State v. Howell, A89A2219
| Decision Date | 05 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. A89A2219,A89A2219 |
| Parties | The STATE v. HOWELL. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Ken Stula, Sol. and Kip Shepherd, Asst. Sol., for appellant.
James W. Smith, for appellee.
Appellee was brought to trial on an accusation which alleged, in relevant part, that he "did give his name as being Mark Ryan, a false name[,] to William Jones[,] a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties[,] ... in violation of OCGA Section 16-10-25." The jury found appellee guilty and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence on the guilty verdict. Appellee then filed a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the accusation had failed to allege that he had given a false name to the law enforcement officer with the specific intent of misleading the officer. The trial court granted appellee's motion in arrest of judgment and the State appeals.
Martin v. State, 96 Ga.App. 557, 558(1), 100 S.E.2d 645 (1957). To constitute a crime, giving a false name to a law enforcement officer must be accompanied by the specific intent to mislead the officer. The accusation upon which appellee was tried did not expressly allege that appellee had given a false name to the law enforcement officer with that specific intent. The accusation did, however, expressly allege that appellee had given a false name to the law enforcement officer "in violation of OCGA Section 16-10-25." Compare Ponder v. State, 121 Ga.App. 788, 175 S.E.2d 55 (1970); Hilliard v. State, 87 Ga.App. 769, 75 S.E.2d 173 (1953); Rambo v. State, 25 Ga.App. 390, 103 S.E. 494 (1920). Thus, the accusation in effect incorporated the terms of the applicable code section that appellee was charged with having violated. Appellee could not admit the allegation that his acts were "in violation of OCGA Section 16-10-25," and yet not be guilty of the offense of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer. Compare Hilliard v. State, supra; Dukes v. State, 9 Ga.App. 537, 71 S.E. 921 (1911).
(Emphasis supplied.) Wages v. State, 165 Ga.App. 587, 588(2), 302 S.E.2d 112 (1983). Considering the factual allegations and the specific incorporation by reference of OCGA § 16-10-25, appellee cannot be heard to contend that he was not sufficiently apprised of the elements of the offense he was charged with having committed, even though the element of the specific intent to mislead the officer was not otherwise expressly alleged. See Rowles v. State, 143 Ga.App. 553, 554(1b), 239 S.E.2d 164 (1977). ...
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