Speigner v. State, CR-93-1242
Decision Date | 29 December 1994 |
Docket Number | CR-93-1242 |
Citation | 663 So.2d 1024 |
Parties | Nancy Andrews SPEIGNER v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Matthew C. Lamere, Bobbie S. Crook, Dothan, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Robin Blevins, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Nancy Andrews Speigner, pleaded guilty to 15 counts of theft of property in the first degree in violation of § 13A-8-3, Code of Alabama 1975, and 36 counts of theft of property in the second degree in violation of § 13A-8-4, Code of Alabama 1975. She was sentenced to 10 years in the penitentiary on each count, all the sentences to be served concurrently, and she now appeals from each conviction.
The appellant contends that the court did not have jurisdiction to accept her guilty pleas because the statutory period of limitations had expired on some of the counts.
Initially, we observe that the issue of whether the statute of limitations had expired was not presented to the trial court. However, this court has held that "the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional matter." Hines v. State, 516 So.2d 937, 938 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). A guilty plea waives only nonjurisdictional defects. Fuentez v. State, 627 So.2d 1110 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). By pleading guilty to 51 counts, the appellant did not waive his argument concerning the statute of limitations. Thus, this court can review this issue.
First, we must determine the applicable statute of limitations for the offense of theft of property. Theft of property in the first degree and theft of property in the second degree are felonies. Prosecution for a felony must be commenced within three years from the date of the offense. § 15-3-1, Code of Alabama 1975.
The record reflects that in 1987 the appellant was hired as the office manager for Daleville Real Estate Company. In 1992 the owners of the company noticed that they were experiencing a cash flow problem and initiated an audit. It was discovered that the appellant, since the beginning of her employment, had directed that the company bank's statements be mailed to a post office box registered in her name. The 51 counts of theft were based on allegations that the appellant had deposited company checks into her personal account from September 1989 to May 1992. The total amount of those checks exceeded $50,000.
The state contends in its brief that the theft was a continuous transaction and that the statutory limitations period had not run on the last theft that had been committed by the appellant, i.e., the last that check had been deposited to her account. This argument would be meritorious if the appellant was charged with one count of theft that encompassed her conduct. However, the appellant was charged with 51 different counts of theft of property. Each theft was treated as a separate transaction, and the continuous transaction theory, therefore, does not apply here.
The record reflects that the appellant was indicted on October 5, 1992, in two indictments, for 51 counts of theft of property. The indictments reflect that the first instances of theft occurred on September 1, 1989 (theft in second degree), September 9, 1989 (theft in first degree), and October 2, 1989 (theft in second degree). Clearly, action on these offenses was not initiated before the three-year limitations period had expired. Thus, the court was without jurisdiction to accept a plea or to fix sentence as to these three offenses.
Because the circuit court was without jurisdiction to accept the appellant's plea to the three counts that were outside the statutory limitations period, we must reverse the three convictions on these three offenses.
In the interest of judicial economy, we will address the remaining issues, which deal with the 48 remaining counts of theft of property.
The appellant contends that the court failed to comply with Rule 14.4, Ala.R.Crim.P., when accepting her guilty pleas. Rule 14.4, states in part that the court must conduct a colloquy with the defendant for the following purposes:
The record indicates that the appellant told the court that the indictments had been read to her and that she had also read them herself. She was told the minimum and maximum penalty she could receive, and her pleas were a result of an agreement whereby the sentences would be served concurrently and not consecutively. The appellant was also informed of the rights she was giving up by pleading guilty and the consequences of her pleas. The record also contains an explanation of rights form signed by the appellant. Rule 14.4(a)(1), Ala.R.Crim.P., was complied with.
The appellant contends that her pleas violated Rule 14.4(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., because, she says, the court had no factual basis for accepting the plea. "The purpose of requiring the trial judge to determine that there is a factual basis for the plea 'is to ensure the accuracy of the plea through some evidence that a defendant actually committed the offense.' " Alderman v. State, 615 So.2d 640, 647 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), quoting United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992, 995 (10th Cir.1988), remand order withdrawn and plea vacated on rehearing, 866 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir.1989) (en banc). ...
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...the ordinary rules regarding preservation and waiver. See, e.g., Ex parte Campbell, 784 So.2d 323, 325 (Ala.2000) ; Speigner v. State, 663 So.2d 1024 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) ; Hines v. State, 516 So.2d 937 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) ; Cox v. State, 585 So.2d 182 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 503 ......
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