Sharpe v. Sharpe

• Decision Date: 12 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-142,94-142
• Citation: 902 P.2d 210
• Parties: Roseanne Federer SHARPE, a/k/a Roseanne Tarter, Appellant (Defendant/Petitioner), v. John R. SHARPE, Appellee (Plaintiff/Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 210

902 P.2d 210

Roseanne Federer SHARPE, a/k/a Roseanne Tarter, Appellant (Defendant/Petitioner), v. John R. SHARPE, Appellee (Plaintiff/Respondent).

No. 94-142.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Sept. 12, 1995.

Robin Sessions Cooley (argued) and Mark A. Bishop of Burke, Woodard & Bishop, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Donna A. Murray and Henry F. Bailey, Jr. (argued) of Bailey, Pickering & Stock, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice.

Appellant filed a petition for modification of child support payments in the district court alleging that application of the Wyoming child support guidelines would result in more than a twenty percent change per month in the father's child support obligation. Following a hearing, the district court concluded that a deviation from the child support guidelines was warranted.

We reverse and remand.

I. ISSUES

Appellant, the mother, presents four issues:

I. Whether Wyoming law allows the court to consider a lack of visitation and negative feelings between children and the non-custodial parent as a basis to deny or reduce the non-custodial parent's child support obligation?

II. Whether the facts in this case are sufficient to rebut the presumptive child support amount as unjust or inappropriate?

III. Whether it is against the public policy of our state to allow a reduction in child support based on limited visitation and negative feelings between children and the non-custodial parent?

IV. Whether the Appellant is entitled to attorney fees and court costs in bringing this action and in pursuing this appeal based on Wyoming Statute 20-6-306(c) and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure (W.R.A.P.) Rule 10.04?

Appellee, the father, rephrases the issues as:

I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in applying Wyo.Stat. § 20-6-302(b) in its determination that the application of the presumptive child support would be unjust and inappropriate in this case?

II. As the trier of fact, did the District Court correctly determine the evidence was sufficient to rebut the presumptive child support amount as unjust or inappropriate?

III. Is Appellant entitled to attorney fees and costs under Wyo.Stat. § 20-6-306(c) and W.R.A.P. 10.04?

IV. Is Appellee entitled to attorney fees, costs and damages under W.R.A.P. 10.05?

II. FACTS

At the time the parties were married on February 12, 1982, the mother had five children from a previous marriage. Within a year, the father adopted the children. The parties subsequently divorced in October 1991. A child custody and support agreement, incorporated into the divorce decree, granted the mother primary care, custody and control of the minor children, subject to the father's reasonable rights of visitation, and required the father to make child support payments of $125.00 per month per minor child.

On May 27, 1993, the mother filed a petition for modification of the child support agreement, alleging that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred after the court entered the divorce decree. The requested modification was based upon the support guidelines, specifically W.S. 20-6-306 (1994 Rpl.). The mother asserted that application of the guidelines would result in more than a twenty percent change per month.

Evidence introduced at a hearing revealed that the father's income had not changed significantly since the entry of the divorce decree. Additionally, the district court heard testimony from the father that he had tried to visit the children and to remain a part of their lives, as well as testimony regarding the negative feelings and animosity among the children and the father--most of which had arisen since the entry of divorce--including the fact that two of the children had told the father that he was "not their father," that he should "not contact" them, and that they "wanted nothing to do with him." At the time of this hearing, two of the children had become emancipated.

The district court found that although application of W.S. 20-6-306 would result in more than a twenty percent change in the father's child support obligation, the father had successfully rebutted the presumed child support under W.S. 20-6-302(b) (1994 Rpl.), concluding that the presumptive amount would be unjust and inappropriate because of the magnitude of the negative feelings and the extent of the alienation that had occurred between the father and the adoptive children. The district court therefore concluded that a deviation from the child support guidelines was warranted under W.S. 20-6-302(b)(xiii) and ordered the father to continue paying $125.00 per month per child until the first child becomes emancipated; thereafter, support would increase to $180.00 per month per child until each became emancipated.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The district court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce or modify the terms of a child support obligation. Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Wyo.1995); Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 625 (Wyo.1993); Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Wyo.1988).

(a) In granting a divorce or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. * * * Either parent may petition to enforce or revise the decree. The court which entered the decree has continuing subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children require.

W.S. 20-2-113(a) (1994 Rpl.).

The district court has broad discretion in determining the proper amount of a child support award. Pinther, 888 P.2d at 1253; Smith, 863 P.2d at 625; Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Wyo.1991). We will disturb the district court's ruling only upon a showing that the district court has abused its discretion. Pinther, at 1253; Smith, at 625; Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Wyo.1992). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of reason or commits an error of law. Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 348 (Wyo.1994); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo.1993). Thus, the standard we apply is whether or not the court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Jones v. Jones, 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo.1993); Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Wyo.1989).

B. Petition for modification of child support

Any party may petition for modification of a child support order by alleging that the application of the support guidelines will result in a twenty percent change in the monthly support amount. W.S. 20-6-306; Pinther, 888 P.2d at 1253; Smith, 863 P.2d at 625; Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 98 (Wyo.1992); Roberts, 816 P.2d at 1295. However, a twenty percent differential between the presumptive support according to the guidelines and the amount required according to an existing child support order, while it does require a hearing, does not control the ultimate determination with respect to modification. Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41-42 (Wyo.1995). Section 20-6-302 invokes the discretion of the trial judge in the modification hearing to weigh the enumerated thirteen factors and also the presence or absence of an agreement between the parties. Id. at 42.

A new, narrow rule regarding the petitioner's burden of proving a change in circumstances warranting modification of child support was recently announced in Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37. There we held that when parties enter into a stipulation or agreement which is approved by the court and that stipulation or agreement includes a stipulated amount of child support which deviates from guidelines in existence at the time the judgment was entered, to justify modification of the child support order, the parties must show some material change of circumstance other than, and in addition to, the fact that a deviation exists. Id. at 41-42. This new rule applies only to cases in which the parties entered into a stipulation to child support amounts before the current guidelines were enacted but which deviated from the guidelines in existence at that time, and to stipulated child support amounts under the current guidelines which deviate from the current guidelines by twenty percent or more at the time the judgment was entered.

This policy is consistent with our view that child support agreements entered into by the parties are favored by the courts. Smith, 895 P.2d at 41 (citing Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953 (Wyo.1962)); Roberts, 816 P.2d at 1296-97. However, even though a stipulation is an agreement between the parties, it is not a contract; and contract law has no place in the consideration of child support agreements. See Pauling, 837 P.2d at 1077-78. The primary consideration regarding child support agreements is the best interests of the children--contract law cannot abrogate this controlling consideration. See Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo.1985); Roberts, at 1296. When the parties agree to child support amounts, and the judgment incorporates such agreement, the district court adopts and incorporates the agreement based upon representations of the parties and based upon the finding that their agreement as to child support is in the best interests of the children. This rule also lends integrity to stipulations voluntarily entered into by the parties and adheres to the doctrine of finality of judgments which is supported by the doctrine of res judicata. See Smith, 895 P.2d at 40; Roberts, at 1296. This diminishes the needless relitigation of that which has already been decided by the district court.

Upon review of the record and the briefs on appeal, it is apparent that the only change of circumstance upon which the mother relies is the stipulated fact that the child support amount deviated from the current support guidelines by twenty percent or more. Because the hearing...