Smith v. Cincinnati

Decision Date06 January 1993
Docket NumberNo. C-910792,C-910792
Citation85 Ohio App.3d 13,619 N.E.2d 46
PartiesSMITH et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF CINCINNATI et al., Appellees. *
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Roger R. Chacksfield, Cincinnati, for appellants.

Fay D. Dupuis, City Sol., and Mark C. Vollman, Cincinnati, for appellees, Cincinnati and Scott Johnson, Cincinnati, City Manager.

PER CURIAM.

On May 5, 1987, plaintiffs-appellants, nine police officers holding ranks below that of sergeant in the Cincinnati Police Division, 1 filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas alleging that defendants-appellees had violated certain provisions of the consent decree entered August 13, 1981, in United States of America v. City of Cincinnati, Civil No. C-1-80-369, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division. Appellants claimed that as a result of appellees' violations of the consent decree, specifically, the failure lawfully to determine and post a notice of complement, they were denied promotions to the rank of sergeant guaranteed by Ohio's civil service laws. Appellants requested a declaration of "the rights, duties, obligations and status of the parties as related to their individual claims for promotion to the rank of police sergeant in the Cincinnati Police Division." Appellees filed a petition for removal to the federal district court which was granted.

Subsequent to the removal of the case to the federal district court, appellants' original counsel withdrew and present counsel was substituted. An amended complaint for declaratory judgment was filed alleging (1) violations by appellees of the consent decree; (2) bad faith on the part of appellees in "knowingly, intentionally and illegally" manipulating the sergeants' complement; (3) violations by appellees of Ohio's civil service laws; and (4) violations by appellees of R.C. 737.05. Appellants requested a declaration as to their promotional rights under the consent decree and Ohio's civil service laws, the legality of appellees' reduction of the sergeants' complement, the proper number of officers to be included in the complement, and the "person, persons or source" authorized to establish and to alter the complement pursuant to R.C. 737.05.

Following a bench trial, the district judge dismissed appellants' complaint for declaratory judgment, finding that appellees had not violated the consent decree and that the litigation was "essentially a collateral attack upon the consent decree." Appellants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (1991), 929 F.2d 702, which remanded the case to the district court for the resolution of certain questions of state law which had not been addressed. The state-law issues included (1) whether the notice of complement was posted as required by the consent decree; (2) what effect the failure to post the notice of complement would have on compliance by appellees with Ohio's civil service laws; (3) what entity has the authority to establish the sergeants' complement; (4) what method was used to set the complement at one hundred fifteen on November 3, 1982; (5) whether the method used to set the complement violated state law; and (6) whether appellees violated R.C. 124.37, which requires demotion through rank rather than attrition to abolish positions. Upon remand, the district court returned the case to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas for resolution of the remaining state-law issues.

Following the return of the case to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, the court framed the remaining state-law issues as follows:

"(1) Whether the City properly set the complement for the number of sergeants at 115 on November 3, 1982; and

"(2) Whether the personnel actions taken in regard to the sergeants' complement by the City were valid."

Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court's judgment entry states:

"The City properly set the complement for the rank of sergeant for all times relevant per the consent decree which clearly controls the subject, and to which the FOP agreed. Even if the City failed to post the notice of complement in some locations, such failure has no effect on the setting of the complement.

"It is the Court's view that the City's personnel actions in regard to the sergeants' complement were authorized by the consent decree and not violative of Ohio civil service law. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the City acted in accordance with the existing law including Hungler v. Cincinnati (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 338 [25 OBR 392, 496 N.E.2d 912] as interpreted by the First District Court of Appeals for Hamilton County and as it existed at the time of their actions."

Appellants timely appealed. Appellants' sole assignment of error alleges the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.

At the time the consent decree was entered, the sergeants' complement was one hundred twenty-seven. Subsequently, appellees prepared a notice of complement setting the sergeants' complement at one hundred fifteen effective November 3, 1982. The number of sergeants was allowed to decrease through attrition to one hundred fifteen by July 28, 1985. On August 6, 1985, an eligibility examination was held. The sergeants' complement was determined to be full on September 10, 1986, and no further promotions were made. As of that time, the complement had been raised by appellees to one hundred twenty. Appellants allege that the sergeants' complement was illegally reduced by appellees and that the correct complement of sergeants was one hundred twenty-seven. Therefore appellants allege, the next seven people in line plus two minority "double fills," the nine plaintiffs-appellants, should have been promoted.

