Rycroft v. Gaddy
| Decision Date | 23 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 0126,0126 |
| Citation | 281 S.C. 119,314 S.E.2d 39 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Kenneth R. RYCROFT, Appellant, v. Clifford F. GADDY, Jr., Rene J. Tanguay and The Citizens and Southern National Bank of South Carolina, Respondents. . Heard |
David D. Armstrong, Greenville, for appellant.
James Watson and Michael J. Giese, of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for respondent Gaddy.
William Douglas Gray, of Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Gable & Gray, Anderson, for respondent Citizens and Southern National Bank of South Carolina.
Rene J. Tanguay, pro se.
This is an action for abuse of process, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The trial judge granted the respondents' motion for involuntary non-suit with prejudice. We affirm.
The instant case arose out of an earlier lawsuit between the appellant-Rycroft and the respondent-Tanguay. Rycroft and Tanguay were equal shareholders in a corporation when Rycroft sued for dissolution of the corporation. Tanguay retained the respondent-Gaddy as counsel and counterclaimed alleging that Rycroft had defrauded the corporation.
The day before the commencement of the trial, Tanguay and Gaddy learned that Rycroft had used C & S Bank as a depository for certain corporate checks. Rycroft was served with a subpoena duces tecum directing him to bring his records to the hearing. He failed to comply with the subpoena contending he did not have sufficient time to do so. Prior to the conclusion of the hearing, Gaddy moved to continue the lawsuit so that he could obtain Rycroft's personal banking records from C & S. This motion was denied by the Master-in-Equity.
The Master issued his written report to the Circuit Court on June 29, 1979. Even though neither party excepted to the Master's report, the action was not dismissed until Circuit Judge Eppes issued his order, dated September 6, 1979, confirming and adopting the Master's report.
Rycroft complied with the Master's report by sending two certified checks to Tanguay. After these checks had been received, Gaddy had two subpoenae duces tecum issued by the Greenville County Clerk of Court, one dated July 23, 1979, and the other August 1, 1979. Both subpoenae directed C & S Bank to produce the records of Rycroft's checking account. C & S complied with the subpoenae and turned the records over to Gaddy who gave them to Tanguay.
In February of 1980, Gaddy served Rycroft with notice of motion to reopen the judgment. The motion was granted by Special Circuit Judge Sparks who found that Rycroft had committed an extrinsic fraud upon the court. This order was later reversed on appeal. See Rycroft v. Tanguay, 279 S.C. 76, 302 S.E.2d 327 (1983). Rycroft then initiated this action against Tanguay, Gaddy, and C & S Bank claiming that C & S was negligent in producing his bank records and that the production of those records constituted an abuse of process and an invasion of privacy.
In deciding on a motion for a non-suit, the trial judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. If more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the judge must submit the case to the jury. Dunsil v. Jones Chevrolet, 268 S.C. 291, 233 S.E.2d 101 (1977).
Rycroft claims that C & S was negligent in failing to look beyond the face of a valid subpoena (the validity of which Rycroft admits) to determine if litigation was pending and if the records were requested for a valid purpose. The subpoenae duces tecum were proper in their form, meet the existing legal procedures in South Carolina (see Section 14-17-260), and clearly indicated that a viable legal action was pending between Rycroft and Gaddy. Since the subpoenae were valid on their face, the bank had no duty to inquire into the circumstances behind the subpoenae as a bank cannot refuse to give information concerning an account when questioned in response to a lawful subpoena. Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) (dictum); In Re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 248 A.2d 531 (1968).
Rycroft next claims that the production of his bank records constituted an invasion of his right to privacy. This tort, recognized as actionable in South Carolina, has been defined as
The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956); Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 276 S.C. 284, 278 S.E.2d 607 (1981).
As we read this definition, three different causes of action can arise under the tort of invasion of the right of privacy: 1) wrongful appropriation of personality; 2) publicizing of private affairs of no legitimate public concern; and 3) wrongful intrusion into private affairs. A necessary element of each different claim is damages. Under the facts of this case, the wrongful appropriation of personality is clearly not at issue.
With regard to C & S, there can be no wrongful intrusion as the bank already had Rycroft's records. Rycroft is claiming that the bank had no right to reveal his private records to a member of the public. However, the subpoenae were proper on their face and the bank had no choice but to comply. Further, the subpoenae were issued to produce documents that were intended to be used in pending litigation. Communications in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and are immune from an action for an invasion of privacy. Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.Civ.App.1976).
With regard to Tanguay and Gaddy, Rycroft claims both wrongful intrusion and publicizing of private affairs. We will deal with the publicity charge first.
Rycroft claims that his bank records were obtained by Gaddy and given to Tanguay who then showed the records to a Mr. Charles Rollins. The testimony at the trial revealed that while Rollins saw the stack of checks and knew that they were Rycroft's checks from C & S Bank, that was the extent of Rollins' knowledge.
Under a cause of action for the "publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern" (emphasis added), an essential element of recovery is a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McCormick v. England
...a breach of confidentiality. Publicity involves disclosure to the public, not just an individual or a small group. Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39 (Ct.App.1984). See also Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 326 S.C. 426, 483 S.E.2d 789 (Ct.App.1997) (a communication t......
-
Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc.
...are claiming either the publicizing of private affairs or the wrongful intrusion into their private activities. In Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39 (S.C.App.1984), the Court of Appeals set forth succinctly the standard of proof required under both these Under a cause of action ......
-
Riley v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs.
... ... Id. Public disclosure of private facts is also ... called publicity. See Rycroft v. Gaddy , 314 S.E.2d ... 39, 43 (Ct. App. 1984). “Publicity means that the ... matter is made public, by communicating it to the ... ...
-
Yarborough v. King
...action for fraud under South Carolina law). 5.South Carolina recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy. See Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39, 42 (S.C.Ct.App.1984). An employee, however, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files, e-mails, and electronic data ma......