Roybal v. Governing Bd. of Salinas City

Decision Date11 January 2008
Docket NumberNo. H030596.,H030596.
Citation72 Cal.Rptr.3d 146,159 Cal.App.4th 1143
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesKeith ROYBAL, et. al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF The SALINAS CITY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et.al., Defendants and Appellants.

ELIA, J.

The Salinas City Elementary School District, its superintendent, and its governing board (collectively, "the District") seek review of an order requiring them to pay attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 based on the District's improper layoff of three District employees, the successful petitioners in the underlying mandamus proceeding.1 On appeal, the District contends that no reasonable basis exists for recovery of attorney fees under this statute. We agree that the fee award is not supported by the record or the purposes and policies of the "private attorney general" doctrine. Accordingly, we will modify the judgment to delete these fees from the amount awarded to petitioners.

Background

Petitioners are three school psychologists who were employed by the District. In early 2005, in the face of decreasing student attendance and a revenue shortfall, the Governing Board of the District adopted a resolution reducing certain services and terminating the employment of certain certificated employees. The superintendent thereafter sent a "Notice of Layoff to 134 full-time certificated employees, including petitioners, pursuant to Education Code section 44949.

Respondents requested a hearing, which took place in April 2005 before an administrative law judge (ALJ) pursuant to Education Code section 44949, subdivision (c)(3). Respondents contended that the layoff was procedurally defective and that the District had improperly deviated from the seniority list "to retain certain psychologists with advanced Spanish [l]anguage proficiency skills." The ALJ, however, rejected petitioners' arguments, finding insufficient evidence that they were more skilled in the Spanish language than the psychologists the District had decided to retain. The Governing Board adopted the proposed decision of the ALJ, effective June 30, 2005.

Petitioners then sought a peremptory writ of mandate in superior court. In their amended petition they challenged the ALJ's decision with respect to several points, including the finding that they lacked sufficient Spanish language skills to allow the District to lay them off before less senior psychologists.

The superior court agreed with petitioners that the District had improperly deviated from seniority order in implementing the layoff. Petitioners, the court found, were all bilingual. The District thus had "failed to demonstrate that the Petitioners did not have the necessary bilingual skills. Furthermore, [the District] failed to produce evidence that there exis[t] any objective criteria for determining language skill levels for school psychologists, such as Petitioners." The court directed the District not only to set aside the ALJ's decision and reinstate petitioners, but also to pay them "damages for past and future lost wages, the value of lost benefits, and other damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure [section] 1095" as well as costs and attorney fees.

In the ensuing motion for damages and attorney fees, petitioners asserted that they were entitled to attorney fees under Education Code section 44944 and under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.2 Addressing the latter statute, petitioners asserted that "whenever particular school employees enforce the specific provisions of the Education Code and force the District to comply with that, it benefits every school employee in the state whom [sic ] is entitled to that protection. So it is a very large group of people." Petitioners further argued that the financial burden of the litigation was out of proportion to the damages they were asserting. In response, the District maintained that petitioners had not satisfied all the prerequisites for recovery of attorney fees under section 1021.5, particularly the necessity and burden of private enforcement in relation to the petitioners' individual interests in the litigation.

After considering the written and oral arguments of the parties, the superior court ruled that petitioners were not entitled to attorney fees under the Education Code statutes pertaining to layoff, particularly sections 44955 and 44959. They did, however, meet the requirements for such fees under section 1021.5. Accordingly, on May 26, 2006, the court entered judgment awarding damages to two of the petitioners and costs and attorney fees to all three.

Discussion

Section 1021.5 permits an award of attorney fees to a successful party in an action that "has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any."

The statute, a codification of the "private attorney general" doctrine, recognizes that "privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible." (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200 (Woodland Hills); see also Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 690, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 [private attorney general doctrine is designed to "encourage private enforcement of important public rights and to ensure aggrieved citizens have access to the judicial process where statutory or constitutional rights have been violated"].) Accordingly, "private attorney general" fees may be awarded when the plaintiffs action "(1) served to vindicate an important public right; (2) conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons; and (3) imposed a financial burden on plaintiffs which was out of proportion to their individual stake in the matter." (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874; Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 318, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900, 667 P.2d 704)

Trial court decisions on attorney-fee requests under section 1021.5 have traditionally been reviewed deferentially and upheld absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 142-143, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874; Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1125, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 1.) Our Supreme Court recently clarified, however, that the proper standard of review depends on the extent to which there were issues of fact below. If the issue is whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied, "this may be a mixed question of law and fact and, if factual questions predominate, may warrant a deferential standard of review." (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 788, 129 P.3d 1.) If, on the other hand, the underlying facts are largely undisputed and the issue calls for statutory construction, it is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. (Id. at pp. 1175-1176, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 788, 129P.3d 1.)

The application of section 1021.5 in this case involves mixed questions of law and fact. But even giving all possible deference to the superior court's exercise of discretion and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of its ruling, we cannot uphold the judgment.

1. Important Right

The first prong of the section 1021.5 test for "private attorney general" fees requires a determination of "the `strength' or `societal importance' of the right involved." (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 935, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200.) That right may be constitutional or statutory, but it must be "an important right affecting the public interest"—it "cannot involve trivial or peripheral public policies." (Ibid.; Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation (2001) 94 Cal. App.4th 1033, 1044, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 787.) Where, as here, the right vindicated is conferred by statute, "courts should generally realistically assess the significance of that right in terms of its relationship to the achievement of fundamental legislative goals." (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 936, 154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200.)

Here petitioners claimed attorney fees based on their having been "forced to litigate their statutory right under Education Code § 44955 to be laid off only in seniority order, and in accordance with the law as defined by the Court in Alexander v. Board of Trustees of Delano Joint Union School District (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 567, 188 Cal.Rptr. 705, thereby benefitting all school psychologists and other certificated employees, including all school teachers, by vindicating an important right affecting the public interest in uniform and fair administration of public schools." On appeal, petitioners do not repeat that circular statement and mention Alexander only in describing the requirements of section 44955. Instead, petitioners turn to the trial court's order, which stated that "[t]he legal work [of petitioners' attorneys] was of high quality and the issue litigated was important both as to its impact on other parties and in reaffirming the basic...

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