, 1898, Bonner purchased the same land at a sale for State and county taxes. There the assessment had been completed, and the State and county taxes had become a fixed lien on the lands before their purchase by the levee district, and the court simply meant to hold that a change in the use of the property after the State and county taxes had become a lien did not release the land from liability for such taxes. The reason is that to so hold would be to give a retrospective effect to the section of the Constitution above referred to. An exemption from taxes created by the Constitution will not be given a retrospective effect unless an intention that it shall have such an effect is clearly expressed and it is apparent that the section of our Constitution relating to this subject was not intended to operate retrospectively. City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Institution for Instruction of Blind, 214 Pa. 138, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 437, 63 A. 420, and case note. So it will be readily seen that the Bonner case is not an authority for the position taken by counsel for the defendant.

Counsel for plaintiff rely on the case of Miller v. Henry, 105 Ark. 261, 150 S.W. 700. There the court, at the end of an opinion, which was devoted almost exclusively to other propositions, said the lands which had been bought in by the St. Francis Levee District at a sale for levee taxes were not subject to taxation while in the hands of the levee district, but no reason was given for such holding.

We now propose to take up the question and decide it anew for the reason that it is now earnestly insisted that such a holding is in direct conflict with the holding of this court in School District of Fort Smith v. Howe, 62 Ark. 481, 37 S.W. 717, and Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445, 22 S.W. 29.

The St. Francis Levee District is a quasi-corporation to which is delegated certain powers as a governmental agency. Carson v. St. Francis Levee Dist., 59 Ark. 513, and Board of Dir. St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Fleming, 93 Ark. 490, 125 S.W. 132. The correctness of the chancellor's holding depends upon whether the lands were acquired by the levee district in its proprietary capacity or in the exercise of its functions as a governmental agency. In the former case the lands would not be exempt and in the latter they would be exempt from taxation. This distinction, we think, has been recognized in our previous decisions relating to the question.

In the case of Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445, 22 S.W. 29, the court held that the hospital buildings, grounds and materials, under our Constitution, were exempt from taxation, but that the property leased or rented was not exempt though the revenues were applied solely to the subject of the public charity. The reason is that under our Constitution it is only when the property itself is actually and directly used for public charity that the law exempts it from taxation.

In the later case of Hot Springs School District v. The Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497, 106 S.W. 954, we held that a hospital building with the grounds connected therewith which was used in the operation of a public charity was not excluded from constitutional exemption from taxation merely because patients who were able to do so paid for the attention and medicine which the...