Sandoval v. Archdiocese of Denver, 99CA1133.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99CA1133.,99CA1133.
• Parties: Angela C. SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ARCHDIOCESE OF DENVER, a corporation Sole, as Owner and Entity in Control of Holy Family Grade School, and Diana Bennett, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

8 P.3d 598

Angela C. SANDOVAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ARCHDIOCESE OF DENVER, a corporation Sole, as Owner and Entity in Control of Holy Family Grade School, and Diana Bennett, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99CA1133.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

July 6, 2000.

Stafford & Stafford, L.L.C., John T. Stafford, Jr., Lakewood, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons LLP, Charles Goldberg, Samuel M. Ventola, Scott M. Browning, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

Kennedy & Christopher, P.C., John R. Mann, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association.

Law Offices of Richard Werner, Richard Werner, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association.

Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.

While an elementary grade student at a Diocesan school, plaintiff, Angela C. Sandoval, was involved in a four-year sexual relationship with her teacher that ended in 1991. Subsequently in 1998, she filed this action against defendants, the Archdiocese of Denver, a corporation Sole, as Owner and Entity in Control of Holy Family Grade School, and Diana Bennett, former principal of the school, asserting claims of negligence, respondeat superior and ratification, and outrageous conduct. The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to file her claims within the two-year limitations period set forth in § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S.1999, and thus granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint against these defendants. Plaintiff appeals from that judgment, and we affirm.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should only be granted if there is a clear showing that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Compass Insurance Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606 (Colo.1999). Our review is de novo. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo.1995).

I.

Plaintiff's primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred when it determined that her claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. To the contrary, plaintiff argues, because her civil action was based on a sexual assault committed by defendants' employee, her claims were governed by § 13-80-103.7, C.R.S.1999, which provides a six-year statute of limitations for victims of a sexual offense. We disagree.

A.

Originally, civil claims brought by a victim of sexual assault were governed by the various general limitations statutes, the terms of which had been shortened in the General Assembly's extensive tort reform in 1986. In 1990, however, the General Assembly carved out an exception by enacting § 13-80-103.7, which consolidated "any civil action[s] based on a sexual assault or a sexual offense against a child" under a six-year statute of limitations. The limitations period commenced when a claim for relief accrued or, if the victim was "under a disability," when the disability was removed. A person "under disability" was defined pursuant to § 13-81-101(3), C.R.S.1990, as, for example, a minor under age eighteen.

In 1993, the General Assembly determined that a victim could also be "disabled" by a suppressed memory caused by the psychological and emotional trauma of a sexual assault by someone with whom the victim had a special relationship. Thus, it amended the statute alternatively to allow victims subjected to sexual abuse six years from the date their memory surfaced to pursue a civil action. Hearings on H.B. 1259 before the House Judiciary Committee, 59th General Assembly, First Session (February 11, 1993). See also Hearings on H.B. 1259 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 59th General Assembly, First Session (March 10, 1993); cf. Sailsbery v. Parks, 983 P.2d 137 (Colo.App. 1999).

As amended, § 13-80-103.7 provides, in relevant part:

(1) Notwithstanding any other statute of limitations ... any civil action based on... a sexual offense against a child shall be commenced within six years after a disability has been removed for a person under disability, as such term is defined in subsection (3.5) of this section, or within six years after a cause of action accrues.... Nothing in this section shall be construed to extend the statutory period with respect to vicarious liability.

....

(3.5)(a) [P]erson under disability also includes a victim of a sexual assault when the victim is in a special relationship with the perpetrator of the assault ... and where the victim is psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the harm resulting therefrom. For the purpose of this subsection (3.5), "special relationship" means a relationship between the victim and the perpetrator of the sexual assault which is a confidential, trust-based relationship, such as ... teacher-student .... [A]s elements of the cause of action, a person under disability ... shall have the burden of proving that the assault or offense occurred and that such person was actually psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault ... and the harm resulting therefrom....

B.

The dispositive issue here is whether the phrase, "any civil action `based on' a sexual offense," restricts application of the extended limitations period to claims brought against a perpetrator or encompasses related claims raised against third parties. We hold that the statute of limitations set forth in § 13-80-103.7 does not apply to claims against parties other than a perpetrator of a sexual offense.

Statutory construction is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Itin v. Bertrand T. Ungar, P.C., 978 P.2d 142 (Colo. App.1998).

Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to give it a construction and interpretation that will render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted. See Civil Service Commission v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645 (Colo.1991). It must be read and considered as a whole, and construed to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152 (Colo.2000).

We look first to the plain language of the text. See State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo.2000). If, however, the General Assembly's intended meaning of a phrase is doubtful, the court should consider the language in the context of the statute and by reference to the meaning of words associated with the word or phrase at issue. Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo.1995). And, if the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear, a court also may look to pertinent legislative history to determine the purpose of the legislation. See Fishburn v. City of Colorado Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo.App. 1995).

1.

Plaintiff contends that the term "based on" should be read alone and given its literal meaning. Thus, because her claims arose from the factual circumstances of the sexual offense by defendants' employee, plaintiff argues that the extended limitations period applied. Indeed, some jurisdictions have accepted a similar argument. See Werre v. David, 275 Mont. 376, 913 P.2d 625 (1996) (because the claim against her stepfather was the starting point or foundation, negligence claim against mother was actionable); C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop, 138 Wash.2d 699, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (claims of negligence can be considered a subset of intentional sexual abuse; absent the abuse, victim would not have suffered any injury and the negligence claims could not stand).

In support of her position, plaintiff asserts that the 1993 amendment focused on a victim's repressed memory disability. Hence, she argues, the General Assembly intended a "harms-based" statute that would broaden the victim's remedies by extending the time frame in which she or he can identify not only a perpetrator but also third parties responsible for the abuse. In support of this reasoning, she cites Almonte v. New York Medical College, 851 F.Supp. 34 (D.Conn. 1994) (statutory focus is on actions flowing from a particular type of harm, and not parties; such a harm-based approach is consistent with the legislative intent to afford a plaintiff sufficient time to recall and come to terms with traumatic childhood events).

Defendants, however, contend that Werre, C.J.C., and Almonte are inapposite because the underlying statutes in those cases, unlike here, encompass claims for damages for "injuries suffered as a result of" a sexual assault.

Instead, here, § 13-80-103.7, C.R.S.1999, links the type of claims to which it applies to offenses listed in the criminal code. See §§ 13-80-103.7(2) and 13-80-103.7(3), C.R.S. 1999. That language, defendants assert, restricts the scope of § 13-80-103.7 to civil claims "based on" the act of the perpetrator of a sexual assault or offense, such as assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotion distress, or breach of fiduciary duty.

Some state courts which have statutes similar to Colorado's have so held. See Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873 (R.I.1996) (the only intended legislative target is the person who at the time of the abuse would have been subject to criminal prosecution, and does not include his employer unless employer would also have had criminal liability); Debbie Reynolds Professional Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.4th 222, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 514 (1994) (plaintiff may seek recovery for any act committed by a defendant that would have been proscribed by specified penal code sections; thus, recovery excluded for defendants who are alleged to have contributed to plaintiff's damages by negligence).

Defendants point out that, four years after Debbie Reynolds was decided, California amended its statute expressly to provide that it applies to "an action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was...