Santa Barbara Federation of Teachers v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1977
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Citation: 76 Cal.App.3d 223,142 Cal.Rptr. 749
• Parties: SANTA BARBARA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1081,, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA BARBARA HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Education of Santa Barbara High School District, et al., Defendants and Respondents (two cases). Civ. 51052.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 749

142 Cal.Rptr. 749

76 Cal.App.3d 223

SANTA BARBARA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1081, AFL-CIO, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA BARBARA HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT and Board of Education of Santa Barbara High School District, et al., Defendants and Respondents (two cases).

Civ. 51052.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Dec. 27, 1977.

Levy, Koszdin, Goldschmid & Sroloff and Henry R. Fenton, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants

George P. Kading, County Counsel, and Don H. Vickers, Deputy County Counsel, Santa Barbara, for defendants and respondents.

IBANEZ, ^* Associate Justice.

In this appeal, two cases involving substantially identical facts and issues of law have been consolidated for consideration by this court. The appeal in both cases is from a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate sought by the nominal appellant, Santa Barbara Federation of Teachers, Local 1081, on behalf of several individual petitioners (hereinafter "petitioners") who are employees of the Santa Barbara School District in one case, and of the Santa Barbara High School District in the second case. Both school districts are governed by the same board of education (see Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 339-347, 118 Cal.Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605) and will be referred to hereinafter collectively as "respondent."

Petitioners sought to compel respondent to grant them probationary status on the basis of their cumulative years of employment, allowing them to attain permanent status by tacking on their additional years of employment since the date of the petition. The issue on appeal is whether respondent's classification of the petitioners as temporary employees for the school years 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77 was proper.

FACTS

The cases were submitted to the trial court upon the following stipulated facts:

Each of the individual petitioners (Lynn Milligen and Elliot Tucker in the High School District case; Gail Fenelon in the School District case) ¹ was employed by respondent as a temporary teacher for at least 75 percent of the days that schools were in session by a series of yearly contracts for the school years 1974-75, 1975-76, and 1976-77. ² Petitioners have been informed at all times of their status as temporary teachers and were aware of that status when they accepted each of the yearly employment contracts. Each of the petitioners, however, has received the same salary and benefits as would be earned by a teacher with probationary or permanent status.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that any of the petitioners was employed to replace a specific certificated teacher on leave of absence. At all times, however, the number of temporary teachers in both districts has either equalled or been less than the number of probationary and permanent teachers missing from service on leaves of absence.

It additionally appears that probationary or permanent teachers on leave could have been assigned to teach the various classes taught by petitioners had they not been away, or, at least in one case, that a teacher on leave could have been assigned to teach the class of a certificated employee who could then have been reassigned to teach an industrial arts class taught by one of the petitioners.

DISCUSSION

Although the contracts of employment accepted by petitioners purported to fix their status as that of temporary teachers, they are not estopped to claim probationary status if the statutory scheme of the Education Code compels the latter classification under the particular facts of each petitioner's employment situation. ³ (See § 13338.1; Campbell v. Graham-Armstrong (1973) 9 Cal.3d 482, 486-487, 107 Cal.Rptr. 777, 509 P.2d 689; Paulus v. Board of Trustees (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 59, 61, 134 Cal.Rptr. 220.) The statutory mandate must be clear, however, before the terms of the contracts may be abrogated. (Centinela Valley Secondary Teachers Assn. v. Centinela Valley Union High Sch. Dist. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 35, 38, 112 Cal.Rptr. 27; see also Matthews v. Board of Education (1962) 198 Cal.App.2d 748, 752, 18 Cal.Rptr. 101.)

The statutory classification system applicable in the present case is both complex and obscure; several sections of the code appear to conflict with each other. At the core of the classification scheme is a division of teachers into four basic categories: permanent, probationary, substitute, and temporary. "The essence of the statutory classification system is that continuity of service restricts the power to terminate employment which the institution's governing body would normally possess. Thus, the Legislature has prevented the arbitrary dismissal of employees with positions of a settled and continuing nature, i. e., permanent and probationary teachers, by requiring notice and hearing before termination. (Citations.) Substitute and temporary teachers, on the other hand, fill the short range needs of a school district, and may be summarily released absent an infringement of constitutional or contractual rights. (Citations.) Because the substitute and temporary classifications

are not guaranteed procedural due process by statute, they are narrowly defined by the Legislature, and should be strictly interpreted." (Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist., supra, 11 Cal.3d 821, 826, fn. omitted, 114 Cal.Rptr.

589, 591, 523 P.2d 629, 631.) Petitioners Were Properly Classified As Temporary Teachers Pursuant To Section 13337.3

During the relevant years of petitioners' employment, section 13337.3 provided in pertinent part for the employment of temporary teachers as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 13336 and 13337, the governing board of a school district may employ as a teacher, for a complete school year but not less than one semester during a school year, any person holding appropriate certification documents, and may classify such person as a temporary employee. The employment of such persons shall be based upon the need for additional certificated employees during a particular semester or year because a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester or year, or is experiencing long-term illness, and shall be limited, in number of persons so employed, to that need, as determined by the governing board." (Emphasis added.)

The dispute between the parties centers on the italicized portion of the above-quoted language. The petitioners contend that the statute allows temporary status only when a teacher replaces a specific employee on leave, i. e., the temporary teacher must teach the classes that a particular teacher on leave would have taught. Since respondent failed to establish that petitioners were replacing any particular probationary or permanent employees on leave, petitioners conclude that their initial classification as temporary teachers under section 13337.3 was improper and that they should therefore have been classified as probationary teachers under section 13334. ⁴

Respondent, on the other hand, disputes petitioners' contention that section 13337.3 contemplates replacement on a one-to-one basis, and contends that the statute requires only that the total number of temporary teachers not exceed the aggregate of probationary and permanent teachers on leave at any one time. In light of the fact that the number of temporary teachers in both districts has at all relevant times been equal to or less than the number of probationary and permanent employees on leave, respondent maintains that its classification of petitioners as temporary teachers was proper.

Courts must construe statutes so as to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 256, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049.) That intent must initially be sought in the language of the statute (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, at p. 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224; Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 227, 231, 137 Cal.Rptr. 146.) But here the words of section 13337.3 are ambiguous and fairly susceptible to both of the constructions suggested by the parties. We have neither been directed to, nor have we found, any reports of the Legislature which would provide a clue to the legislative intent behind section 13337.3. We must therefore look for the intent of the Legislature in the general policies and purposes of the teacher classification system, mindful of the consequences which will flow from any particular interpretation of the statute. (Vittal v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 112, 120, 87 Cal.Rptr. 319.)

It has been said that the purpose of the tenure law is to give employment security to teachers while protecting the community The potential for abuse inherent in respondent's construction of section 13337.3 is obvious. In any school district, other than the very smallest, there will always be some fairly fixed percentage of probationary and permanent teachers on leave at any one time. Respondent's interpretation of the statute would allow school districts to indefinitely maintain a work force of "temporary" teachers up to that fixed percentage, barring the application of some other provision which would limit the number of years that a teacher could serve in a temporary capacity. In other words, a school district with a 5 percent rate of certificated teachers on leave could continually classify 5 percent of its teachers as "temporary," thereby depriving them of the opportunity of ever attaining permanent status. (Cf. Centinela Valley Secondary Teachers Assn. v. Centinela Valley Union High Sch. Dist., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 35, 44-45, 112 Cal.Rptr. 27, Fleming, J., dissenting.)

from ineffective teachers. (Curtis v. San Mateo Junior College Dist. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 161, 165, 103 Cal.Rptr. 33.) The courts will...