Searcy v. Davenport

• Decision Date: 13 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-729.,02-729.
• Citation: 100 S.W.3d 711
• Parties: John E. SEARCY, III, v. Emmett DAVENPORT, Neill Reed, Stephanie E. Whitwell, and Hurley Whitwell Realty Co., Inc.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

100 S.W.3d 711

John E. SEARCY, III, v. Emmett DAVENPORT, Neill Reed, Stephanie E. Whitwell, and Hurley Whitwell Realty Co., Inc.

No. 02-729.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 13, 2003.

John E. Searcy, Dennard, pro se.

Stephen E. Whitwell, North Little Rock, for appellees.

JIM HANNAH, Justice.

Appellant John E. Searcy, III, appeals the dismissal of his Amended Complaint for Fraud Upon the Court and denial of his motion to recuse. We hold that this case is barred by res judicata because the fraud alleged by Searcy is a repeated allegation that he was unlawfully deprived of his property, all aspects of which were or could have been litigated in the prior action to quiet title. Searcy v. Davenport, slip op. at 1 (Ark.App. March 14, 2002). We also hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Searcy's motion to recuse.

Facts

Searcy acquired forty acres in Van Buren County in 1986. Searcy then became involved in a dispute with the Internal Revenue Service over back taxes, and the forty acres were seized and sold. A deed in the record indicates that on September 18, 1995, the forty acres were deeded to the United States of America, and this same deed indicates that on June 21, 1996, the forty acres were deeded to appellees Neill Reed and Emmett Davenport by the United States in a quitclaim deed.

On June 27, 1997, appellees filed an action on the quitclaim deed to quiet title in the forty acres. On November 12, 1999, the Van Buren County Chancery Court entered a decree quieting title in appellees, specifically finding that Searcy held no interest in the forty acres. On March 14, 2001, the decision of the chancery court was affirmed. Searcy, supra.

On June 8, 2000, Searcy filed the present action for fraud on the court against Neill Reed, Emmett Davenport, Stephen E. Whitwell and Hurley Whitwell Realty Co., Inc., alleging the decree in Searcy had been procured by fraud and requested that the 1999 decree be set aside. Searcy filed an amended complaint making the same allegations, but changed the relief requested and asked for damages against appellees. However, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss in the present case, Searcy stated that he was alleging that the attempt to transfer title to appellees by the United States was fraudulent, and that he had attempted to prove this fraud in Searcy, but was prevented from doing so by the chancery court.

Searcy also moved the trial court to recuse in the present case. The motion to recuse alleges that Judge Charles E Clawson, Jr. was biased. Searcy argued as support for the accusation of bias that Judge Clawson presided in Searcy and ruled against him on evidence and the ultimate issue of title to the forty acres. We note that Searcy also filed a complaint with the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission following the decision on the action to quiet title.

Res Judicata

Searcy presents the same arguments in the present action as he asserted in the earlier case in Searcy. He again asserts in the present case, as he did in Searcy, that the United States Government failed to follow lawful procedure in acquiring title, that the United States never acquired title, and that appellees therefore could not acquire title from the United States. Searcy also argues as he did in Searcy, that appellees committed a fraud upon the court by presenting the trial court with documents and making arguments to quiet title when the appellees knew that they could not acquire title because the United States had no title to pass to them.

In his answer to the petition to quiet title in Searcy, supra, Searcy asserted that the appellees had acquired no interest in the forty acres through the United States because the United States seized the forty acres from him fraudulently and without due process. He further alleged in the action to quiet title that appellees knowingly provided title documents to the trial court which the appellees knew to be fraudulent. Thus, the issue of whether appellees committed fraud in asserting a right to clear title in the forty acres was raised in Searcy, supra, and it is now being raised again in the present case.

The concept of res judicata has two facets, one being issue preclusion and the other claim preclusion. Huffman v. Alderson, 335 Ark. 411, 983 S.W.2d 899 (1998); John Cheeseman Trucking, Inc. v. Pinson, 313 Ark. 632, 855 S.W.2d 941 (1993). Under claim-preclusion, a valid and final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars another action by the plaintiff or his privies against the defendant or his privies on the same claim. Huffman, supra. Res judicata bars not only the relitigation of claims which were actually litigated in the first suit, but also those which could have been litigated. Id. Further, where a case is based on the same events as the subject matter of a previous lawsuit, res judicata will apply even if the subsequent lawsuit raises new legal issues and seeks additional remedies. Id. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars relitigation of issues. Crockett & Brown v. Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993). In State v. Thompson, 343 Ark. 135, 34 S.W.3d 33 (2000), we stated of collateral estoppel:

When an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of that issue between the same parties in any future proceeding. E.g., Edwards v. State, 328 Ark. 394, 943 S.W.2d 600, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 950, 118 S.Ct. 370, 139 L.Ed.2d 288 (1997) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994)). In order to establish collateral estoppel, proof of the following is required: 1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; 2) the issue must have been actually litigated; 3) the issue must have been determined by a final and valid judgment; and 4) the determination must have been essential to the judgment. Edwards, 328 Ark. at 401-02, 943 S.W.2d at 603.

Thompson, 343 Ark. at 139-40, 34 S.W.3d 33.

At the hearing on appellee's motion to dismiss in the present case, Searcy responded to the assertion that he was attempting to relitigate the issue of fraud by stating that he believed the issue of fraud was a new issue. He stated:

In fact, the Chancery Court, when I attempted — when I attempted to prove the fraud in Chancery Court, I was prevented from — from proceeding down that road. It was considered a — separate issue, which I — I disagreed with. I think it — I think it had — it was an issue that was very — very germane to the — to the decision of that — of that Court. And I don't believe that those issues were ever considered by the Chancery Court — or this issue — the — the issues I'm bringing forward in ...