Sneiderman v. State
Decision Date | 11 March 2016 |
Docket Number | No. A15A1774.,A15A1774. |
Citation | 784 S.E.2d 18,336 Ga.App. 153 |
Parties | SNEIDERMAN v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Brian Steel, Atlanta, for Appellant.
Anna Green Cross, for Appellee.
, Presiding Judge.
Andrea Sneiderman appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of hindering the apprehension of a criminal in violation of OCGA § 16–10–50
(count 1); concealing a material fact from the Dunwoody Police Department in violation of OCGA § 16–10–20 (count 2); three counts of making a false statement to the Dunwoody Police Department in violation of OCGA § 16–10–20 (counts 3, 8, and 10); and perjury in violation of OCGA § 16–10–70 (count 6). The charges stemmed from the November 2010 shooting death of Sneiderman's husband; Sneiderman's conduct during the Dunwoody Police Department's investigation of the fatal shooting; and Sneiderman's testimony during the February 2012 murder trial of Hemy Neuman, who was her workplace supervisor at the time of the shooting. At the murder trial, Neuman admitted that he had an affair with Andrea Sneiderman; that he planned to murder her husband; and that he shot and killed her husband, Russell Sneiderman. Neuman v. State, 297 Ga. 501, 501, 773 S.E.2d 716 (2015).1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
1. Sneiderman contends that the trial court erred by denying her general demurrer, filed during the jury trial, in which she asserted that counts 1 and 2 of the indictment were void because they failed to allege all the essential elements of the charged crimes.
"A general demurrer challenges the very validity of the indictment and may be raised anytime...." State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 485, 238 S.E.2d 38 (1977)
. "An indictment is void to the extent that it fails to allege all the essential elements of the crime or crimes charged." Henderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 538, 697 S.E.2d 798 (2010). The rule that a grand jury indictment must set forth all the essential elements of the charged offense serves to satisfy the Six Amendment's due process requirement that the defendant "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," and the Fifth Amendment's indictment requirement ensuring that a grand jury return an indictment only when it finds probable cause to support all the essential elements of the offense. Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 54–55, 464 S.E.2d 198 (1995).
As to count 1, Sneiderman claims the indictment was void for failing to allege the essential mens rea or intent element contained in the charged offense under OCGA § 16–10–50
. The relevant portions of OCGA § 16–10–50 provide that:
] is an intent to hinder the apprehension or punishment of a person who the actor knows or has reason to believe is either (1) a felon, (2) an escaped inmate, or (3) an escaped prisoner." Robert E. Cleary, Jr., Kurtz Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Georgia, (I) Impending Arrest or Prosecution, (II)(A) (2014 ed.). Sneiderman contends that count 1 is void because it failed to expressly charge the essential mens rea element of OCGA § 16–10–50 that she intended to hinder the apprehension or punishment of Neuman who she knew or had reason to believe was a felon.
We find that count 1 of the indictment sufficiently set forth the essential mens rea element of OCGA § 16–10–50
. Count 1's express reference to OCGA § 16–10–50 on which the charge was based, along with the other factual allegations, adequately informed Sneiderman of the charged offense. State v. Howell, 194 Ga.App. 594, 595, 391 S.E.2d 415 (1990). Moreover, count 1 further alleged that Sneiderman "did knowingly and willfully conceal facts and destroy evidence of Hemy Neuman's guilt in the murder of Russell Sneiderman, which she knew was evidence of the crime of Murder...." These allegations necessarily raised an inference that Sneiderman acted with the intent required under OCGA § 16–10–50 to hinder the apprehension or punishment of Neuman who she knew was a felon. The failure to expressly allege the essential element of mens rea or intent does not render an indictment defective "where the indictment employs language that necessarily raises an inference that the requisite criminal intent existed." Morris v. State, 310 Ga.App. 126, 130, 712 S.E.2d 130 (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted); Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 861, 204 S.E.2d 603 (1974). It follows that the allegations of count 1 warranted an inference that the grand jury found probable cause to support the essential mens rea element contained in OCGA § 16–10–50. The trial court did not err by denying the general demurrer to count 1.
As to count 2, Sneiderman claims the indictment was void for failing to allege the essential element of materiality contained in the charged offense under OCGA § 16–10–20
. The relevant portions of OCGA § 16–10–20 provide as follows:
for the said accused person, in the County of DeKalb and State of Georgia, on or about the 24th day of November, 2010, did knowingly and willfully conceal from representatives of the Dunwoody Police Department the existence of a romantic relationship between herself and Hemy Neuman, while that Department was conducting an official investigation into the murder of Russell Sneiderman.
Because count 2 involved the portion of OCGA § 16–10–20
dealing with concealment of a fact, an essential element of the offense was proof that the concealed fact was material in a matter within the jurisdiction of the alleged department or agency. Kurtz, supra, at (P) Perjury and Related Crimes, (IX) (2014 ed.). Sneiderman contends that count 2 is void because it failed to expressly charge that the concealed fact (a romantic relationship between herself and Neuman) was material to decisions of the Dunwoody Police Department in its investigation into the murder of Russell Sneiderman.
We find that count 2 sufficiently set forth the essential element of materiality contained in OCGA § 16–10–20
. Count 2 alleged that, in violation of OCGA § 16–10–20, Andrea Sneiderman had a romantic relationship with Neuman, and that, while the Dunwoody Police Department (DPD) was conducting an investigation into the murder of Russell Sneiderman, she knowingly and willfully concealed that relationship from DPD representatives. Count 2's express reference to OCGA § 16–10–20 on which the charge was based, along with the other factual allegations, adequately informed Sneiderman of the charged offense. Howell, 194 Ga.App. at 595, 391 S.E.2d 415. Although count 2 did not expressly allege that the concealed relationship was material to decisions of the DPD in its murder investigation, the failure to expressly allege the essential element of materiality in OCGA § 16–10–20 did not render the indictment defective because the language of the indictment necessarily raised an inference of the requisite materiality. Morris, 310 Ga.App. at 130, 712 S.E.2d 130 ;
; see United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir.1975) ( ). The allegations that Sneiderman "knowingly and willfully" concealed her romantic relationship with Neuman from DPD representatives while the DPD was investigating the murder of Russell Sneiderman necessarily raised an inference that she acted intentionally to conceal that fact from the DPD representatives with knowledge that the fact was material (i.e. of consequence) to the investigation. See Byrd v. State, 216 Ga.App. 316, 318, 454 S.E.2d 594 (1995) ( ). Accordingly, the allegations of count 2 warrant an inference that the grand jury found probable cause to support the essential element of materiality contained in the offense charged under OCGA § 16–10–20. The trial court did not err by denying the general demurrer to count 2.
2. Sneiderman contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts on counts 8 and 10.
Count 8 charged that Sneiderman...
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