Scott v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
| Decision Date | 25 November 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 31709.,31709. |
| Citation | 203 Minn. 547,282 N.W. 467 |
| Parties | SCOTT v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Freeborn County; Norman E. Peterson, Judge.
Action by Mae T. Scott against the Prudential Insurance Company of America on a life policy. From an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appeals.
Order reversed and new trial granted.
Meighen, Knudson & Sturtz, of Albert Lea, for appellant.
Shearer, Byard & Trogner, of Minneapolis, and Elmer R. Peterson, of Albert Lea, for respondent.
This is an action by the widow of Clarence Scott as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued on his life on December 20, 1935, which contains a provision that if within two years from the date thereof, the insured, whether sane or insane, shall die by suicide, the liability of the company shall not exceed the amount of the premiums paid on the policy. The insured died of gunshot wound within the two years, on August 28, 1936. The issue is whether he died by accident or suicide. Plaintiff had a verdict only for the amount of the premiums paid and appeals from an order denying her motion for new trial. Plaintiff assigns as error (1) the exclusion of evidence: (a) of insured's declarations to show that he intended to repair his automobile and return home at a time subsequent to that of his death; (b) that the insured habitually carried and used the gun with which he was shot to shoot pheasants and other small game; and (c) that the insured in fact was not short in his accounts with his employer as claimed by defendant, and (2) that the court erred in the charge in limiting the effect of plaintiff's final argument so as to prevent the jury from making permissible inferences from facts in evidence. Defendant contends that error, if any, was not prejudicial since it appears as a matter of law that the insured committed suicide.
1. Defendant claims that the only permissible inference from the position and nature of the wound is that insured committed suicide. But the wound cannot be considered apart from the other evidence because a finding of suicide is an inference from all the facts proved by the evidence. The insured was 45 years old, in good health, cheerful and hopeful. He was married and his family life was happy. He had a son whose fifteenth birthday was on the day of insured's death. The insured and his son were very fond of each other and were rather close companions. Preparations were made to celebrate the boy's birthday by a dinner in the evening. The insured planned for the future and looked forward to the opening of new filling stations by the oil company by which he was employed, as a means of increasing his business and income. Plaintiff offered to show that the insured had made arrangements with a friend to repair his automobile truck in the evening. The insured had no financial troubles of any kind except a certain claim by the employer that there was a shortage which the defendant was permitted to prove and which plaintiff was denied the right to refute. He was paying for his home and his payments were up to date. There were no expressions by the insured of despair, melancholia, or intention to commit suicide.
There were no eye witnesses to the death which occurred in the afternoon of August 28, 1936, not far from insured's home on a country road which was on the insured's gasoline and oil route. There is evidence that the insured was seen driving around the vicinity. The fatal shot was fired while the truck was in motion, the ignition being still on when the car was stopped. The insured was found sitting behind the steering wheel with his body slumped over to the right with his head down. A 410-gauge short barrel pistol grip shotgun with a discharged shell in it was found against the door of the cab in the truck and fell out when the door was opened. An undischarged shell was found in insured's pocket. A witness who heard the shot testified that the truck went from 150 to 200 feet after the shot was fired, along the road and off to the right. The insured had a gunshot wound on the right side of the head, one inch above and slightly forward from the line of the ear, about one-half inch in diameter or about twice the size of the inside of the barrel of the gun. The gun was either touching or close to the head when the shot was fired. There were powder burns over an area about one-half inch surrounding the wound. The evidence shows that a wound of this character might be made if the gun were held from six to twelve inches from the head. Defendant's witnesses testified that they could not state at what angle the shot entered the head or the course of the wound. The skull was fractured from a point extending from the left side of the head at the eye over the skull and down between the two eyes in the nose region. The inference is that the general course of the shot was from the back of the head on the right, forward and upward to the left side of the head. The insured owned the gun for at least five or six years and used it for shooting different kinds of game, pheasants, gophers, rats, crows, blackbirds and birds and animals of that kind. It was a small gun with a barrel about fifteen inches long and a handle like that of a large pistol. Insured was in the habit of carrying the gun between the seat cushion and the back cushion of the seat of the cab. The upholstering on the cushions in the cab was worn and ragged, exposing strands of thread and wire. There was testimony that despite a locking device on the gun, if a slight pressure (such as a thread caught to the trigger) were applied to the trigger while the hammer was pulled back to less than full cock position, the hammer might be released with sufficient force to explode a shell. If insured tried to get the gun with his right hand while driving, he must have kept his left hand on the steering wheel and reached around behind him between the cushions with the right hand to take hold of the gun. If he attempted to bring it around in front of him so that he could shoot out of the left front window, he would have to incline his body somewhat to the right and rear in reaching to get hold of the gun. It is possible that in taking the gun and lifting it from that position he brought it close to the rear of his head and in the general direction from right rear to left front, which corresponds with the general direction of the shot. The distance from the end of the barrel to the insured's head depended entirely upon where he took hold of the gun and how he lifted it, but in any event the distance must have been about that shown by the evidence as possible to produce a similar wound and powder burns.
If we consider only the evidence received, without the qualifying effects of the excluded evidence, the question of accident or suicide was for the jury. We apply the rule given below in the charge that where there is credible evidence of self-destruction, the presumption against suicide ceases and the issue is for the determination of the jury upon all permissible inferences from the evidence. Hawkins v. Kronick Cleaning & Laundry Co., 157 Minn. 33, 195 N.W. 766, 36 A.L.R. 394. See Luce v. Great Northern Ry. Co., Minn., 281 N.W. 812, filed October 28, 1938; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 58 S.Ct. 500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 114 A.L.R. 1218; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 4 Cir., 79 F.2d 724, 103 A.L.R. 171. But in such a situation, the insurer has the burden of showing that death was due to suicide. The jury is at liberty to take into consideration the abnormality of suicide "and to give such probative force, as their judgment dictates, to the fact upon which the presumption is based." Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, supra, 79 F.2d 730. In short, the jury may make an inference against suicide based upon love of life and the natural propensity to prolong and protect it. In this case no possible motive for suicide was shown except the alleged charge of shortage. If insured were charged with a shortage, the question would still be whether that was a sufficient inducing cause for suicide. If the charge were not true, there would not be much, if any, basis for the inference. This case is ruled by Kornig v. Western Life Ind. Co., 102 Minn. 31, 112 N.W. 1039, and Huestis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 131 Minn. 461, 155 N.W. 643. In Kornig v. Western Life Ind. Co., the defense of suicide was interposed in an action on an insurance policy. It appeared that the insured was shot on the right side of the head about one and one-half inches back of the ear and the course of the bullet was backward and downward and the insured was found dead with the revolver loosely grasped in his hand. The...
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