Shannon v. Mem'l Drive Presbyterian Church U.S.

• Decision Date: 01 September 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 14–14–00359–CV,14–14–00359–CV
• Citation: 476 S.W.3d 612
• Parties: Jessica Shannon, Appellant v. Memorial Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

476 S.W.3d 612

Jessica Shannon, Appellant

v.Memorial Drive Presbyterian Church U.S., Appellee

NO. 14–14–00359–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed September 1, 2015

David Patrick Smitherman, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Tanya Nicole Garrison, Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION

Martha Hill Jamison, Justice

We issued our original opinion in this case on July 21, 2015. Appellee filed a motion for rehearing. We overrule the motion for rehearing, withdraw our previous opinion, and issue this substitute opinion.

We are asked to decide whether ecclesiastical immunity can shield a church from contractual liability when the subject contract does not implicate church doctrine. In seven issues, appellant Jessica Shannon challenges the trial court's grant of appellee Memorial Drive Presbyterian Church's plea to the jurisdiction and motions for summary judgment. Concluding that the Church is not entitled to immunity from suit under these circumstances, we reverse the trial court's grant of the plea. Further concluding that the Church established as a matter of law that its conduct was not extreme and outrageous for purposes of Shannon's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in the Church's favor on that claim. We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Shannon's other claims and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

Shannon was dismissed from her position as Elementary Ministries Director at the Church. She sent a demand letter to the Church asserting that she had been terminated for making allegations of sexual harassment against an elder of the Church. Shannon and the Church subsequently signed a "Confidential Separation Agreement and Release." The Church paid Shannon $25,000 and agreed that she could "classify the end of th[e] employment relationship as a resignation, rather than a termination ... for purposes of ... future employment offers." The Agreement includes a confidentiality clause applicable to Shannon and a provision that "[i]n the event that [Shannon is] asked about her separation of employment, [she] may reply only with the words ‘we have reached an amicable parting,’ but will not otherwise indicate the nature of the resolution of these matters." In addition, the Church and Shannon each agreed not to "disparage" the other.

Shannon subsequently was hired by the Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary as a development officer. This position required her to participate in fundraising efforts for the Seminary. An elder at the Church also served on the Board of Trustees for the Seminary. He contacted the Board Chair at the Seminary to ask whether the Seminary had checked Shannon's references. The Board Chair contacted the President of the Seminary, who instructed Kurt Gabbard, its Vice President for Business Affairs, to check Shannon's references. Gabbard then contacted the head of human resources at the Church, Karen Winship. Winship told Gabbard she could not discuss the reason Shannon left "because of a severance agreement," but Winship "could not think of a circumstance under which the [C]hurch would rehire [Shannon] or that she would want to come back." Winship referred Gabbard to Dave Steane, Executive Pastor at the Church, who stated that he "could not tell [Gabbard] the reasons why [Shannon] left because of the existence of an agreement[, but] it should be obvious that there were issues, otherwise there would not be an agreement." Steane also stated "that it would be difficult for [Shannon] to carry out her duties [to raise funds from the Church]" or from "anywhere in Houston." The Seminary terminated Shannon's employment because she purportedly misrepresented the circumstances surrounding her departure from the Church and based on its concern that she would not be able to solicit donations for the Seminary.

Shannon sued the Church, bringing claims for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel and slander, and fraudulent inducement. The Church filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Church is immune from suit under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the so-called ministerial exception. The Church also filed two traditional motions for summary judgment with supplements and amendments, contending (1) the Church is immune from liability under chapter 103 of the Labor Code; (2) Shannon waived her right to enforce the provisions of the Agreement by giving the Church "express authorization to provide full details concerning her past employment to the Seminary in her Employment Application"; (3) the Church did not breach the Agreement as a matter of law; (4) the Church's behavior was not extreme and outrageous for purposes of Shannon's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and (5) Shannon waived her fraudulent inducement claim by releasing all claims that existed as of the date of the Agreement.¹ The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and the motions for summary judgment and rendered final judgment for Shannon to take nothing by way of her claims against the Church.

Discussion

Shannon argues the trial court has jurisdiction over her claims because neutral principles apply to the contractual dispute at issue and the ministerial exception does not apply in a non-employment context. She also asserts that chapter 103 of the Labor Code does not apply under these facts and she did not waive her claims against the Church by authorizing the Church "to provide full details regarding her past employment." She further contends that fact questions exist regarding whether the Church breached the Agreement and whether its conduct was extreme and outrageous and that the trial court erred in concluding that she released her fraudulent inducement claim.

We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. City of Pasadena v. Belle, 297 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.2004) ). A defendant's plea may challenge either the plaintiff's pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. Id. When, as here, the defendant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. See id. If that evidence raises a fact issue as to jurisdiction, the plea must be denied because the issue must be resolved by the factfinder. Id. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to present a jurisdictional fact issue, however, we must rule on the plea as a matter of law. Id. A trial court properly dismisses those claims over which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction but retains claims in the same case over which it has jurisdiction. See Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338–39 (Tex.2006) ; see also Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 152–53 (Tex.2012) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction over ... each of his claims; the court must dismiss those claims (and only those claims) over which it lacks jurisdiction.").

We generally analyze jurisdiction separately for each claim. See In re C.D.B., No. 14–13–00718–CV, 2015 WL 1405921, at *2 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2015, no. pet. h.). When the claims are dependent on the same facts, however, it is not always necessary to address each claim separately. See City of Dallas v. Jones, No. 05–07–00831–CV, 2008 WL 588997, at *4 (Tex.App.–Dallas Mar. 5, 2008, pet. denied) ; cf. Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150–51 (Tex.2013) (holding in the context of personal jurisdiction challenge that courts need not assess forum contacts on a claim-by-claim basis if all claims arise from same forum contacts).² The standard of review for a plea to the jurisdiction based on submitted evidence generally mirrors that of a traditional motion for summary judgment. Quested v. City of Houston, 440 S.W.3d 275, 279–80 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ). To obtain summary judgment, the movant must conclusively disprove at least one element of each of the nonmovant's claims or conclusively establish all elements of an affirmative defense as to each claim. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade & Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex.1996). The nonmovant has no burden to respond to or present evidence regarding the motion until the movant has carried its burden to conclusively establish the cause of action or defense on which its motion is based. State v. $90,235, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex.2013). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848 ; see also Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 280. The evidence raises a genuine issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the summary-judgment evidence.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex.2007).

With regard to a plea challenging jurisdictional facts, as here, the movant must assert the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction and present conclusive proof that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See City of Houston v. Little Nell Apartments, L.P., 424 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Proof is...