Snyder v. Snyder
| Decision Date | 23 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 43691,43691 |
| Parties | Richard A. SNYDER, Appellant, v. Mavis A. SNYDER, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In a divorce proceeding where the court makes a disposition of jointly owned property providing that the wife shall have the right to possession until sale and that upon sale the net equity shall be divided equally between the parties, the joint tenancy is severed by the decree and the parties hold title to the property as tenants in common unless the decree specifically provides that they shall hold title as joint tenants and not as tenants in common.
2. When a divorce decree does not specifically provide for payment by one spouse of future medical expenses of the other, the trial court may not subsequently order the retroactive payment by the one of medical expenses incurred by the other spouse subsequent to the original decree.
3. In the interest of finality of divorce decrees and the establishment of economic certainty for the paying spouse, it is suggested that the trial court in ordering the payment of future medical expenses of the other spouse limit the obligation to the procurement of hospitalization and medical insurance. If the spouse for whom the other is to pay such expenses is uninsurable the court should consider other alternatives.
4. The record in this case does not justify an increase in alimony from $350 per month to $400 per month. However, on remand evidence may be taken as to additional changes in circumstances and evidence should be received as to whether the original award of alimony included allowance for medical expenses.
Dingle, Suk & Zeigler and Richard Zeigler, Rochester, for appellant.
Tuveson & Goldman and Bob A. Goldman, Albert Lea, for respondent.
Raymond C. Ploetz, Excelsior and Robert H. Meier, St. Paul, amici curiae.
Considered en banc without oral argument.
Plaintiff, Richard A. Snyder, appeals from an amended judgment and decree entered 15 months after the original decree of divorce. The amended decree awarded defendant, Mavis A. Snyder, the homestead of the parties and required plaintiff to pay medical expenses incurred by defendant from the time of the original decree, to pay all future medical expenses of the defendant, and to pay increased monthly alimony. We reverse as to the award of the homestead and the requirement that plaintiff pay the past medical expenses of defendant and remand this matter to the trial court for further consideration.
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced by a judgment and decree entered August 17, 1970. Pursuant to that decree, plaintiff husband was granted custody of the minor child of the parties, the personal property and household goods in his possession, a 1969 Chevrolet automobile, a boat, and certain shares of common stock. Defendant wife was awarded the household goods and personal property in her possession, a 1965 Chevrolet automobile, and $350 per month alimony. In addition, the original decree provided as follows:
The decree further provided that plaintiff should make the mortgage payments and pay the real estate taxes, defendant pay the utilities, and the maintenance and upkeep be divided equally between the parties.
On December 3, 1971, the trial court entered an amended judgment and decree with reference to the homestead property which provided as follows:
'Paragraph VI of the Judgment and Decree dated August 17, 1970, is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows:
In addition, the amended decree increased the alimony payments to $400 per month and required plaintiff to pay medical expenses incurred by defendant in the amount of $1,340.35. These expenses arose from surgery necessitated by an illness not in existence or known by either party at the time of the original decree. The court further ordered that plaintiff should be responsible for all medical expenses of defendant in the future and recommended that plaintiff 'provide a health insurance policy in this regard in his good discretion.' 1
1. The real estate of the parties, subject of the court's actions in both the original and amended decrees, was held in joint tenancy. This court has never directly ruled on the effect of a divorce decree on jointly owned property, although we have expressed several times our concern over the continuance of joint or undivided interests in property following a divorce decree. Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Minn. 181, 169 N.W.2d 595 (1969); Wos v. Wos, 291 Minn. 404, 191 N.W.2d 829 (1971); Leutgers v. Kasten, 295 Minn. 545, 204 N.W.2d 210 (1973).
Historically, joint tenancy arose out of the English common law as one of the means of preserving the right of survivorship and, along with tenancy by the entirety, existed at the time of the founding of our country. Early legislative history in Minnesota discloses an intent, even before the granting of statehood, to limit the use of these common-law estates in real property. Tenancies by the entirety were abolished 2 and estates in joint tenancy were permitted only if there were an express declaration in derogation of tenancies in common. 3 The present statute, Minn.St. 500.19, subd. 2, provides in part as follows:
'All grants and devises of lands, made to two or more persons, shall be construed to create estates in common, and not in joint tenancy, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy.'
Thus, we have an early legislative history showing a preference for tenancy in common with its vesting of undivided interests as opposed to joint tenancy with its transfer of the estate of a tenant upon his death to the surviving joint tenant or tenants. In addition, it is historically true that at the time of this early legislative action divorce was not a common occurrence. This accounts for the lack of specific legislation at that time on the effect of divorce on these estates but obviously does not account for the lack of such legislative action at present.
In Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 238, 41 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1950), we had occasion to comment on the nature of an estate in joint tenancy. We there said:
'The language of the statute must be construed in the light of well-settled rules governing joint tenancy, the severance thereof, liens upon the interest of one of the joint tenants, and the like.
'A joint tenancy is characterized by four unities, viz.,--unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession. If all these continued unsevered, the survivor of the joint tenants becomes the sole owner upon the death of the others. If, however, any one of the unities is destroyed, the jointure is severed, with the consequence that what was a joint tenancy becomes a tenancy in common. Greiger v. Pye, 210 Minn. 71, 297 N.W. 173 (1941); Papke v. Pearson, 203 Minn. 130, 280 N.W. 183 (1938). The jointure may be severed either Voluntarily, as by a conveyance of the interest of a joint tenant (Greiger v. Pye and Papke v. Pearson, Supra); or by a partition by the joint tenants (14 Am.Jur., Cotenancy, § 14); or Involuntarily, as by an execution sale of the interest of a tenant. (14 Am.Jur., Cotenancy, § 14, Supra).
'In order to effect a severance of the jointure, the effect of the act or transaction, whether it is voluntary or involuntary insofar as the joint tenant is concerned, must be to divest him of his estate in joint tenancy.'
Prior to 1951, our case law had held that where the issue of the right to real estate is litigated in a divorce action, a judgment and decree is conclusive and cannot be modified after the time for appeal has expired. In re Petition of Wipper, 176 Minn. 206, 222 N.W. 922 (1929); Anich v. Anich, 217 Minn. 259, 14 N.W.2d 289 (1944). In 1951 the common-law rule was made more specific by L.1951, c. 551, now codified as Minn.St. 518.64:
'* * * Except for an award of the right of occupancy of the homestead, all divisions of real and personal property provided by Sections 5 and 6 of this act (Minn.St. 518.58 and 518.59) shall be final, and subject only to the power of the court to impose a lien or charge thereon at any time while such property, or subsequently acquired property, is owned by the parties or either of them, for the payment of alimony or support money, or to sequester the property as is provided by Section 518.24, Minnesota Statutes of 1949.'
This section is determinative of this case if there had been a 'division' of real property in the court's order and decree of August 17, 1970. The use of the word 'division' in this section is somewhat misleading. Clarification can be found in the language of Minn.St. 518.58, referred to in this section. Section 518.58 provides:
'Upon a divorce for any cause, or upon an annulment, the court may make such disposition of the property of the parties acquired during coverture as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the nature and determination of the issues in the case, the amount of alimony or support money, if any, awarded in the judgment, the manner by which said property was acquired and the persons paying or supplying the consideration therefor, the charges or liens imposed thereon to secure payment of alimony or support money, and all the facts and circumstances of the case.'
This section charges the court with the responsibility for making a just...
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