Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles
| Decision Date | 02 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2019-000693,Opinion No. 27990 |
| Citation | 848 S.E.2d 768,431 S.C. 374 |
| Parties | Bradley SANDERS, Petitioner, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES and Columbia Police Department, Respondents below, Of whom South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles is the Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Heath Preston Taylor, of Taylor Law Firm, LLC, of West Columbia, for Petitioner.
Frank L. Valenta Jr., Philip S. Porter, and Brandy Anne Duncan, all of the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, of Blythewood, for Respondent.
The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver's license of Bradley Sanders (Sanders) pursuant to South Carolina's implied consent statute after he refused to take a blood-alcohol test following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The suspension was upheld by the Office of Motor Vehicles and Hearings (OMVH), the Administrative Law Court (ALC), and the court of appeals. See Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 426 S.C. 21, 824 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 2019). We affirm.
On November 21, 2012, at approximately 4:10 a.m., the Columbia Police Department dispatched an officer to Whaley Street after a single vehicle ran off the road and struck a tree. Upon arrival, the officer found Sanders standing nearby at a gas station, bleeding from the head. The officer questioned Sanders and noticed that he slurred his words, had an odor of alcohol, and appeared to be "off-balance," both physically and mentally. Sanders denied being in an accident, but his personal belongings and blood were found inside the wrecked vehicle, and he could not explain how he injured his head
. Sanders was taken by ambulance to a hospital emergency room, where he was found to have extensive head and neck injuries.
The officer advised Sanders of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and informed him that he was under arrest for DUI. The officer also gave Sanders notice, both verbally and in writing, of his rights under South Carolina's implied consent statute. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (2018) (implied consent law). A hospital employee indicated to the officer that Sanders was unable to submit to a breath test. As a result, the officer asked Sanders to take a blood-alcohol test. Sanders refused. No blood sample was collected.
The DMV issued a Notice of Suspension to Sanders informing him that it had suspended his driver's license for refusing to submit to testing in accordance with the implied consent statute. Under the statute, the South Carolina General Assembly has declared that "[a] person who drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination [thereof]." Id. § 56-5-2950(A).
Sanders challenged the license suspension in a contested case hearing before the OMVH. The issue before the OMVH centered on whether Sanders had refused to submit to a test pursuant to section 56-5-2950. Because Sanders was asked to submit to a blood test, the hearing more specifically focused on whether the officer was justified in requesting a blood sample because licensed medical personnel had determined Sanders was unable to submit to a breath test.1
The officer testified that he requested the blood sample after a hospital employee indicated Sanders was unable to submit to a breath test. The officer stated he personally observed the employee in the emergency room and saw that she wore a hospital identification badge that identified her name and title as "Angela Albright, RN."
The officer also provided a one-page, standardized form, the "South Carolina Law Enforcement Division - Urine/Blood Collection Report" (SLED Report), which documented the officer's investigation. The officer indicated on the form that Sanders had been arrested for an offense related to intoxication and was advised of his implied consent rights. There was also a section for completion by licensed medical personnel, which contained alternative statements describing whether blood and/or urine samples had been sought or collected. The following statement was marked regarding Sanders:
A blood sample is requested by the arresting officer because a licensed medical person has informed the officer that the subject is unable to take a breath test at this time due to any reason deemed acceptable by that licensed medical person.
In the line designated for "Name and [Title] of Licensed Medical Personnel," Nurse Albright wrote in "Angela Albright, RN," and she signed on the line reserved for "Signature of Licensed Medical Personnel." The officer signed the bottom of the form, documenting that his request for a blood sample had been "Refused." Sanders also signed to confirm that he received a copy of the SLED Report.
Sanders's counsel objected to the SLED Report stating that, although Nurse Albright "may well be a registered nurse," he could not determine whether she actually was one because she was not there to cross-examine as to her credentials, and anyone "can have hospital garb on," citing State v. Frey , 362 S.C. 511, 608 S.E.2d 874 (Ct. App. 2005).2 Sanders's counsel also argued he should be able to cross-examine Nurse Albright as to her reason why Sanders could not take a breath test (he noted the underlying reason was not specified on the SLED Report). Sanders's counsel asserted the officer's testimony on these points would be hearsay.
The officer reiterated that he personally witnessed Nurse Albright wearing a hospital identification badge with her name and the designation of her title as "RN" and saw her performing her duties in the emergency room. He also noted that Nurse Albright had identified her hospital title on the SLED Report as "RN." The officer lastly added that he was told that the reason why Sanders could not supply a breath sample was because Sanders "would not be able to get out [of the hospital emergency room] in a timely manner in order to provide that breath sample." See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(A) (). No contemporaneous objection was made by Sanders's counsel to the officer's additional statement regarding the underlying reason why medical personnel found Sanders could not provide a breath sample (the inability for Sanders to be discharged from the emergency room within the two-hour time limit).
Sanders's counsel provided the officer with a copy of Sanders's medical records and asked him to recite for the record the portions that counsel had highlighted about Sanders's diagnosis and symptoms. The officer read the portions stating Sanders was diagnosed with "[s]calp contusions, scalp laceration
[s], cervical strain, and [a] closed head injury," and that the common symptoms of a head injury could include, among other things, dizziness, headaches, and "slow bleeding or other problems inside the head." Sanders's counsel asked the officer, "Does it sound like he may have had a concussion and was out of it?" The officer declined to discuss this point.
Sanders then testified as to his injuries and medical condition following the accident. At his counsel's urging, Sanders also recited the findings in his medical records, confirming he was diagnosed with "[s]calp contusions, scalp lacerations
, cervical strain
, and [a] closed head injury." Sanders testified that he "had no clue" what happened after the accident and "was very disoriented," and he stated he did not recall being in the hospital or being asked to submit a blood sample. During cross-examination, Sanders conceded that he went to Five Points at approximately 1:00 a.m. the night of his arrest and "probably had two [alcoholic drinks], maybe part of a third" before his one-car accident shortly after 4:00 a.m. Sanders stated that the last thing he remembered was driving down the street towards the tree, and the rest of the evening was very "fuzzy" and "foggy," as the only other thing he recalled was waking up in jail with blood encrusted in his hair.
During closing remarks, Sanders's counsel made a general request to renew his hearsay objection. In the alternative, counsel asserted Sanders had "absolutely no knowledge of what was going on" after the accident because Sanders "had a significant head injury
, had a concussion" and he did not "remember anything until he woke in jail the next morning" with "blood all over the back of his head."
The OMVH issued a written order upholding the suspension. The OMVH found Sanders was lawfully arrested for DUI and was advised of his implied consent rights. The OMVH found the officer made a reasonable request for a blood sample after being informed by licensed medical personnel that Sanders was unable to submit to a breath test. The OMVH noted Sanders had argued this information was hearsay because he did not know if Nurse Albright was an RN and he did not have the opportunity to question her as to the reason why she made this finding. The OMVH "conclude[d] that the testimony was not hearsay because it was not admitted to prove that [Sanders] was actually unable to leave, only that the blood test was warranted because licensed medical personnel determined he was unable to provide a breath sample." The OMVH further concluded that the officer "presented a prima facie case that the person who told him and signed the form [the SLED Report] was licensed medical personnel - she was in the hospital, treating patients, represented herself as a nurse, and wore a name tag that indicated she was a registered nurse," and Sanders made no attempt to refute...
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