Scales v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co

• Decision Date: 16 May 1919
• Docket Number: 19888
• Citation: 212 S.W. 8
• Parties: SCALES v. NATIONAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

212 S.W. 8

SCALES v. NATIONAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO

No. 19888

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 16, 1919

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; Guy D. Kirby, Judge. Action by Maggie Scales against the National Life &amp Accident Insurance Company. From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals, and case was certified by the Court of Appeals (186 S.W. 948). Reversed and remanded, with directions. Plaintiff recovered judgment for $ 700 and interest on a life and accident policy issued by defendant to William C. Scales, in which this plaintiff, his widow, is the beneficiary. Defendant appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals, where, in an opinion by Farrington, J., reported in 186 S.W. 948, the judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for $ 140. But that court, deeming its opinion in conflict with that of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Applegate v. Travelers Insurance Co., 153 Mo.App. 63, 132 S.W. 2, certified the cause to this court. The policy was dated December 9, 1909 and provided for payments as follows: (1) In case of death by accident $ 700. (2) In case of death from disease or poison or from self-inflicted injuries, one-fifth of the amount above named. There are no other provisions in the policy that affect the issues here involved. It is conceded that the insured committed suicide by drinking carbolic acid, a poison, on October 17, 1914, and that notice and proof of the death were duly made and given. There is no evidence in the cause as to whether the insured was sane or insane at the time he drank the deadly potion. The trial was before the court without a jury. The defendant asked the following declaration of law, which was refused: "The court declares the law to be that, if it believes and finds from the evidence that death resulted to the insured, W. C. Scales, caused by taking carbolic acid, a poison, intentionally, then it will make a finding in favor of the plaintiff to wit; $ 140, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from October 17, 1914, to date. The only point here involved is the propriety of the refusal of the instruction. The case of Newell v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 212 S.W. 991, which was argued in this court on the same day on which this case was argued, and which involved the same question, has been considered in connection with this case and we have availed ourselves of the able and exhaustive briefs of counsel in both the cases.

FOR APPELLANT: Patterson & Patterson and George Pepperdine, all of Springfield.

FOR RESPONDENT: E. D. Merritt, of Springfield.

Holland, Rutledge & Lashly, of St. Louis, amici curiae.

RUEBEN F.ROY, Commissioner. WALKER, J., concurs. FARIS, BLAIR, WILLIAMS, and GRAVES, JJ., concur in result for reasons stated in Brunswick v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., No. 19764, 213 S.W. 45. BOND, C. J., not sitting. WOODSON, J., absent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM

RUEBEN F.ROY, Commissioner (after stating the facts as above).

I. There are some clear and undisputed rules of law which should be borne in mind in the consideration of this case:

1. A policy of insurance against death by accident covers a death by suicide by a person who is at the time insane. In other words, death by suicide of an insane person is death by accident. Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U.S. 527, 7 S.Ct. 685, 30 L.Ed. 740. That proposition is conceded by both parties here.

2. Intentional self-destruction by an sane man is not an accident. In Lovelace v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104, 28 S.W. 877, 30 L. R. A. 209, 47 Am. St. Rep. 638, it was held that a voluntary death is not a death by accident. A long line of authorities is there cited.

In Young v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 126 Mo.App. 325, 103 S.W. 557, the Lovelace Case was cited, and it was held that a death is accidental when it "is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it."

3. On the question as to whether the insured was sane or insane at the time of committing suicide, the presumption is in favor of his sanity, and the burden of proof is upon the one affirming the contrary. Blackstone v. Ins. Co., 74 Mich. 592, 42 N.W. 156, 3 L. R. A. 486; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leubrie, 71 F. 884, 18 C. C. A. 332; Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U.S. 232, 24 L.Ed. 433; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U.S. 121, 3 S.Ct. 99, 27 L.Ed. 878; Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co., 274 Mo. 83, 201 S.W. 1128.

It necessarily follow that the insured in this case is presumed to have been of sound mind when he killed himself.

We think the "suicide statute" is clear, so far at least as the point here involved is concerned. Here it is:

Sec. 6945. "In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void.

That statute does not put into the policy a single obligation other than those mentioned in the policy. It merely takes out of the policy the defense of suicide as to the obligations mentioned in that policy.

Without embarrassing ourselves just here with a consideration of any of the decided cases; we will apply the statute to this policy and see how and to what extent it affects it. The policy contains the following obligations on the part of the insurer:

(1) To pay $ 700 in case of death by accident. That includes death by suicide by an insane person, and does not include death by suicide by a sane person. (2) To pay $ 140 in case of death by disease or poison or by self-inflicted injuries. Let it be conceded here without deciding, that death by self-inflicted injuries includes death by suicide whether the insured was sane or insane.

Has the plaintiff here any cause of action under the first or accident clause of the policy? If the insured had been insane when he drank the poison, the suicide would have been an accidental death covered by that accident clause and the defense of suicide would have been taken out of the policy by the statute. But the plaintiff here has not that kind of a case. Indeed, she has no case at all under that accident clause, for the death here was not by accident. Through there is no obligation written in this policy under which plaintiff, under the facts of this case, can recover more than $ 140, yet she claims that the statute puts such obligation asked...