SanTamaria v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 12 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06–577 (RC).
• Citation: 875 F.Supp.2d 12
• Parties: Gloria SANTAMARIA et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

875 F.Supp.2d 12

Gloria SANTAMARIA et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 06–577 (RC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 12, 2012.

Robert W. Jones, James E. Brown and Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Edward P. Taptich, Richard Allan Latterell, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting In Part and Denying In Part the Parties' Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs are the parents and next friends of several children who are protected by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),¹20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. The plaintiffs initiated this action to request an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred while prosecuting various administrative claims under the IDEA. The defendant, the District of Columbia, disputes the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' request. The court concludes that part, but not all, of the plaintiffs' request is reasonable. Accordingly, the court grants in part and denies in part the parties' respective motions.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs are parents and next friends of a number of children enrolled in various schools within the District of Columbia Public Schools system (“DCPS”). Compl. ¶ 4. The plaintiffs initiated administrative hearings to determine whether the defendant failed to provide these children with a Free and Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), as the IDEA requires. Id. Following the hearings, several children were awarded relief under the IDEA. Mem. Op. (Feb. 6, 2007) at 1–2. The plaintiffs requested reimbursement of attorneys' fees in twenty-two claims, which the defendant did not pay. ² Pls.' Mot. at 1. The plaintiffs then filed this action to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. See generally Compl. Initially, the parties disputed whether certain plaintiffs were “prevailing parties” under the IDEA, a question the court resolved in 2007 by concluding that most of those plaintiffs had prevailed. See Mem. Op. (Feb. 6, 2007) [Dkt. # 11]. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fee request. Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.' Mot.”) [Dkt. # 18]; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mot.”) [Dkt. # 22]. With these motions ripe for consideration, the court now turns to the parties' arguments and to the applicable legal standards.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Attorneys' Fees Under the IDEA

A district court is authorized to award “reasonable attorneys' fees” to a prevailing party under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The court's award of fees is based on a two-step inquiry: the court must first determine if the party is the “prevailing” party, and second, the court must determine whether the requested fees are reasonable.³Jackson v. District of Columbia, 696 F.Supp.2d 97, 101 (D.D.C.2010). “The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see also Jackson, 696 F.Supp.2d at 101 (applying Hensley in the IDEA context).

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that both the hourly rate and the number of hours spent on any particular task are reasonable. In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C.Cir.1995). A plaintiff can do so by submitting evidence on at least three fronts: “the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995). Once the plaintiff has provided such information, a presumption arises that the number of hours billed is reasonable and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing. Id. at 1109–10.

B. The Court Grants in Part and Denies in Part the Parties' Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment

1. The Number of Hours Billed by the Plaintiffs' Counsel

a. Some of the Plaintiffs' Requested Fees and Costs Are Excessive

The defendant argues that the plaintiff's requested fee award should be reduced because the plaintiffs include “bill review” as a cost. Def.'s Mot. at 21. The plaintiffs concede that they may not receive any fees for these charges. Pls.' Reply at 8 [Dkt. # 24]. Accordingly, the court will not award the plaintiffs any fees or costs associated with invoices that charge for “bill review.”

In addition, the defendant identifies several charges that they believe are excessive and should not be included in the court's award. See Def.'s Mot. at 20–21. The defendant points to a handful of charges that were incurred by an education advocate—not an attorney or a paralegal. Id. The plaintiffs concede that education advocates may not recover fees or costs under the IDEA, Pls.' Reply at 8, and the defendant's objection is therefore moot. The court will therefore disallow any portion of the request that is attributed to education advocates.

b. The Court Will Reduce the Plaintiffs' Award by 5% For Their Limited Success

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs' award should be reduced because the plaintiffs only received a limited degree of success in their claims. Def.'s Mot. at 21. The entirety of the defendant's argument is as follows:

As to the claims of S.M., M.J., and D.K., their exhibits demonstrate overall that they only enjoyed approximately 75% success on their claims. As to the claims of J.P., A.P., R.W., S.Y., P.B. and L.F., their exhibits only demonstrate that they enjoyed approximately 50% success in their claims. These claims should be reduced accordingly.

Id. The plaintiffs do not address this argument in their opposition.

A court has the discretion to reduce an award of attorneys' fees to account for a party's limited success. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933;B.R. ex rel. Rempson v. District of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 153, 164–65 (D.D.C.2011); Lopez v. District of Columbia, 383 F.Supp.2d 18, 22–23 (D.D.C.2005). When awarding fees for a partially successful plaintiff, it is crucial to first determine whether the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed are related to those claims on which the plaintiff did not succeed. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35, 103 S.Ct. 1933. If the claims “involve a common core of facts” or are based on “related legal theories,” “[m]uch of counsel's time will likely be devoted to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Accordingly, the court should “focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by plaintiff in relation to the hours that counsel reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id.; see id. at 436–37, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (“There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations. The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.”).

Here, several plaintiffs received a large proportion of the relief they had originally sought. For example, although an administrative officer concluded that S.M. was not denied a FAPE, S.M. was successful in his request to obtain home-schooling. Compl., Ex. 13 at 6. Similarly, a hearing officer concluded that M.J. was not necessarily denied a FAPE but nevertheless concluded that M.J. might have been denied certain special education services and required that DCPS investigate the matter and provide compensatory education if necessary. Id., Ex. 9 at 11–12. D.K. received an order requiring DCPS to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation and convene a multidisciplinary team (“MDT”) to review and revise D.K.'s individualizededucation program (“IEP”). Id., Ex. 11 at 2–3.

Regarding the District's conclusion that several other plaintiffs received only 50% of the relief they sought, the court concludes that their level of success does not warrant a drastic reduction of the award of attorneys' fees. For example, a hearing officer found that J.P. was not denied a FAPE, but the officer did find that DCPS failed to conduct an evaluation, despite recommendations by a DCPS psychiatrist. DCPS was ordered to conduct a vocational assessment and to convene an MDT/IEP meeting to make any appropriate adjustments in the child's IEP. Compl., Ex. 15 at 6. The same is true of plaintiff A.P., id., Ex. 16 at 4 (finding no denial of a FAPE but ordering DCPS to convene a MDT/IEP placement meeting), plaintiff R.W., id., Ex. 20 at 4 (finding no denial of a FAPE but ordering a psychiatric assessment and requiring the DCPS to convene an MDT/IEP meeting), plaintiff S.Y., id., Ex. 22 at 3 (no denial of FAPE but DCPS was ordered to conduct psycho-educational, speech/language, social history and clinical psychological evaluations and to convene an MDT/IEP meeting), P.B., id., Ex. 4 (no denial of a FAPE but MDT/IEP meeting ordered, and DCPS ordered to develop a compensatory education plan and provide said education) and plaintiff L.F., id., Ex. 6 (no denial of a FAPE but MDT/IEP meeting ordered).

The defendant does not argue that the plaintiffs brought any meritless claims that were unrelated to their successful claims. E.g., B.R. ex rel. Rempson, 802 F.Supp.2d at 165 (reducing the plaintiffs' fee award because they brought a meritless claim that was separate from their successful claim). But the court recognizes that these plaintiffs received less than all of the relief they sought. See Dickens v. Friendship–Edison P.C.S., 724 F.Supp.2d 113, 121–23 (D.D.C.2010) (reducing the plaintiffs' fee award because the plaintiffs received some but not all of their requested relief). In light of the plaintiffs' overall degree of success...