Roe v. Gelineau

• Citation: 794 A.2d 476
• Decision Date: 12 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2000-136-Appeal.,2000-136-Appeal.
• Parties: Joseph ROE v. Louis E. GELINEAU et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

794 A.2d 476

Joseph ROE v. Louis E. GELINEAU et al.

No. 2000-136-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 12, 2002.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Timothy Conlon, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Thomas R. Bender, William T. Murphy, James T. Murphy, Linn Foster Freedman, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

The plaintiff, Joseph Roe (plaintiff or Roe), sued the various defendants for alleged physical, emotional, and sexual abuse suffered while he was a minor in the custody of the State of Rhode Island (state), residing at the Saint Aloysius Home. A Superior Court justice found that the statute of limitations for bringing the action had expired and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has argued on appeal that the statute of limitations was tolled by G.L. 1956 § 9-1-19¹ because he was of "unsound mind." We are sensitive to the lifelong trauma that childhood physical and sexual abuse can cause, and we recognize the legal and psychological obstacles that beset the victims of such abuse. Here, however, we reject the plaintiff's contention that unsound mind was evidenced in his case by his transient inability to recall the abuse, his inability to deal with it in therapy, and his consequent inability to bring specific claims relating to the abuse until he filed this lawsuit. Wedo so because the plaintiff has failed to provide the proof required by our case law on repressed recollection. In light of the historical scope of the tolling disabilities, the longstanding legal significance of the term "unsound mind," and the practical benefits of adopting an operational definition of the term, we are of the opinion that the inability to manage one's day-to-day activities is the proper barometer for measuring whether a plaintiff's mental state falls within the range of conditions that constitute an unsound mind. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and conclude that Roe's alleged unsound mind did not fall within the purview of the tolling statute. The plaintiff's contract claims against St. Aloysius are pending in the Superior Court.

Facts and Procedural History

The plaintiff,² at the age of twenty-three, filed a multi-count complaint on June 3, 1996, alleging that he had been physically, emotionally, and sexually abused while he was a resident at the Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum d/b/a Saint Aloysius Home (St. Aloysius) in Greenville, Rhode Island. When he was placed at St. Aloysius in 1982, plaintiff was in the custody of the state Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). According to plaintiff, the Diocese of Providence of the Roman Catholic Church owned St. Aloysius and operated it under a contract with DCYF as a residential treatment facility for boys between the ages of five and fourteen who suffered behavioral, emotional, or developmental problems. Alleging that he suffered abuse at the hands of staff members over a period of approximately two and one-half years, Roe asserted various personal injury claims against Bishop Louis E. Gelineau (Bishop Gelineau); the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, a corporation sole (RCB); St. Aloysius and its managing director, Father Robert McIntyre; the state; eight officers of DCYF, including two designated as John Doe 1, Director, and John Doe 2, Executive Director;³ and twenty other John Doe or Jane Doe defendants.⁴ The plaintiff also asserted a breach-of-contract claim against St. Aloysius.

In an amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that the three-year statute of limitations on the personal injury claims had been tolled or suspended for several reasons, including the delayed discovery of his harm, his incapacity or disability under § 9-1-19, and because of defendants' fraudulent concealment of facts underlying plaintiff's claims, their concealment of negligence, fraud, breach of a fiduciary duty, and the conspiracy among them to commit negligent acts.

The defendants Bishop Gelineau and RCB filed a Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the personal injury claims on the ground that plaintiff filed the claims after the expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in § 9-1-14(b); all other defendants also filed similar motions. In response to the motions to dismiss, plaintiff argued that his minority tolled the statute of limitations and that he was of unsound mind until some point within three years of filing the complaint. Section 9-1-19.

Various other plaintiffs brought nine similar cases that were assigned to a single justice "for management purposes," following which the justice granted the motion of defendants Bishop Gelineau and RCB to consolidate this case with the other pending cases. While the motions to dismiss were pending and Bishop Gelineau remained a defendant, the justice granted summary judgment in favor of RCB, and this Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the corporate veil could not be pierced. Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 52 (R.I.1999).

Because the motion justice considered documents outside the pleadings, the motions to dismiss were treated as Super.R.Civ.P. 56 motions for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 12(b). Cipolla v. Rhode Island College Board of Governors for Higher Education, 742 A.2d 277, 280 (R.I.1999) (per curiam); Bethlehem Rebar Industries, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 582 A.2d 442, 444 (R.I.1990). After finding that plaintiff's claim of unsound mind failed to satisfy the tolling requirements of § 9-1-19, the court entered final judgments in favor of all named defendants with respect to the personal injury claims pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; the contract claims against St. Aloysius are still pending. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the justice erred in finding that plaintiff's claim of unsound mind did not toll the statute of limitations.

Standard of Review

We review de novo a justice's decision to grant summary judgment, applying the same rules and standards as those employed by the justice. Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 29 (R.I.2001); Woodland Manor III Associates v. Keeney, 713 A.2d 806, 810 (R.I.1998). We shall affirm the judgment only when, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be decided, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Heflin, 774 A.2d at 29; Woodland Manor III Associates, 713 A.2d at 810. But the nonmoving party cannot prevail by relying solely on allegations or on denials in the pleadings; rather, it must identify or present evidence that a dispute of material fact remains. Heflin, 774 A.2d at 29.

Before making a final ruling on a motion for summary judgment, however, a motion justice may first need to find certain preliminary facts before moving on to decide the question of law, namely, whether the statute of limitations has run against a plaintiff. Hall v. Insurance Co. of North America, 727 A.2d 667, 669-70 (R.I.1999) (per curiam). We review questions of law de novo. Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Bowen Court Associates, 763 A.2d 1005, 1007 (R.I. 2001)

. Here, then the justice must first find whether the particular mental condition in this case constitutes an unsound mind for purposes of the tolling requirements of § 9-1-19. Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 879 (R.I.1996).

Minority under § 9-1-19

Before turning to the merits of plaintiff's claim of an unsound mind, we briefly address an issue discussed during oral argument, namely, how long plaintiff's minority tolled the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for personal injuries states, "Actions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after." Section 9-1-14(b).⁵ The statute is tolled, however, by several legal disabilities under § 9-1-19.

It is uncontested that under § 9-1-19, plaintiff's minority tolled his claims, and therefore they could have been brought at any time within the three years after the end of his minority. During the Superior Court proceedings on this issue, plaintiff argued that his minority ended when he turned eighteen on July 26, 1990, and his appellate brief contended that his minority ended upon his emancipation in October 1990. The defendants pointed out that Roe's minority may have ended for tolling purposes on July 26, 1993, under the pre-1988 version of § 9-1-19, in which the age of minority extended to twenty-one for causes of action that arose on or before July 1, 1988, whereas the 1988 amendment lowered the age of majority to eighteen for causes of action arising after July 1, 1988. Public Laws 1988, ch. 107, §§ 1, 2. Because plaintiff's claims stemmed from events that took place between 1982 and 1985, the pre-1988 statute would have fixed his age of majority at twenty-one. The plaintiff, however, did not raise that issue in the Superior Court.

It is well established that, under the raise-or-waive rule, this Court refrains from reviewing issues not raised in the trial court. State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I.2001). We may review an issue not previously raised only in narrow circumstances, when basic constitutional rights are involved. Id. "For example, when an intervening decision of this court or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel's failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review." State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I.1987). To invoke the exception, however, "the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial." Breen, 767 A.2d at 57. Because Roe's age of minority for statute of limitations...