Bloomfield Twp. v. Kane

• Decision Date: 13 August 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 308241.
• Citation: 302 Mich.App. 170,839 N.W.2d 505
• Parties: BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP v. KANE.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

302 Mich.App. 170

839 N.W.2d 505

BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP

v.KANE.

Docket No. 308241.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 10, 2013, at Detroit.

Decided Aug. 13, 2013, at 9:05 a.m.

Secrest Wardle, Troy (by Vahan C. Vanerian), for Bloomfield Township.

Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, Ferndale (by Howard I. Wallach), for Jordan Kane.

Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and FITZGERALD and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The prosecution appeals by leave granted the circuit court opinion and order dismissing the charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated ¹ in violation of MCL 257.625(1) and Bloomfield Township Ordinances, § 36–19.² We reverse the judgment of the Oakland Circuit Court and remand this case to the 48th District Court for reinstatement of the charge and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 6, 2010, Officer Steve Sherwood of the Bloomfield Township Police Department was informed of a disabled vehicle on the Interstate–75 business loop at Opdyke Road.³ Upon arriving at the scene, the officer found defendant trying to start the vehicle, which had extensive damage including damage to the driver's side wheels. Defendant informed the officer that he was driving when he suddenly hit the guardrail. The officer noted that defendant had difficulty maintaining his balance and that his speech was impaired. Defendant allegedly told the officer that he takes Ritalin, although he had not taken the drug in some time, but that his mother had given him Xanax, which caused his driving accident. Defendant was transported to a hospital where a blood sample was taken. The lab results indicated that defendant had 250 nanograms of Zolpidem per milliliter of blood in his system. Zolpidem is a sedative used to treat insomnia that is sold under the brand name Ambien. Defendant was initially charged with operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in his system, MCL 257.625(8), but that charge was dismissed, and he was instead charged with operating while intoxicated, specifically while under the influence of a controlled substance, MCL 257.625(1)(a). Defendant moved to dismiss the charges in district court, alleging that Zolpidem was not a controlled substance contained in schedules 1 to 5 of the controlled substances act, MCL 333.7101 et seq. In an affidavit, defendant further asserted that he had mistakenly ingested Zolpidem and, therefore, he did not have the requisite mens rea to support the elements of the offense. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the regulation of Zolpidem by administrative rule was sufficient to support the elements of the offense. The district court did not rule on the mens rea issue. On appeal, the circuit court reversed, holding that Zolpidem was not listed by statute as a controlled substance, and the offense at issue, MCL 257.625(1), did not incorporate the rules promulgated by the Board of Pharmacy; therefore, the prosecution could not establish the elements of the offense of operating a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance. We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. ⁴

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The interpretation and application of a statute presents a question of law that the appellate court reviews de novo. People v. Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich. 6, 12, 825 N.W.2d 554 (2012). “[T]he intent of the Legislature governs the interpretation of legislatively enacted statutes.” People v. Bylsma, 493 Mich. 17, 26, 825 N.W.2d 543 (2012). The intent of the Legislature is expressed in the statute's plain language. People v. Cole, 491 Mich. 325, 330, 817 N.W.2d 497 (2012). When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the Legislature's intent is clearly expressed, and judicial construction is neither permitted nor required. Id. If a statute specifically defines a term, the statutory definition is controlling. People v. Williams, 298 Mich.App. 121, 126, 825 N.W.2d 671 (2012). When “terms are not expressly defined anywhere in the statute, they must be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and the context in which they are used.” Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich. at 13, 825 N.W.2d 554. However, technical words and phrases that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with that meaning. See MCL 8.3a; Bylsma, 493 Mich. at 31, 825 N.W.2d 543. Additionally, when a term is not defined in a statute, the dictionary definition of the term may be consulted or examined. People v. Perkins, 473 Mich. 626, 639, 703 N.W.2d 448 (2005). The court's reliance on dictionary definitions assists the goal of construing undefined terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330–331, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). “However, recourse to dictionary definitions is unnecessary when the Legislature's intent can be determined from reading the statute itself.” People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 563, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001).

