Seagrave v. State
Decision Date | 12 July 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-2228.,SC00-2228. |
Citation | 802 So.2d 281 |
Parties | Steven SEAGRAVE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Jamie Spivey, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Karla D. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal, which certified a question to be of great public importance.1 See Seagrave v. State, 768 So.2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows:
IS THE ASSESSMENT OF VICTIM INJURY POINTS FOR "SEXUAL CONTACT" UNDER SECTION 921.0011(7), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), LIMITED TO CRIMINAL ACTS THAT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL BATTERY, THUS REQUIRING THE UNION OF THE SEXUAL ORGAN OF ONE PERSON WITH THE ORAL, ANAL OR VAGINAL OPENING OF ANOTHER?2
For the reasons that follow, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative and affirm the First District's decision.
Petitioner Steven Seagrave was convicted of committing a lewd, lascivious or indecent assault on a child under the age of sixteen pursuant to section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997).3 Seagrave does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct and admits that the record revealed that Seagrave rubbed the twelve-year old victim's buttocks and placed her hand on his clothed penis. In sentencing Seagrave, the trial court assessed forty victim injury points for "sexual contact" pursuant to section 921.0011(7)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1997), which provides:
If the conviction is for an offense involving sexual contact that does not include sexual penetration, the sexual contact must be scored in accordance with the sentence points provided under s. 921.0014 for sexual contact, regardless of whether there is evidence of any physical injury.4
On appeal, the First District affirmed the imposition of victim injury points, adopting the rationale of the Fifth District's decision in Kitts v. State, 766 So.2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (on rehearing en banc), wherein the district court held that fondling and kissing a child's breasts qualified as "sexual contact" within section 921.0011(7)(b)2. See Seagrave, 768 So.2d at 1123. In reaching this conclusion in Kitts, the Fifth District expressly receded from its prior decisions in Reyes v. State, 709 So.2d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), and Spioch v. State, 742 So.2d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999),review granted, 760 So.2d 948 (Fla.2000). See Kitts, 766 So.2d at 1069; Seagrave, 768 So.2d at 1123.
In Reyes, the defendant was convicted of attempted sexual battery under sections 777.04 and 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (1995). 709 So.2d at 181. The basis for the assessment of the victim injury points was the fondling of the female victim's breasts. See id. at 181. The Fifth District in Reyes concluded that because the sexual battery statute defined "sexual battery" as "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with the sexual organs of another," the imposition of victim injury points for "sexual contact" based upon a violation of the sexual battery statute referred only to those circumstances in which "union or penetration" occurred.5 See id. at 182. In reliance on Reyes, the Fifth District in Spioch held that the defendant's fondling of the victim's penis through the victim's clothing did not constitute "sexual contact" for purposes of imposing victim injury points because "neither penetration nor union occurred." 742 So.2d at 818. However, Spioch involved the crime of lewd and lascivious assault on a minor rather than sexual battery.
Because in Kitts the Fifth District subsequently receded from Reyes and Spioch, all of the district courts that have interpreted section 921.0011(7)(b)2. presently are in agreement that "sexual contact" victim injury points are not limited to acts involving "a union of the sexual organ of one person with the oral, anal or vaginal openings of another." See Louis v. State, 764 So.2d 930, 931-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ( ); Blackburn v. State, 762 So.2d 989, 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ( ); Vural v. State, 717 So.2d 65, 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) ( ); Mackey v. State, 516 So.2d 330, 330-31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) ( ).
Seagrave, 768 So.2d at 1123. Judge Peterson, in his dissenting opinion in Kitts and in his opinion in Reyes, expressed the view that victim injury points for sexual contact were limited to acts of sexual battery that involved union but no penetration. See Kitts, 766 So.2d at 1068 (Peterson, J., dissenting); Reyes, 709 So.2d at 182.
Accordingly, in order to resolve any uncertainty regarding the interpretation of "sexual contact" for the assessment of victim injury points under section 921.0011(7), the First District certified the above question to the Court as one of great public importance. See Seagrave, 768 So.2d at 1123.
The question presented in this case is under what circumstances victim injury points may be assessed for "sexual contact" under section 921.0011(7). Seagrave asserts that victim injury points are limited to criminal offenses that rise to the level of a sexual battery. In other words, Seagrave maintains that the trial court improperly assessed victim injury points for his conviction under section 800.04 for fondling a minor victim's buttocks and placing the victim's hand on Seagrave's clothed penis because this conduct did not involve a union of the sex organ of one person with the oral, anal or vaginal opening of another. Because the assessment of victim injury points under the sentencing guidelines at issue in this case is based on a statutory scheme, we necessarily begin with the words of the statute. See Overstreet v. State, 629 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla. 1993) ( ).
Section 921.0011(7) provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 921.0014, Florida Statutes (1997), sets forth the sentencing guidelines, including the appropriate amount of sentencing points that may be added based upon victim injury. With regard to victim injury points, the sentencing guidelines provide:
2nd degree murder-death 240 Death 120 Severe 40 Sexual penetration 80 Moderate 18 Sexual contact 40 Slight 4
As the Fifth District explained in Kitts, "[t]here is nothing in the case law or the statutes which expressly defines sexual contact" with regard to section 921.0011(7). 766 So.2d at 1068. Because the statute does not define the term "sexual contact," the Court must resort to canons of statutory construction in order to derive the proper meaning. See Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992). "One of the most fundamental tenets...
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