Sage v. Rudnick

• Decision Date: 17 June 1904
• Citation: 100 N.W. 106,91 Minn. 325
• Parties: SAGE v. RUDNICK.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

91 Minn. 325

100 N.W. 106

SAGE

v.RUDNICK.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 17, 1904.

On rehearing. Reversed.

For former opinion, see 98 N. W. 89.

Start, C. J., and Lewis, J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

In 1866 Congress granted to the state of Minnesota, in aid of the construction of a railroad therein, certain lands consisting of the oddnumbered sections within 10 miles on either side of the center line of the road when definitely located. The state, by chapter 9, p. 11, Sp. Laws 1867, accepted the grant, and in turn granted the lands to the railroad company upon certain conditions named in the act. The Hastings & Dakota Railroad Company, the grantee and beneficiary, filed its map of definite location in June, 1867, fully complied with the conditions of the grant, completed its road in 1880, and the land was formally conveyed by the state to plaintiff, the successor of the railroad company, in 1891. Defendant settled upon the land in controversy in this action, the same being a part of that so granted to the railroad company, and within the place limits of its grant, in 1877, and has ever since continuously remained in the open, adverse, and exclusive possession of the same. Subsequent to filing the map of definite location by the Hastings & Dakota Company and the completion of its road, the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railroad Company made claim to this and other lands within the primary limits of the grant to the Hastings & Dakota Company, which claim it presented to the Interior Department of the general government for adjudication, where it was pending and undetermined from 1883 to 1891, when it was disposed of adversely to the Manitoba Company. In this action by plaintiff, successor to all the rights of the Hastings & Dakota Company, to recover possession of the land from defendant, it is held:

1. That the grant to the railroad company was in praesenti, and the legal title to the land in question passed to the Hastings & Dakota Railroad Company upon the filing of its map of definite location in 1867.

2. The statute of limitations began to run in favor of defendant's alleged title by adverse possession at the time of his settlement upon the land, the legal title thereto being then in the railroad company.

3. After the title so passed from the government to the railroad company, the Interior Department had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the asserted claim of the Manitoba Company, and the pendency of that controversy before the department did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in favor of defendant's adverse claim.

4. When the legal title to public land has passed from the government, the Interior Department has no jurisdiction to determine controversies between individual claimants concerning the title or right to the possession thereof.

5. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co. v. Olson, 91 N. W. 294, 87 Minn. 117,94 Am. St. Rep. 693, distinguished.

BROWN, J.

Action in ejectment, in which defendant interposed the defense of title by adverse possession. The trial court instructed a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed from an order denying a new trial. The appeal came on for hearing and was decided at the October, 1903, general term, and is now before us on rehearing. The opinion will be found in 98 N. W. 89.

The only question presented on the former hearing was whether the defendant should have been permitted to prove, in support of his defense, that he had been in the actual, open, and exclusive possession of the land under claim of right for 15 years next preceding the commencement of the action. It was then held that the case was controlled by St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 91 N. W. 294,94 Am. St. Rep. 693, and the ruling of the learned trial court, holding that the defendant's claim of title, on the conceded facts, was invalid, was sustained. An application for rehearing having been granted, the cause was again argued and submitted upon the same question at the present term of court.

The facts are as follows: In 1866 the Congress of the United States, by act approved on July 4th of that year (14 Stat. 87, c. 168), granted to the state of Minnesota, to aid in the construction of a railroad from Hastings to the western boundary of the state, certain lands consisting of the odd-numbered sections within a belt 10 miles in width on each side of the line of the railroad when definitely located. The grant was accepted by the state of Minnesota on March 7, 1867, by chapter 9, p. 11, Sp. Laws 1867, by which act the state in turn granted the lands to the Hastings & Dakota Railroad Company. Subsequent to the act of acceptance and grant to the railroad company, the latter, on June 26, 1867, filed its map of definite location, and thereafter fully complied with the conditions of the grant and completed its road about the year 1880-the precise date is not before us. Plaintiff in this action succeeded to all the rights of the railroad company, and the land was formally certified to him by the state in 1891. The land in controversy in this action was a part of that so granted to the railroad company, and within the place limits of that grant. Defendant entered into possession of the same under claim of right in 1877, and the evidence offered by him on the trial tends to show that since that time he has remained in the actual, open, notorious, and exclusive possession thereof. This action was brought against him in 1896 to recover possession of the land, and it is the claim of plaintiff that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in defendant's favor on his alleged claim of adverse possession until the land was formally certified to the railroad company by the state in 1891. The trial court, basing its decision upon the Olson Case, supra, sustained this contention, and the only question now before us is whether the court in so ruling erred.

The act of Congress by which this land was granted to the railroad company is similar to those of other grants of a like nature, and operated to pass the title to the land from the government at the time the company filed its map of definite location. This question has been repeatedly before the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases, and the decisions are uniform that such grants are in praesenti, and pass the title upon filing the map of definite location of the road. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44, 22 L. Ed. 551; Leavenworth Ry. Co. v. U. S., 92 U. S. 733, 23 L. Ed. 634; Ry. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. 426, 26 L. Ed. 578;Railway Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528, 11 Sup. Ct. 168, 34 L. Ed. 767. It is unnecessary, so far as passing title is concerned, that a patent or formal certificate of the Interior Department be issued. Langdeau v. Hanes, 21 Wall. 521, 22 L. Ed. 606;Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 7 Sup. Ct. 985, 30 L. Ed. 1039; Weeks v. Bridgman, 41 Minn. 352, 43 N. W. 81. The legal title having passed by the act of Congress, and by the act of the Legislature of Minnesota of March 7, 1867, which expressly granted to the railroad company all lands and interest therein conferred upon the state by the act of Congress, the railroad company and its successor, plaintiff in this action, from the time of filing the map of definite location in June, 1867, had the undoubted right to maintain an action to recover the land from any person claiming any right or interest therein. The courts were open to them, and any form of action could have been maintained therein to protect their rights. This precise question has been before many of the courts of our sister states, and the decisions are uniform to the effect that in land grants of this kind the statute of limitations commences to run in favor of an adverse claimant from the time of filing by the railroad company of its map of definite location, where, as in the case as bar, the grant is one in praesenti. In the case of Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Whitaker, 109 Cal. 268, 41 Pac. 1083, the court had before it the rights acquired by a railroad company under a land grant similar to that involved in the case before us. It was held that the railroad company became the owner of the lands there in controversy on filing its map of definite location, that the statute of limitations commenced to run in favor of defe...