Smith v. Luber

• Decision Date: 03 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2291 September Term, 2004.,2291 September Term, 2004.
• Citation: 885 A.2d 894,165 Md. App. 458
• Parties: Jonathan Scott SMITH v. Linda Cheryl LUBER.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

885 A.2d 894

165 Md. App. 458

Jonathan Scott SMITH v. Linda Cheryl LUBER.

No. .

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

November 3, 2005.

Jonathan Smith (Pro Se, on the brief), Columbia, for Appellant.

Linda C. Luber (Pro Se, on the brief), Woodstock, for Appellee.

Panel: DAVIS, KRAUSER and BARBERA, JJ.

DAVIS, Judge.

In this appeal, we are called upon to reiterate the oft-stated essence and character of a consent decree; that, despite the imprimatur conveyed by the endorsement affixed to the decree by the court, it derives its legal efficacy from the consent of the parties. Jonathan S. Smith, appellant, a Maryland lawyer, appeals from the entry of a judgment of absolute divorce and the entry of an Order of Court Reflecting Agreements of the Parties, entered on May 7, 2004, by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Appellant also appeals from the Order of the court denying his Amended Motion to Vacate or, Alternatively, to Alter, Amend, or Revise Order and Judgment, entered on November 15, 2004. Appellant presents two issues for our review, which we rephrase as follows:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by entering the Order of Court Reflecting the Parties' Agreement when the Order failed to accurately reflect the agreement of the parties?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion and amended motion to vacate or, alternatively, to alter, amend, or revise Order and judgment?

We answer the first question in the affirmative. Accordingly, we vacate the Order of the circuit court and remand with instructions to revise the court's Order and enter an Order that accurately reflects the agreement the parties have consented to on the record.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter involves a contentious divorce between appellant and appellee, Linda C. Luber. On February 15, 2002, appellant filed for a limited divorce, citing constructive desertion on the part of appellee as the grounds in the Circuit Court for Howard County, where appellant is a practicing attorney. Appellee's counter-complaint for limited divorce, on the grounds of abandonment and desertion, was filed on March 18, 2002. After the filing of several motions and other documents in that court, appellant filed a motion requesting that the case be transferred to Anne Arundel County due to his personal and professional relationships in Howard County. After all of the judges in Howard County recused themselves, the administrative judge signed the Order transferring the case on May 13, 2002 to Anne Arundel County.

The parties filed voluminous pleadings and documents with the court, eventually reaching an agreement with respect to support and visitation of their minor child. The remaining issues to be resolved at trial involved the disposition of their substantial financial and property holdings. The case proceeded to trial on the merits on November 17, 2003, and continued for eight days. During the course of the trial, the parties reached agreement on some of the issues and those agreements were placed on the record. On November 25, 2003, the parties reached an agreement as to the remaining issues, which ended the litigation. The remaining agreements reached by the parties were entered into the record in open court. Both parties were asked qualifying questions by their attorneys about their acceptance of the agreement on the record and both acknowledged their acceptance.

The following day, the parties returned to court to enter the findings of fact regarding the grounds for divorce into the record. The court granted the parties' request to sign the divorce decree after January 1, 2004, in order that they may file joint tax returns and take advantage of capital gains and losses resulting from the sale of certain assets under their agreement. The trial court requested that the parties reduce the agreement to writing as it was read into the record, and it was further agreed that the parties would submit to the court for signing the written agreement as a Consent Property Agreement. Counsel for appellee volunteered to draft the consent property agreement for submission to the court.