Appellants argue that the sergeants' complement was unlawfully set in violation of R.C. 737.05 and the Charter of the city of Cincinnati. R.C. 737.05 provides in pertinent part:

"The police department of each city shall be composed of a chief of police and such other officers, patrolmen, and employees as the legislative authority thereof provides by ordinance."

The Charter of the city of Cincinnati, Section 5, Article V, provides for seven ranks in the police force: Chief, Assistant Chief, Captain, Lieutenant, Sergeant, Patrolman and Recruit. Further, the charter vests all legislative powers in the city council pursuant to Section 1, Article II. Section 3, Article V of the charter states in part:

"Except as provided in this charter the council shall have no power to modify the provisions of the laws of the state of Ohio now or hereafter in effect relating to the civil service and civil service commission."

Normally, the authority to create and fund the ranks in the police department rests in the legislative authority of the city. See State ex rel. McClure v. George (1945), 145 Ohio St. 187, 30 O.O. 378, 61 N.E.2d 87; Atwood v. Judge (1977), 63 Ohio App.2d 94, 17 O.O.3d 289, 409 N.E.2d 1022. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a position in the police or fire department is created only when the number of positions in that rank is increased by ordinance and council makes a specific appropriation to fund the position. State ex rel. Pell v. Westlake (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 360, 18 O.O.3d 514, 415 N.E.2d 289; State ex rel. Finn v. Garfield Hts. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 5, 63 O.O.2d 3, 295 N.E.2d 197. The power to create a civil service position includes the power to abolish it. Weston v. Ferguson (1983), 8 Ohio St.3d 52, 8 OBR 523, 457 N.E.2d 818.

In the case sub judice, Captain Michael Hines, who was assigned to the police personnel section of the Cincinnati Police Division, testified that the notice of complement which was to be posted by July 1, 1982, designated one hundred fifteen as the authorized sergeants' complement effective November 3, 1982. That number was given to Captain Hines by Carl Lind, the head of the police division office of budget and coordination. Captain Hines testified that one hundred fifteen was a projected figure, and that the actual number of sergeants in the complement could change throughout the budget process. For example, the sergeants' complement which was initially projected at one hundred fifteen was actually funded for one hundred twenty sergeants.

David Rager, Assistant Director of Safety for the city of Cincinnati, testified that he is responsible for presenting a balanced budget to the city manager and ultimately, to city council. A summary budget form, which shows the total number of positions that would be funded based upon a "base budget" recommended by the city manager, is made available to council for review. A "discretionary budget" is also prepared. The city manager recommends the amount of funds to be spent on the police division, but council makes the final decision on the amount to be included in the budget. Council must also decide whether to fund the items listed in the "discretionary budget" through additional revenue.

Rager testified that council must approve the structure of the Cincinnati Police Division in terms of funding a certain number of officers in each rank. For example, if the police chief wishes to fund one more lieutenant position and two fewer sergeant positions, he must go to council for the authority to change the structure even though the change may not have an impact on the budget.

The record establishes that Cincinnati City Council ultimately sets the budget and structure, including the number of positions funded, for the Cincinnati Police Division. We hold that council has not illegally delegated its authority under R.C. 737.05 and the Charter of the city of Cincinnati to create and fund the ranks of the Cincinnati Police Division.

Appellants also argue that the sergeants' complement, set at one hundred twenty-seven in the consent decree, was illegally reduced...

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    ...64 Ohio St.2d 360, 415 N.E.2d 289; State ex rel. Finn v. Garfield Hts. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 5, 295 N.E.2d 197. However, upon reviewing Smith and the cases upon which that language is based, we agree with the trial court that the language is obiter dictum, as the cases cited in Smith do not......
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    ...a civil service position includes the power to abolish it. Weston v. Ferguson (1983), 8 Ohio St.3d 52 ." Smith v. Cincinnati , 85 Ohio App.3d 13, 17, 619 N.E.2d 46 (1st Dist.1993).{¶13} A review of the relevant case law establishes that when a city does not have a charter, disputes as to th......
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    ...would follow the abolishment. See Hungler v. Cincinnati (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 338, 25 OBR 392, 496 N.E.2d 912; Smith v. Cincinnati (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 13, 619 N.E.2d 46. In this case, there is no dispute that the proper promotion, demotion and layoff procedures set forth in R.C. 124.37 w......
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