Santana v. State, 7784

• Decision Date: 24 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 7784,7784
• Citation: 431 S.W.2d 558
• Parties: George Rivera SANTANA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. . Amarillo
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 558

431 S.W.2d 558

George Rivera SANTANA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 7784.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

Amarillo.

June 24, 1968.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1968.

Brock, Wright, Waters & Galey, William T. Kirk, Jr., Lubbock, for appellant.

Fred West, County Atty., Jack Layne, Asst. County Atty., Lubbock, for appellee.

DENTON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order entered by the 99th District Court of Lubbock County, sitting as a Juvenile Court, pursuant to Article 2338--1, Vernon's Ann.Tex.St. declaring appellant, a male fourteen years of age, a juvenile delinquent and committing him to the custody of the Texas Youth Council. Trial was before a jury.

On December 13, 1966 a petition was filed by the Lubbock County Attorney charging Santana with assault with intent to rape. A first amended petition was filed January 13, 1967 charging the same offense to have been committed on December 8, 1966 rather than on December 12, 1966. A second amended petition was filed January 17, 1967 charging the same offense but alleging in more particular the county in which the alleged offense was committed. No question is raised as to the service of these petitions on the parties hereto. On February 2, 1967, the date the trial was had, a 'Second Amended Original Petition' was filed charging appellant with the offense of rape. This is the pleading upon which the trial was held. In response to two special issues submitted, the jury found Santana guilty of rape, found him to be a delinquent child as defined in the court's charge to the jury.

Appellant's first point of error raises the question whether in a delinquency proceeding the continued use of the standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is permissible rather than beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). It is appellant's contention the thrust of Gault in requiring the safeguards of notice of charges; right to counsel; right to confrontation and cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimination requires the state to prove the elements of the crime charged in a deliquency proceeding beyond a reasonable doubt. His position is the refusal to require this quantum of proof is a denial of the due process of law. The decision in Gault did not directly pass upon this question of the degree of the burden of proof required in juvenile cases.

Since the enactment of the Juvenile Act, Article 2338--1, in 1943, the Texas courts have uniformly held that juvenile proceedings were to be conducted under the rules established for civil cases. Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 151 A.L.R. 1217; Steed v. State, 143 Tex. 82, 183 S.W.2d 458; State v. Thomasson, 154 Tex. 151, 275 S.W.2d 463. The Juvenile Act makes no reference to the standard of proof required in delinquency cases. However, in accordance with the philosophy of the Juvenile Act, and in view of the established premises these proceedings were to be conducted as a civil proceeding rather than a criminal proceeding, out courts have consistently held the state was only required to prove the act of delinquency by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Ferrell (Tex.Civ.App.) 209 S.W.2d 642 (Ref. N.R.E.); Cantu v. State (Tex.Civ .App.) 207 S.W.2d 901; Robinson v. State (Tex.Civ.App.) 204 S.W.2d 981.

The purposes and basic philosophy of the Texas Juvenile Act has coincided with the general concept of juvenile proceedings in all states. The idea of crime and punishment was abandoned and the child was to be rehabilitated in his own interest and in the interest of society. The basic philosophy has prevailed in practically every state jurisdiction until the United States Supreme Court handed down Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. There the court considered the requirements for a valid waiver of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia in order that a juvenile could be tried in the District Court as an adult. The court held it was necessary that 'the basic requirements of due process and fairness' be satisfied in considering the validity of such waivers of jurisdiction. The Kent decision was limited to a construction of the District of Columbia statute until the Supreme Court extended this holding to all juvenile proceedings. In re Gault, supra. As Mr. Justice Fortas said in Gault: '* * * while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone'. The court then held the essential elements of due process require that a juvenile proceeding must include notice of charges; the right to counsel; the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses. The court deemed there elements 'critically important'. Aside from the appellant's contention here that he did not have adequate notice of the charges against him, there is no contention the rights above required were not met in this case. As noted above the Gault decision did not pass directly upon the exact question presented here, to-wit: the quantum...