Thereafter, counsel for appellee prepared a draft consent agreement, which was submitted to counsel for appellant for review. Upon reviewing the agreement, counsel for appellant rejected the document on the grounds that it failed to accurately reflect the agreement as it was entered into the record. By letter dated December 9, 2003, counsel for appellant suggested ordering the transcripts and attaching them to a brief consent order, because the attached transcripts accurately reflected the agreement of the parties. By letter dated December 10, 2003, counsel for appellee rejected the suggestion to attach the transcript, preferring to have exact language in a written consent agreement, to avoid further litigation. On December 15, 2003, appellant's counsel forwarded a seven-page letter outlining appellant's issues with the consent order as submitted by appellee's counsel. On December 17, 2003, appellee's counsel submitted a revised consent order to appellant detailing the changes made and corrections to the order. By letter dated December 19, 2003, counsel for appellee submitted a letter to the court documenting the consternation of the parties surrounding the language of the consent order. There was then a letter submitted to the court by appellant's counsel, on December 23, 2003, in response to the December 19, 2003 letter, notifying the court that appellant refused to accept the agreement as written. Appellee's brief mentions other letters exchanged between the parties; however, none was included in the record and therefore they are not available for the court to review.

On May 5, 2004, appellee's counsel again wrote to the court. In that letter, it was explained that the sale of the marital home was to be settled on May 14, 2004; the letter also requested the court to do what it could to provide the parties with a decree in a timely fashion. On May 7, 2004, appellant's counsel notified the court by letter of the continuing objection to the consent order submitted by appellee for its failure to accurately reflect the agreement of the parties. He also requested that the court execute the consent order and divorce decree attached to their letter.

The court executed the Order of Court Reflecting Agreements of the parties, along with the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, on May 7, 2004. Appellant filed an Amended Motion to Vacate or, Alternatively, to Alter, Amend, or Revise Order and Judgment on June 23, 2004. Appellee filed a response to appellant's motion and, on November 15, 2004, the court issued a memorandum opinion. In the opinion, the court concluded that the Order of May 7, 2004 accurately and properly reflected the agreement of the parties and the Order shall remain in full force and effect. Appellant filed this timely appeal.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by entering the Order of Court Reflecting Agreements of the Parties because the Order does not accurately reflect the parties' agreement. Appellant also asserts the Order was entered without his consent and over his repeated objections. We have said that abuse of discretion occurs

"where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court"; or "when the court acts without any guiding rules or principles." It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration "appears to have been made on untenable grounds," when the ruling is "clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court," when the ruling is "clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result," when the ruling is "violative of fact and logic," or when it constitutes an "untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice."

Das v. Das, 133 Md.App. 1, 15-16, 754 A.2d 441 (2000)(citing North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13-14, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994)) (citations omitted). We afford the trial judge's decision making wide latitude under the abuse of discretion standard. See Das, 133 Md.App. at 15,

754 A.2d 441. Our case law makes clear that we will only reverse a decision of the trial court on review for abuse of discretion where "justice has not been done," and "there is a grave reason for doing so." Das, 133 Md. App. at 16,

754 A.2d 441 (citing Wormwood v. Batching Systems, Inc., 124 Md.App. 695, 700, 723 A.2d 568 (1999)). We will not reverse simply because we would not have made the same ruling as the trial court. See North, 102 Md.App. at 14,

648 A.2d 1025.

Under consideration in this appeal is the parties' settlement agreement. Settlement agreements are looked upon favorably by courts because they further the interest of efficient and economical administration of justice and the lessening of friction and acrimony. Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md.App. 359, 361, 370 A.2d 577 (1977) (citing Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550, 248 A.2d 373 (1968)). A consent judgment or decree has been defined as "an agreement of the parties with respect to the resolution of the issues in the case or in settlement of the case, that has been embodied in a court order and entered by the court, thus evidencing its acceptance by the court." Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 82, 807 A.2d 1 (2002) (citing Jones v. Hubbard, 356 Md. 513, 529, 740 A.2d 1004 (1999); Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 478, 610 A.2d 770 (1992)).

The settlement agreement in this case was entered on the record in open court and acknowledged by the parties. The agreement was comprehensive with respect to issues in the case and effectively ended the litigation. The court accepted the agreement and requested appellee's counsel to reduce the agreement to writing and submit it to the court as a Consent Order. Appellant does not challenge the fact that he entered into an agreement which is binding, but whether the...