When interpreting a statute, the court must avoid a construction that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. People v. Huston, 489 Mich. 451, 462, 802 N.W.2d 261 (2011). “Generally, when language is included in one section of a statute but omitted from another section, it is presumed that the drafters acted intentionally and purposely in their inclusion or exclusion.” People v. Peltola, 489 Mich. 174, 185, 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011). “When the Legislature adopts or incorporates by reference a provision of an existing statute, regulation, or rule, the separate provision that is adopted or incorporated becomes part of the legislative enactment as it existed at the time of the legislation, and any subsequent amendment of the incorporated provision has no effect.” Jager v. Rostagno Trucking Co., Inc., 272 Mich.App. 419, 423, 728 N.W.2d 467 (2006). “The Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of appellate court statutory interpretations, and silence by the Legislature for many years following judicial construction of a statute suggests consent to that construction.” People v. Higuera, 244 Mich.App. 429, 436, 625 N.W.2d 444 (2001) (citation omitted). When two statutes or provisions lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that interpretation is controlling. People v. Ellis, 224 Mich.App. 752, 756, 569 N.W.2d 917 (1997).

Statutes that relate to the same matter are considered to be in pari materia. People v. Perryman, 432 Mich. 235, 240, 439 N.W.2d 243 (1989). “Statutes that address the same subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as a whole.” People v. Harper, 479 Mich. 599, 621, 739 N.W.2d 523 (2007). This general rule of statutory interpretation requires courts to examine the statute at issue in the context of related statutes. Id.

Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things, or which have a common purpose. It is the rule that in construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although enacted at different times, and containing no reference one to the other. [Detroit v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 374 Mich. 543, 558, 132 N.W.2d 660 (1965), overruled on other grounds by City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 475 Mich. 109, 120, 715 N.W.2d 28 (2006).]

When statutes relate to the same subject matter, they must be construed together for purposes of determining legislative intent. Van Antwerp v. Michigan, 334 Mich. 593, 605, 55 N.W.2d 108 (1952). The objective of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative purpose as found in statutes addressing a particular subject. World Book, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury, 459 Mich. 403, 416, 590 N.W.2d 293 (1999). “Conflicting provisions of a statute must be read together to produce an harmonious whole and to reconcile any inconsistencies whenever possible.” Id. at 416, 590 N.W.2d 293. See also Mich. Basic Prop. Ins. Ass'n v. Office of Fin. & Ins. Regulation, 288 Mich.App. 552, 560, 808 N.W.2d 456 (2010).

When the Legislature delegates power to a commissioner, the commissioner is authorized to adopt rules and regulations as the commissioner deems necessary to give effect to the purposes underlying the laws of this state. See American Community Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Ins., 195 Mich.App. 351, 360, 491 N.W.2d 597 (1992). These rules and regulations must be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act.⁵Id. at 360–361, 491 N.W.2d 597. Each agency subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act must adopt rules governing the procedures prescribed or authorized thereby. New Prods. Corp. v. State Hwy. Comm'r, 352 Mich. 73, 79, 88 N.W.2d 528 (1958). “A rule adopted by an agency in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq., is a legislative rule that has the force and effect of law.” Morley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 252 Mich.App. 287, 290, 651 N.W.2d 808 (2002). “Since the adoption of a rule by an agency has the force and effect of law and may have serious consequences of law for many people, the Legislature has [prescribed] an elaborate procedure for rule promulgation.” Detroit Base Coalition for the Human Rights of the Handicapped v. Dep't of Social Servs., 431 Mich. 172, 177, 428 N.W.2d 335 (1988). The rulemaking process includes “public hearings, public participation, notice, approval by the joint committee on administrative rules, and preparation of statements, with intervals between each process.” Id. at 177–178, 428 N.W.2d 335. These requirements were imposed to account for the delegation by legislative bodies to administrative agencies the “authority to make public policy....” Id. at 178, 428 N.W.2d 335....