Shelton v. Lee

• Decision Date: 05 July 2016
• Docket Number: S16A0106
• Parties: Shelton v. Lee.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

299 Ga. 350

788 S.E.2d 369

Shelton

v.Lee.

S16A0106

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: July 5, 2016

Sarah L. Gerwig–Moore, Mercer Law School, Stuart Ellis Walker, Martin Snow, LLP, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Clint Christopher Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

BENHAM

, Justice.

Appellant William Lee Shelton was tried by a jury in the Pike County Superior Court and convicted of malice murder and robbery by force. He was sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal in 2005, this Court affirmed Shelton's convictions and rejected, among other things, an evidentiary challenge to venue in Pike County, because, even though conflicting evidence was presented regarding where the injury causing death was inflicted, the body was discovered there. Thus, we concluded, the evidence was sufficient to establish venue in Pike County beyond a reasonable doubt. Shelton v. State , 279 Ga. 161, 162–163, 611 S.E.2d 11 (2005)

.

On July 11, 2013, Shelton filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he asserted that his due process rights were violated by the instruction to the jury which closely tracked language found in OCGA § 17–2–2 (c)

, that “where it cannot be readily determined in which county the cause of death was inflicted, it shall be considered that the cause of death was inflicted in the county in which the dead body was discovered.”¹ Shelton argued that this language instructed the jury to consider the cause of death to have occurred where the body was found and unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving venue to the defendant. The habeas court found this issue was barred by res judicata because the issue of whether venue was established in Pike County was raised and ruled upon in the direct appeal.

1. We agree with Shelton that a due process challenge to the jury instruction on venue was neither raised nor ruled upon in his direct appeal. In Shelton's direct appeal, this Court addressed only the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to venue. Shelton v. State , supra.

The warden concedes that the habeas court's finding that this ground for habeas relief was barred by res judicata was erroneous. In a habeas corpus proceeding, res judicata bars only those issues actually litigated and decided on direct appeal. See Schofield v. Palmer , 279 Ga. 848, 851, 621 S.E.2d 726 (2005) (a claim that was not raised in earlier proceedings is not procedurally barred for habeas corpus review). Although we conclude the habeas court erred in finding Shelton's due process challenge was barred by res judicata, we nevertheless decide, for the reasons that follow, that the habeas court reached the right result in denying habeas relief. As a result, the habeas court's denial of relief on this ground is hereby affirmed under the right for any reason rule. See Tolbert v. Toole , 296 Ga. 357, 362, 767 S.E.2d 24 (2014) (finding the habeas court reached the correct result in denying habeas relief even though based upon an improper factual assumption). In fact, Shelton's due process challenge to the jury instructions at his trial is procedurally defaulted because he has failed to show cause for his noncompliance with the requirement that he assert this challenge on direct appeal, as well as actual prejudice as a result of such noncompliance. See § 9–14–48 (d); Chatman v. Mancill , 278 Ga. 488, 489, 604 S.E.2d 154 (2004)

.

2. (a) Shelton asserted in his amended petition for habeas relief that the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Owens v. McLaughlin²

established a change in the law in his favor that would allow him to overcome his procedural default. See Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557, 784 S.E.2d 341 (2016) ; Bruce v. Smith , 274 Ga. 432, 553 S.E.2d 808 (2001). Because we conclude the Eleventh Circuit's opinion misunderstands Georgia's substantive law of venue, we disapprove that court's conclusion that a jury instruction based upon the language used in OCGA § 17–2–2 (c), like the one given in this case, unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof with respect to venue. Properly understood, the jury instructions given in this case did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof with respect to venue to the defendant. They accurately instructed the jury on the substantive Georgia law of venue in a case such as this one where it is not readily apparent where the crime was committed. Accordingly, Shelton fails to show he is entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

