Squire v. City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 17 November 1970
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: John T. SQUIRE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants, Appellants and Respondents. Marguerite A. Warren, Intervener, Respondent and Appellant. Civ. 28870.

Page 347

91 Cal.Rptr. 347

12 Cal.App.3d 974

John T. SQUIRE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants, Appellants and Respondents.

Marguerite A. Warren, Intervener, Respondent and Appellant.

Civ. 28870.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Nov. 17, 1970.

Rosenthal & Leff, Inc., Irwin Leff, San Francisco, for plaintiffs.

City Atty's Office by Thomas A. Toomey, and Edmund Bacigalupi, San Francisco, for defendants.

Victor B. Levit, Allan R. Moltzen, Long & Levit, San Francisco, for intervener.

TAYLOR, Associate Justice.

In a declaratory relief and mandamus action brought by the Transport Workers Union, in its representative capacity, against the City and County of San Francisco, its Mayor, board of supervisors, civil service commission and controller, we are called upon to decide whether the trial court properly interpreted a provision in section 151.3.1 of the Charter of the City and County of San Francisco. Section 151.3.1, submitted to the electorate as Proposition G, approved by the voters in the November 7, 1967 election, and effective July 1, 1968, tied wages and conditions and benefits other than wages of the platform employees and coach and bus operators of the Municipal Railway of the City and County of San Francisco to the 'average of the two highest wage schedules' in comparable systems in the nation. The two highest systems prevailing on July 1 of each year were to be determined by a survey conducted by the civil service commission.

On August 4, 1969, pursuant to the provisions of the section, the civil service commission certified to the board of supervisors systems in Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, as the systems with the two highest wage schedules. The collective bargaining agreements for the systems in Washington and Boston contained provisions for cost-of-living adjustments based on changes in the Consumer Price Index, and the figures submitted by the civil service commission included the cost-of-living adjustments already determined and being paid on July 1, 1969. For fiscal 1968--1969, transit systems in New York, the New York Transit Authority and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, whose collective bargaining agreements contained no provisions for cost-of-living adjustments based on a Consumer Price Index, had been certified as the systems with the two highest wage schedules.

Conditions and benefits other than wages were also tied by provisions of the charter section to the two highest wage schedules. Section 151.3.1(f) provided that, when in the two systems used for certification, vacation, retirement and health service benefits were greater than similar benefits provided by the charter, then an amount not to exceed the difference of such benefits 'may be converted to dollar values and the amount equivalent to these dollar values shall be paid into a fund,' with further provisions for a joint administration of the fund by representatives of the city and the operators. The collective bargaining agreements of the two New York systems, which contained no cost-of-living provisions and upon which wages and conditions and benefits other than wages had been fixed for fiscal 1968--1969, contained provisions for vacation, retirement and health service benefits that were greater than those already being provided under the charter to San Francisco operators, resulting in substantial payments by the city to the fund.

Because the Washington and Boston agreements were not available at the time set for fixing the wage schedule and conditions and benefits other than wages, the civil service commission recommended that the board of supervisors continue in effect conditions and benefits other than wages provided under the collective bargaining agreements of the two New York systems until further information had been obtained ¹ and, basing its estimate on the prior year, estimated the amount to be paid into the fund for fiscal 1969--1970 to be $1,852,393. ²

The controversy began when an examination of the collective bargaining agreements of the systems in Washington and Boston revealed that the conditions and benefits other than wages (retirement, vacation and health service benefits) provided in these agreements Were lower than those already provided by the charter for operators in San Francisco.

At that time, the controller, having already made seven payments totaling $1,080,562 into the fund, received an actuarial study showing that if conditions and benefits other than wages were to be tied to the Washington and Boston agreements, no sum was due to the trust fund, and he thereupon stopped making payments into the fund.

The union then brought this action on behalf of the operators, asking the trial court to declare its rights under the charter section and to provide relief by way of mandamus. Appellant Warren, a resident and a taxpayer, attempted to intervene in a representative capacity on behalf of all the taxpayers in the city and county, but was denied leave to intervene by the trial court.

The trial court ruled that '(T)he definition of 'wage schedule' as used in Section 151.3.1 of the Charter includes only the maximum rate of pay provided in each such wage schedule and does not include cost-of-living adjustments which may be added to the rate of pay * * * (pursuant to) other sections of a collective bargaining agreement' and gave plaintiffs relief by way of mandamus. The city and its officers appeal from this judgment and appellant Warren appeals from the order of the court denying her leave to intervene.

We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying the taxpayer leave to intervene. Intervention is governed by statute (Code Civ.Proc. § 387), and is not a matter of absolute right but is discretionary with the court. We have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant Warren leave to intervene ³ (People By and Through State Lands Commission v. City of Long Beach (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 271, 274, 6 Cal.Rptr. 658; Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 352, 355--356, 285 P.2d 1017; La Mesa etc. Irr. Dist. v. Halley (1925) 195 Cal. 739, 741, 235 P. 999). Furthermore, we have granted the taxpayer permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the city and to be heard orally in this court, and have given every consideration to the legal arguments advanced by her. Thus, since the question here is purely one of law, the taxpayer has experienced substantially the same advantages of representation that intervention would have afforded.

The major question is whether the trial court properly interpreted the relevant provisions of the charter. The interpretation of a charter provision is a proper matter for declaratory relief (Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 636--637, 12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247; Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Com'rs. (1942) 21 Cal.2d 399, 132 P.2d 804; San Bernardino Fire & Police Protection League v. City of San Bernardino (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 401, 417, 18 Cal.Rptr. 757). Plaintiffs having pleaded a cause of action in declaratory relief, the trial court was authorized under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, section 1060 to interpret the disputed charter provisions and to adjudicate this controversy.

The pertinent sections are 151.3.1(b), which provides that the board of supervisors shall fix a 'wage schedule * * * which shall not be in excess of the average of the Two highest wage schedules so certified by the civil service commission,' and 151.3.1(e), which provides that 'the terms Wage schedule and wage schedules wherever used in the section are hereby defined and intended to include Only the maximum rate of pay provided in each such wage schedule.' (Italics added.)

In examining the collective bargaining agreement of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority entered into January 1, 1966, amended by memorandum agreement executed March 27, 1969, effective January 1, 1969, we find a table setting forth basic rates of pay starting on January 1, 1966, with specified increases at yearly and six-month intervals. Another part of the agreement provides that 'the basic rate of wages * * * shall be subject to cost-of-living adjustments' to be determined quarterly in accordance with a formula based on a Consumer Price Index. The terms of the agreement also provide that 'the Basic hourly or weekly wage rates * * * shall not be reduced because of application of the cost-of-living formula.' (Italics added.)

A similar table setting forth basic wage rates with increases at stated intervals and a separate provision for cost-of-living adjustments appear in the agreement of the D.C. Transit System, Inc., effective from November 1, 1966, to October 31, 1969. That agreement also provides that 'the basic wage rates As adjusted shall not be reduced because of the application of the escalator clause as herein provided.' (Italics added.)

It appears, therefore, that the collective bargaining agreements in the systems certified by the civil service...