Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees System, No. 03-5162 (R.I. Super 4/9/2004), 03-5162
| Decision Date | 09 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-5162,03-5162 |
| Parties | HEIDI ISELIN v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND, and EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
This is an appeal of the September 10, 2003, decision of the Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island (Retirement Board), which denied the Appellant, Heidi Iselin (Iselin), an accidental disability pension. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 42-35-15 and 9-30-1.
On August 7, 1983, Iselin began her employment with the State of Rhode Island. On September 1, 1996, while at work for the Department of Mental Health and Retardation as a Community Living Aide, Iselin slipped on a kitchen floor that was covered with broken egg shells. A resident under Iselin's care inadvertently placed the eggs on the floor. As a result of the incident, Iselin suffered injuries to her back. Her injuries required significant medical treatments and eventually back surgery. After her surgery, Iselin became depressed and sought psychiatric treatment. Iselin has not returned to work except for one day shortly after the accident.
In June or July 2002, Iselin filed an application to receive an accidental disability pension.1 By a letter dated October 9, 2002, Iselin was formally notified by the Retirement System's Assistant Executive Director that her application was administratively denied because her application was filed beyond the five-year time period required by G.L. 1956 § 36-10-14. Iselin appealed this denial and the matter was heard by a hearing officer on March 3, 2003. Among other evidence, the hearing officer reviewed Iselin's Exhibit 1, wherein Iselin's psychiatrist, Doctor James Whalen, stated that "due to her medical status at this time, she was unable to appreciate and comply with the deadlines" for an accidental disability pension application. At the hearing, the attorney for the Retirement Board did not challenge Iselin's mental incapacity. On June 10, 2003, the hearing officer affirmed the Retirement System's denial of Iselin's application to receive an accidental disability pension.
Iselin then appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Retirement Board. On September 10, 2003, Iselin, accompanied by counsel, appeared before the Retirement Board. After hearing testimony from Iselin and the Retirement System, the Retirement Board affirmed the hearing officer's decision. This appeal and request for declaratory judgment followed.
Iselin asks this Court to review the Retirement Board's decision under two separate statutes. One invokes the Superior Court's appellate jurisdiction and the other invokes the Superior Court's original jurisdiction.
First, Iselin initiates an administrative appeal under G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act. Effective June 28, 2002, agencies and agency proceedings under Chapter 10 of Title 36 of Rhode Island General Laws became subject to review under the Administrative Procedures Act. P.L. 2002, ch. 316, § 1 and P.L. 2002, ch. 387, § 1 (). Subsection (g) of G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 provides as follows:
"(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
"When reviewing an agency decision pursuant to [G.L. 1956] § 42-35-15, the Superior Court sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review." Mine Safety Appliances v. Berry, 620 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1993). This review "is limited to an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision." Barrington School Comm. v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992) (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Caldarone, 520 A.2d 969, 972 (R.I. 1987); Narragansett Wire Co. v Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376 A.2d 1, 6 (1977)). If such evidence exists, this Court must uphold the agency's decision. Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I. 2000) (citing Barrington School, 608 A.2d at 1138). The trial judge "may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the administrative agency." Bunch v. Board of Review, 690 A.2d 335, 337 (R.I. 1997). The trial judge may reverse the findings of the agency "only in instances wherein the conclusions and the findings of fact are `totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record,' or from the reasonable inferences that might be drawn from such evidence." Bunch, 690 A.2d at 337 (quoting Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981)) (citing Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 588-89, 410 A.2d 425, 428 (1980)).
"Questions of law, however, are not binding upon the court and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts." Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376 A.2d 1, 16 (R.I. 1977) (citing Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Ridgely v. Secretary of Dep't of HEW, 345 F. Supp. 983 (D. Md. 1972); Blue Earth County Welfare Dep't v. Cabellero, 302 Minn. 329, 225 N.W.2d 373 (1974)). A caveat to this general rule is: "[a]lthough Court is the ultimate arbiter of law, [the Rhode Island Supreme Court] give[s] deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it has been charged with administering and enforcing, provided that the agency's construction is neither clearly erroneous nor unauthorized." Arnold v. Rhode Island Dep't of Labor and Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 169 (R.I. 2003) (citing In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I. 2001)). See also Lyman v. Employee's Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, 693 A.2d 1030, 1031 (R.I. 1997); Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I. 1993). The Superior Court may be guided by principles of equity when reviewing questions of law. See Defalco v. Voccola, 557 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 1989).
Second, Iselin seeks a declaratory judgment from this Court pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1, which provides as follows:
An actual justiciable controversy is a predicate to this Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over declaratory judgments under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See, e.g., Providence Teachers Union v. Napolitano, 690 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1997). This Court's power to issue declaratory judgements "is broadly construed, to allow the trial justice to `facilitate the termination of controversies.'" Bradford Assocs. v. Rhode Island Div. of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Capital Properties, Inc. v. State, 749 A.2d 1069, 1080 (R. I. 1999) (quoting Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. E.W. Burman, Inc., 120 R.I. 841, 845, 391 A.2d 99, 101 (1978)). A declaratory judgment action may not be used "for the determination of abstract questions or the rendering of advisory opinions." Lamb v. Perry, 101 R.I. 538, 542, 225 A.2d 521, 523 (1967). "An action pursuant to [this] act invokes the original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction of the Superior Court." Bradford Assocs. v. Rhode Island Div. of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001) (citing Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 479 (R. I. 2000); Roch v. Garrahy, 419 A.2d 827, 830 (R. I. 1980)). The Superior Court's decision to grant or deny declaratory relief is purely discretionary; however, this authority is not absolute as it may be reviewed on appeal for improper exercise of discretion or otherwise abuse of authority. See Woonsocket Teachers Guild Local Union 951, AFT v. Woonsocket School Committee, 694 A.2d 727, 729 (R.I. 1997); Lombardi v. Goodyear Loan Co., 549 A.2d 1025, 1027 (R.I. 1988); State v. Cianci, 496 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 1985).
Iselin does not contest the legality of the five-year statutory period for filing an application for an accidental disability pension. Rather, Iselin argues the deadline should have been tolled by the Retirement Board due to her inability to manage her daily affairs when the application was due. Acknowledging no Rhode Island case law exists to support her position, Iselin analogizes other case law and statutes, such as workers' compensation cases.
In her Complaint, Iselin heavily relies upon Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986), wherein the United States Supreme Court applied a "traditional equitable tolling principle" to a sixty-day time requirement imposed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services for federal disability benefits administered by the Social Security Administration....
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