(b) The Eleventh Circuit in its Owens

opinion noted that this Court “has repeatedly held that the instruction given here does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof.” 733 F.3d at 326 (III)(A) (citing this Court's opinion in Owens's direct appeal, Owens v. State , 286 Ga. 821, 827, 693 S.E.2d 490 (2010) ; Edmond v. State , 283 Ga. 507, 661 S.E.2d 520 (2008) ; and Napier v. State , 276 Ga. 769, 583 S.E.2d 825 (2003) ). The instruction given in the Owens case was substantially identical to the one given to Shelton's jury: where it cannot readily be determined in what county the cause of death was inflicted “it shall be considered that the cause of death was inflicted in the county in which the dead body was discovered.” Owens v. McLaughlin , supra, 733 F.3d at 325(III)(A). Because the Eleventh Circuit found that the “shall be considered” language suggests a mandatory presumption that effectively relieved the state of the burden of proof on the issue of venue, it found the instruction had violated Owens's constitutional rights. In arriving at this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit found that the instruction given to Owens's jury on venue violated the rule in Sandstrom³ that a jury instruction violates the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment if it creates a presumption that shifts to the defendant the burden of proof of an element of the crime charged. As we have in other cases involving substantially similar instructions, but for somewhat different reasons, we conclude again that the instruction given to Shelton's jury did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on the element of venue. Instead, it is our view that the Eleventh Circuit in Owens v. McLaughlin

did not properly construe Georgia's constitutional and statutory law on venue, and therefore it mistakenly concluded that jury instructions based directly on Georgia's venue law improperly shift to the defendant the burden of proof with respect to venue.

Venue, as a matter of constitutional law in Georgia, is “where the crime was committed” and that is where the defendant “shall be tried.” See Const. of 1983 Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI

. (“[A]ll criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, except cases in the superior courts where the judge is satisfied that an impartial jury cannot be obtained in such county.”) But the Constitution does not define where specific crimes are committed. When a crime is clearly complete upon the happening of a single occurrence—usually a single discrete act done with a particular intent or degree of criminal negligence—determining the county in which the crime was committed may be a fairly straightforward task. But in the case of homicide and certain other crimes, that factual determination is not always readily apparent. Homicide crimes, for instance, require both a causal act done with the requisite degree of intent and a resulting death. Those occurrences may happen in different counties, and in such cases the Constitution sets forth no particularized standard for ascertaining in which county the crime was committed. Likewise, the Constitution does not specifically address cases in which a crime occurs upon, or crosses, a state boundary or a county line. Nor does the Constitution address cases in which it is proved that a crime was committed in Georgia, but the county or counties in which the crime was committed are unknown and perhaps unknowable.

The Constitution's venue provision leaves room for the General Assembly to create statutory rules concerning the manner in which a jury should determine where certain crimes were committed. The legislature has done just that in its enactment of OCGA § 17–2–2, subsection (c)

of which concerns venue in homicide cases. This Court has held that OCGA § 17–2–2 does not violate the constitutional mandate. “It merely provides a mechanism by which that mandate can be carried out when the place in which the crime is committed cannot be determined with certainty.” Bundren v. State , 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981). See also Hinton v. State , 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006) (applying Bundren in a homicide case); State v. Mayze , 280 Ga. 5, 10, 622 S.E.2d 836 (2005) (referring to the statute establishing venue in a criminal homicide case as an example of the broad legislative authority of the General Assembly to define where venue lies for certain crimes); Adsitt v. State , 248 Ga. 237 (4), 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981) upholding the constitutionality of OCGA § 17–2–2 (b)

, which establishes where venue lies upon a jury's finding that a crime is committed on or immediately adjacent to the boundary between two counties). Courts in other states have also recognized the authority of the legislature to elaborate upon the state's constitutional provisions relating to venue in special cases like homicides. See, e.g., State v. Krejci , 458 N.W.2d 407, 410–411 (Minn. 1990).

The United States Supreme Court has held that, generally speaking, statutory construction of a state's own law is a matter left to the courts of that state,⁴ and we reiterate that subsection (c) of OCGA § 17–2–2

establishes, as a matter of law, that venue in homicide cases exists where certain events occurred. It does not dictate the county in which a jury must find these events occurred, and thereby the county in which venue lies. Where a specific crime was committed remains an issue of fact to be...