Sheehan v. State
Decision Date | 29 December 1981 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 406 |
Citation | 411 So.2d 824 |
Parties | Donald J. SHEEHAN v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
George E. Schaaf of Coleman, Ross, Carey, Goetz & Schaaf, Inc., Clayton, Mo., and Ira DeMent, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Bill North, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from the denial of the defendant's petition for writ of error coram nobis. Two major issues are presented on appeal.
On October 31, 1977, the defendant pled guilty to the offenses of robbery, kidnapping, rape, assault with intent to rob, and assault with intent to ravish. Although not a part of the record on this appeal, the record indicates that the defendant executed separate "Ireland" forms for each offense. Ireland v. State, 47 Ala.App. 65, 250 So.2d 602 (1971). A factual basis for accepting each plea was established through the admissions of the defendant. The trial judge fully informed the defendant of the constitutional rights that would be waived by the guilty plea, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and the minimum and maximum sentences of each crime. The record indicates that the guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the rape and robbery, to a term of ten years' imprisonment to run concurrently with either life imprisonment term for the kidnapping, and to consecutive terms of twenty years' imprisonment for the two assault offenses. The guilty plea was entered without any plea bargaining agreement between the State and the defendant. The State made no recommendations of sentences to the trial court. No original appeal was taken from the conviction.
The defendant now contends that his guilty pleas are invalid because he was not informed by the trial judge that the sentences imposed could run either concurrently or consecutively. Further, the defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his retained trial counsel did not inform him of the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.
At the hearing on the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the defendant's retained trial counsel, Frank W. Riggs, testified that he usually informed his clients of the possibility of consecutive or concurrent sentences although he did not remember specifically so informing the defendant.
Mr. Riggs testified that he never told the defendant or any member of his family that the sentences would run concurrently even though the defendant's mother had expressed her hope that they would. 1
The defendant's sentencing hearing was held on the seventeenth of November 1977, 17 days after he pled guilty. After the judge had sentenced the defendant for each separate offense, the Assistant District Attorney asked the judge whether the sentences were consecutive or concurrent. After the judge explained his reasons for imposing the lengthy sentences, the following occurred:
Neither upon his pleas of guilty nor at his sentencing hearing did the defendant ever indicate that he would not have pled guilty if he had known his sentences could be made to run consecutively.
The function of a writ of error coram nobis is to bring to the attention of the trial court an error of fact, unknown to it or the affected party at the time of trial which would have prevented the judgment challenged had it been known. In effect, the writ serves as a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Vaughn v. State, 395 So.2d 95 (Ala.1979); Seibert v. State, 343 So.2d 788 (Ala.1977); Lewis v. State, 367 So.2d 542 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 367 So.2d 547 (Ala.1979); Summers v. State, 366 So.2d 336 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 366 So.2d 346 (Ala.1979).
In a coram nobis proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of submitting clear, full, and satisfactory proof of facts which, had they been timely submitted at trial, would have prevented judgment. The degree of proof is highly exacting as to facts and must convince the trial judge of the truth of the allegations in the petition. Summers, 366 So.2d at 343.
The writ of error coram nobis does not serve the purpose of an appeal. It is not intended to provide appellate review where the complaining party has not sought such and the time for taking such has long since expired. Thomas v. State, 280 Ala. 109, 190 So.2d 542 (1966); Mayola v. State, 344 So.2d 818 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 344 So.2d 822 (Ala.1977).
The defendant relies heavily upon the following language of Cooper v. State, 47 Ala.App. 178, 252 So.2d 104, cert. denied, 287 Ala. 728, 252 So.2d 108 (1971).
Cooper, 47 Ala.App. at 182, 252 So.2d 104.
Undeniably whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively is a consequence of pleading guilty. The question in this case is whether the accused must be informed that the sentences could be made to run concurrently or consecutively in accepting guilty pleas for multiple offenses in order for the pleas to be entered voluntarily and intelligently in a manner to fully satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
Boykin v. Alabama, supra, established that a guilty plea must be intelligently and voluntarily entered and that the record must affirmatively disclose that the accused entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Boykin requires that in order for a guilty plea to be made intelligently and voluntarily, the record must affirmatively reveal that the accused voluntarily waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
However, Boykin did not adopt a constitutional requirement that an accused be informed of all the consequences of his guilty plea before the plea will be considered intelligently entered. For example, see United States v. Degand, 614 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1980), holding that the failure of the trial court to inform the defendant that any federal sentence imposed might not run concurrently with the state sentence the defendant was already serving at the time did not vitiate the guilty plea.
The defendant contends that the failure to advise an accused of the possibility of consecutive sentences does violence to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Boykin, supra. The Supreme Court of Arizona has refuted this allegation. In State v. Young, 106 Ariz. 589, 480 P.2d 345 (1971), that court expressly held that the failure to advise of the possibility of consecutive sentences does not violate the principles enunciated in Boykin, supra.
Followed in State v. Gordon, 610 P.2d 59 (Ariz.1980). Alabama Code 1975, Section 14-3-38 requires all sentences to run consecutively unless specifically stated by the trial court to run concurrently.
Following the decision announced in Young, supr...
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