SP v. BEK
| Decision Date | 07 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 353984, No. 353992 |
| Citation | 339 Mich.App. 171,981 N.W.2d 500 |
| Parties | SP, Petitioner-Appellee, v. BEK, Respondent-Appellant. SP, Petitioner-Appellee, v. BEK, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
The Gallagher Law Firm, PLC (by Shane Hilyard) for respondent.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Stephens and Rick, JJ.
In these consolidated1 personal protection order (PPO) appeals, respondent, BEK, appeals as of right the trial court order denying his motion to terminate the PPOs issued against respondent on behalf of two minor children, HP and RP.2 Respondent argues that MCL 600.2950(26)(b) precludes a court from issuing a PPO on the behalf of a minor child against a respondent who is the parent of the minor child and whose parental rights have been terminated. This is an issue of first impression for this Court and is a matter of statutory interpretation. See MCR 7.215(B)(2). Respondent also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the ex parte PPOs and denying his motion to terminate the PPOs. We affirm.
Petitioner and respondent were previously married and were divorced at the time that the petitions were filed. HP and RP were born to the parties during the marriage.
In 2016, respondent was charged with five counts of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) based on allegations that he had sexually abused the minor children. Although respondent was acquitted of all CSC charges in 2018, child protective proceedings to terminate respondent's parental rights were initiated on the basis of the CSC allegations. In the child protective proceedings, the trial court took jurisdiction over the children and found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interests of the children. Following respondent's acquittal of the CSC charges, his parental rights to both RP and HP were terminated in May 2018.3 Respondent had little to no contact with the minor children between 2015 and 2019 and had no contact with the children from May 2018 until November 2019.
In February 2020, petitioner filed two separate petitions seeking ex parte PPOs against respondent on behalf of RP and HP. In the petitions, petitioner alleged that respondent had attended four of HP's basketball games in November 2019, December 2019, and February 2020. Petitioner asserted that respondent stood up in the stands so that HP would see him during the games and that respondent tried to intimidate HP. Petitioner asserted that the children exhibited mental distress after seeing respondent at the games. The trial court entered an ex parte PPO against respondent on behalf of both minor children.
Respondent moved to terminate the PPOs in March 2020, arguing that the trial court erred by issuing them. Specifically, respondent argued that the PPOs could not be issued against him under MCL 600.2950(26)(b) because he was the parent of the unemancipated minor children protected by the PPOs and that the allegations in the petitions were insufficient to support the issuance of the ex parte PPOs.
Following a motion hearing, the trial court denied respondent's motion to terminate the PPOs. The trial court rejected respondent's argument that the PPOs were improperly granted because of MCL 600.2950(26)(b) and concluded that MCL 600.2950(26)(b) did not preclude it from issuing the PPOs because respondent's parental rights had been terminated. The court also concluded that the ex parte PPOs were appropriately granted.
The granting and continuation of a PPO is "within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Pickering v. Pickering , 253 Mich.App. 694, 700, 659 N.W.2d 649 (2002). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision resulted in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes." Hayford v. Hayford , 279 Mich.App. 324, 325, 760 N.W.2d 503 (2008). A trial court's findings of fact underlying a PPO ruling are reviewed for clear error. Id. "The clear-error standard requires us to give deference to the lower court and find clear error only if we are nevertheless left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Arbor Farms, LLC v. GeoStar Corp. , 305 Mich.App. 374, 386-387, 853 N.W.2d 421 (2014) (cleaned up). Additionally, "regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." MCR 2.613(C). "[T]he trier of fact has the advantage of being able to consider the demeanor of the witnesses in determining how much weight and credibility to accord their testimony." In re Miller , 433 Mich. 331, 337, 445 N.W.2d 161 (1989). Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Hayford , 279 Mich.App. at 325, 760 N.W.2d 503.
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of MCL 600.2950(26)(b). We disagree.
MCL 600.2950 sets forth the criteria under which a trial court may issue a PPO in a "domestic" context. The statute permits the court to restrain or enjoin from taking certain actions the petitioner's spouse, the petitioner's former spouse, an individual with whom the petitioner has had a child in common, an individual with whom the petitioner has or has had a dating relationship, or an individual residing or having resided in the same household as the petitioner. MCL 600.2950(1). Under MCL 600.2950(4), the trial court is required to issue a PPO if it determines that "there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1)."
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of MCL 600.2950(26)(b) because the subsection precluded the trial court from granting the PPOs on these facts.
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Mich. Ed. Ass'n v. Secretary of State (On Rehearing ), 489 Mich. 194, 217, 801 N.W.2d 35 (2011). "[T]he provisions of a statute should be read reasonably and in context." McCahan v. Brennan , 492 Mich. 730, 739, 822 N.W.2d 747 (2012). "[N]othing may be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the act itself." Mich. Ed. Ass'n , 489 Mich. at 218, 801 N.W.2d 35 (cleaned up). "When the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted." Pace v. Edel-Harrelson , 499 Mich. 1, 7, 878 N.W.2d 784 (2016).
However, "[a] provision is not ambiguous just because ‘reasonable minds can differ regarding’ the meaning of the provision."
People v. Gardner , 482 Mich. 41, 50 n. 12, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008), quoting Mayor of Lansing v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 470 Mich. 154, 165, 680 N.W.2d 840 (2004). "Rather, a provision of the law is ambiguous only if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning." Mayor of Lansing , 470 Mich. at 166, 680 N.W.2d 840 (cleaned up). An apparently ambiguous statute can be clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme. MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 308 Mich.App. 362, 370, 863 N.W.2d 387 (2014).
"Where the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, a court must look to the object of the statute in light of the harm it is designed to remedy, and strive to apply a reasonable construction that will best accomplish the Legislature's purpose." Marquis v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand) , 444 Mich. 638, 644, 513 N.W.2d 799 (1994). However, "a court should not abandon the canons of common sense." Id. This Court should avoid any construction that would render any part of a statute surplusage or nugatory. Robinson v. Lansing , 486 Mich. 1, 21, 782 N.W.2d 171 (2010). Further, "[s]tatutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the public interest." McAuley v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 457 Mich. 513, 518, 578 N.W.2d 282 (1998).
MCL 600.2950(26)(b) provides that "[a] court shall not issue a personal protection order that restrains or enjoins conduct described in subsection (1) if ... [t]he petitioner is the unemancipated minor child of the respondent." Although respondent does not dispute that his parental rights to the minor children were terminated, he argues that because he is the natural father or parent of the minor children as defined by MCL 722.1(b), the PPOs were issued in violation of MCL 600.2950(26)(b).
"Minor" and "emancipated" are not defined under MCL 600.2950. However, "[w]hen two statutes or provisions lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that interpretation is controlling." Bloomfield Twp. v. Kane , 302 Mich.App. 170, 176, 839 N.W.2d 505 (2013). "Statutes that address the same subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as a whole." Id. (cleaned up). "The objective of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative purpose as found in statutes addressing a particular subject." Id .
MCL 722.1 et seq. , codifies the "fundamental liberty interest of parents with regard to their children ...." Ryan v. Ryan , 260 Mich.App. 315, 333, 677 N.W.2d 899 (2004). MCL 722.1 provides the following definitions:
Respondent argues that in order for a court to issue a PPO under MCL 600.2950 as it relates to a minor child as petitioner against a respondent parent, the child must be emancipated from both parents, meaning both...
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